Opinion
H031834.
1-29-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PAUL GAUWAIN, Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Paul Gauwain appeals from an order extending his involuntary commitment to the California Department of Mental Health under the Mentally Disordered Offenders (MDO) Act. (Pen. Code, § 2970.) He claims that he was denied equal protection because his attorney was allowed to waive a jury trial on the petition to extend his commitment.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We disagree and affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
On May 17, 2007, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a petition to extend defendants involuntary treatment at Napa State Hospital for one-year to July 29, 2008. The petition alleged that defendant had a severe mental disorder, the disorder was not in remission and could not be kept in remission if treatment were discontinued, and defendant posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others. The petition was based on evidence that defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia that rendered him dangerous. At the hearing on the petition, defendants attorney waived defendants personal appearance and a jury trial. Following the hearing, the court found the allegations true and entered an order extending defendants commitment.
DISCUSSION
Defendant notes that under the MDO Act, counsel may waive a defendants statutory right to a jury trial on a commitment petition. (§ 2972; People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825, 830-831.) However, he points out that under the Extended Detention (ED) Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1800), which, like the MDO Act, authorizes the civil commitment of a ward of the Division of Juvenile Facilities who suffers from a mental disorder that render him or her dangerous, counsel may not waive the wards right to a jury trial. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1801.5.) Defendant claims that because an adult facing involuntary commitment under the MDO Act and a ward facing involuntary commitment under the ED Act are similarly situated, and because there is no rational basis for treating them differently, he was denied equal protection in that his attorney was permitted to waive a jury on the recommitment petition. We disagree.
The ED Act allows the state to extend the detention of an adult ward under the jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Facilities (formerly the California Youth Authority) when the ward is determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be physically dangerous to the public because of his or her mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality, which causes the person to have serious difficulty controlling his or her dangerous behavior. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1801.5.) The extended detention is for up to two years. (Id. § 1802.)
A commitment under the ED Act is commenced by petition. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 1800.) The ward is entitled to notice of the petition, a probable cause hearing, and a trial. (Id., §§ 1801, 1801.5.) Trial is by jury unless the right is "personally waived by the person, after he or she has been fully advised of the constitutional rights being waived . . . ." (Id., § 1801.5., italics added.) Defendant acknowledges that this waiver provision has not yet been judicially construed and interprets it to require that the ward must personally waive the jury trial right.
We shall assume for purposes of argument only that defendants interpretation is correct.
Both the state and federal Constitutions provide that no person shall be deprived of equal protection of the laws. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).) A person claiming a violation of equal protection must show that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530.) The threshold question in any equal protection case is whether the groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law being challenged. (In re Lemanuel C. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 33, 47 (Lemanuel).)
In Lemanuel, a ward argued that the ED Act denied him equal protection because it is easier to extend a persons detention under the ED Act than it is to extend the detention of persons under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVP Act) or the MDO Act. The court rejected the claim: "The fact that Youth Authority wards committed under [the ED Act] and adults committed as SVPs or MDOs are considered dangerous due to mental disorders and therefore are subject to commitment for treatment and the protection of the public does not lead to the conclusion that `persons committed under Californias various civil commitment statutes are similarly situated in all respects. They are not. [Citation.] Although [the ED Act] is a civil commitment statute, as are the [SVP Act] and the [MDO Act], the Legislature enacted the adult civil commitment statutes with different purposes in mind than the purpose of the [ED Act] extended detention scheme challenged here." (Lemanuel, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 48.)
Lemanuel pointed out that the SVP Act and MDO Act narrowly target a group of offenders who are labeled based, in part, upon the nature of the underlying conviction, while the ED Act broadly encompasses all youthful offenders without regard to the nature of their crimes. Lemanuel concluded: "Youth Authority wards are distinctly different from more serious adult offenders who have committed violent or sexually violent crimes. The Legislature may `"adopt more than one procedure for isolating, treating, and restraining dangerous persons; and differences will be upheld if justified." [Citation.] [Citation.]" As the Court of Appeal in this case appropriately recognized, `[t]he mere fact that the Legislature has made it more difficult to commit a more serious, adult offender—especially one who faces the stigma of being declared an SVP [or MDO]—does not give rise to an equal protection violation." (Lemanuel, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 48-49.)
The reasoning in Lemanuel applies here. The fact that a ward under the ED Act and an MDO are both considered dangerous due to mental disorders does not mean that they are similarly situated for purposes of an equal protection analysis. It is, arguably, easier to be committed under the ED Act than it is to be committed under the MDO Act. Also, as the Attorney General points out, in contrast to the MDOs underlying conviction, for which defendant had the right to a jury trial that only he could waive (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16; People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47), the wards initial detention is accomplished without the right to a trial by jury, and that right would arise only later in connection with a hearing to extend it. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1805.1; In re Brian J. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 97, 124.)
Moreover, the ED Act covers all wards, regardless of their underlying crimes, which is different from the MDO Act, under which a person may be committed only if his or her mental disorder "was one of the causes of, or an aggravating factor in the commission of the crime for which" he or she was incarcerated. (§ 2960.) Each ED Act commitment hearing can result in a two-year extension of the commitment as opposed to only a one-year commitment under the MDO. Further, there is no requirement under the ED Act that the ward be housed separately from other wards, but it does give the Department of Juvenile Facilities the authority to transfer any ward over 21 years of age to the Department of Corrections for placement in an appropriate facility to protect other persons in the custody of the department. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1802; In re Brian J., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 124.)
In sum, a ward under the ED Act is in a different situation concerning his or her initial and continuing commitment than an MDO Act. Thus, contrary to defendants claim, a ward facing an ED commitment and an adult facing an MDO commitment are not similarly situated, and the Legislature was, therefore, entitled to adopt varying standards for waiving the statutory right to a jury trial in each situation. Accordingly, we reject defendants equal protection claim.
DISPOSITION
The order extending defendants MDO commitment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
PREMO, J.
ELIA, J.