Opinion
A156066
10-31-2019
In re G.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G.D., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J18-00101)
After appellant admitted committing felony vandalism of a vehicle, the juvenile court placed him on deferred judgment for one to three years and ordered him to pay victim restitution. Though the victim chose to have the car partially repaired for $650, the court set restitution based on the amount of the repair shop estimate, totaling $3,521. Defendant contends the court abused its discretion because the amount of the restitution was not based on the replacement cost or the actual cost of repair. We disagree and affirm.
The victim, a minor, and his mother chose to have the car partially repaired.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
J.T. walked to his car in his high school parking lot, entered, and sat in the driver's seat, waiting for his sister. A large group of "boys" gathered behind his vehicle. Appellant approached J.T.'s window and indicated M.B. wanted to talk to him. J.T. refused, believing this was a tactic to get him to exit the vehicle so M.B. could fight with him. Appellant reached through an open window, unlocked one of the car doors, and opened it. While J.T. was being punched in the face by an unknown male, appellant entered the car and pulled the emergency brake, thereby, preventing J.T. from driving away. Eventually the unknown male and appellant left the vehicle.
J.T.'s sister told a police officer she went to her brother's car after school and observed appellant in the car. She had no idea what was happening but pushed appellant out of the way and entered the vehicle. As her brother drove away, appellant kicked the rear passenger side door and the rear passenger side quarter panel, damaging the car.
The Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a juvenile petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)) charging appellant with battery (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (d)) and vandalism (id., § 594, subd. (b)(1)). Appellant admitted he committed felony vandalism, and on the prosecution's motion, the trial court dismissed the battery charge.
The court placed appellant on deferred entry of judgment for one to three years. At the restitution hearing, the court set restitution to J.T. for damage to his vehicle in the amount of $3,521.
Later, following appellant's admission he violated the terms of his deferred entry of judgment, the court declared him a ward of the court with no termination date, removed him from his parents' custody, and committed him to "the Ranch." The court reiterated the previously imposed victim restitution award.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Sets Restitution
J.T. obtained an estimated cost of repair for the vehicle from Mike's Auto Body in the gross amount of $3,521. The repair shop provided a detailed breakdown of the required parts and labor necessary to restore the vehicle, including removal, installation, repair, refinishing, and installing parts of the rear quarter panel. The insurance company, according to J.T.'s mother, paid them a depreciation value of the vehicle, amounting to $3,521. After deciding to keep the car once it was converted to a salvage title, J.T.'s mother had the vehicle repaired to a more acceptable condition, compensating the Dent Erasers LLC (Dent Erasers) $650 for these repairs.
The net amount was $3,421. It appears the estimate adjusted the gross amount by $100, presumably to reflect the insurance deduction. --------
The request for direct victim restitution from the deputy district attorney asked for $650 in property damage and $65 in "Medical Expense," for a total of $715. One month later, the probation officer received a victim restitution and impact statement response from the victim, requesting as follows: "Dent Erasers—$650.00[;] California State Automobile Association (CSAA)—$100.00 deductible; Kaiser Co-payment—$15.00; and Emergency Room Co-payment—$50.00 for a total claim of $815.00."
In preparation for the restitution hearing the court ordered the parties to file and exchange briefs. Following argument of counsel at the hearing, the court determined, "[I]n my view it's clear that the restitution value is the cost to replace—or to repair the vehicle, and that it's not limited to the value of the vehicle. [¶] So under your analysis and the argument here, I'm convinced that the appropriate value is the value that was assessed when the car was inspected to repair the damage caused, which was the $3,521 as reflected, and I think it's a Mike's Auto Body estimate." After the court stated it was going to follow the prosecutor's recommendation and set restitution in the amount of $3,521, the court elaborated, "And I believe this is a situation where, regardless of what their insurance company paid them, they are entitled to restitution. [¶] I also think your client, as part of the rehabilitative process here, should be held accountable for the amount of loss, which is the damage he inflicted on the vehicle and he admitted that he inflicted when he made the admission to the allegation in the petition."
Analysis
Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by ordering victim restitution of $3,521 because it was not based on the lesser replacement cost or lesser actual cost of repair.
"In 1982, by initiative, the voters of California added a provision to the state Constitution establishing a new constitutional right: the right of every crime victim to obtain restitution from the perpetrator of the crime for losses suffered." (People v. Crow (1993) 6 Cal.4th 952, 956.) This constitutional provision directed the Legislature to enact implementing legislation. (Ibid.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 is one of the implementing statutes. (In re Tommy A. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1580, 1587.) It "governs restitution in cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant to section 602." (In re Johnny M. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1131.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (a)(2) provides in relevant part, that the court, upon finding a minor to be a person described in section 602, "shall order the minor to pay, in addition to any other penalty provided or imposed under the law, . . . the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) Restitution to the victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h)." Section 730.6, subdivision (h) reads in relevant part: "The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record. . . . A restitution order pursuant to [subdivision (a)(2)(B) of section 730.6] . . . shall be of a dollar amount sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for all determined economic losses incurred as the result of the minor's conduct for which the minor was found to be a person described in Section 602, including . . . the following: [¶] . . . Full or partial payment for the value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when repair is possible." (Id., § 730.6, subd. (h)(1)(A).)
We review a juvenile court's restitution order for an abuse of discretion. (In re Johnny M., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 1132.) The purpose of an order for victim restitution is to rehabilitate the minor, deter future delinquent behavior, and make the victim whole by compensating for the victim's economic losses. (In re Brittany L. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1387.) The court may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution, so long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole and provided it is consistent with the purpose of rehabilitation. (Id. at pp. 1391-1392.)
Here, the trial court reasoned the appropriate amount of restitution was the Mike's Auto Body estimate of $3,521, assessed when the car was inspected for total repair of the damage caused by appellant. Appellant does not dispute this estimate. Rather, he complains the court should have set restitution in a lesser amount based on either the Kelly Blue Book replacement cost range of $694 to $1,988, or the actual amount J.T.'s mother paid, $650, to have the car repaired to "a more acceptable condition."
The first question is whether the trial court had discretion to order the greater amount, when the cost to repair the victim's vehicle, based on the Mike's Auto Body estimate, exceeded the replacement cost set out in the Kelly Blue Book range of values. Division Four of this appellate district previously answered this question in the affirmative in the context of a juvenile criminal case in In re Dina V. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 486 (Dina V.). There, the minor was ordered to pay victim restitution in the amount of $4,419.72, the cost of repairing the damaged car. On appeal, the minor argued "the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering an amount of restitution that exceeded the replacement value of the damaged car ($3,000)." (Id. at p. 488.) The appellate court disagreed finding, "Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering an amount of restitution sufficient to pay the costs of repair of the victim's vehicle." (Id. at p. 489.) The court explained that limiting the amount of restitution to the replacement cost "is neither required nor logical." (Ibid.) Putting such a limit on restitution, according to the court, "requires that the victim find a similar vehicle, in similar precrime condition, for sale for the replacement value determined by the court, at the victim's time and expense. Such an onus should not be placed upon the victim. Limiting the amount of restitution to the replacement cost would not make the victim whole." (Ibid.)
As in Dina V., the court in the present matter selected the higher repair cost over the lower replacement cost. Nonetheless, under the rationale of Dina V., the court here was not required to choose the lower of the two values. We agree with Dina V.'s reasoning and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the cost of repair over the replacement cost as a basis for setting the restitution amount. Selecting the Mike's Auto Body estimate made the victim, as in Dina V., whole.
However, this does not end our inquiry. The next question we must answer is whether, as the actual cost of repair, the trial court had discretion to select the higher repair estimate of $3,521, instead of the $650 paid by J.T.'s mother to repair the vehicle to "a more acceptable condition." We again answer the question in the affirmative. As the juvenile court noted with respect to the Dent Erasers $650 repair cost, "[J.T. and his mother] opted to spend [$]650 to repair it only sufficiently to make it operable." (Italics added.) This observation is mirrored in the probation officer's report stating, "After the vehicle was converted to a salvage title, they decided to repair the vehicle to a more acceptable condition and paid the Dent Erasers Company $650 to repair the vehicle." Implicitly, the repairs done by Dent Erasers did not reflect the cost to fully repair the vehicle, whereas the Mike's Auto Body estimate was the sum of the entire actual cost to repair. Restitution must be set at an amount " 'reasonably calculated to make the victim whole.' " (In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1102.) There is no evidence in the record to suggest the Dent Erasers repair made J.T. whole. Appellant is not entitled to a windfall because the victim chose to make his vehicle operable by having a less than complete repair of his car done by the repair shop.
Appellant also ignores the various purposes for the law on restitution. "[A]side from making the victim whole, restitution serves valid punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative objectives by . . . helping [the minor] appreciate the harm done to the victim." (People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1097.) Absolving appellant of the responsibility of paying the entire repair costs simply because J.T. and his mother chose to have the car repaired for a lesser amount adequate to make it operable, would frustrate the deterrent and rehabilitative effect of the restitution statutes. J.T. was entitled to a restitution order that fully reimbursed him for reasonable damages resulting from appellant's criminal conduct and it is immaterial that he did not try to have his vehicle totally repaired.
In short, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting restitution at the higher repair cost estimate.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
MARGULIES, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
HUMES, P. J. /s/_________
BANKE, J.