Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. LF009822A
ROBIE, J.
Defendant Victoriano Gauna pled no contest to possession of methamphetamine for sale and appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. He contends the trial court erred when it admitted evidence that was the product of an invalid consent search. We disagree and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2007, Lodi Police Officer Adam Lockie and two other officers went to defendant’s home to investigate an anonymous drug complaint. The door was open. Through the doorway, Officer Lockie saw there were people in the living room, and without entering, asked them if defendant was home. The people in the living room told him that defendant was not home. Defendant then appeared outside the house, walking from the back toward the front door.
Defendant identified himself to Officer Lockie and stated he lived at the house. Officer Lockie explained he was there to investigate a complaint that there was drug dealing at the house. Defendant replied that there were no drug sales at the house, but suggested it might be his neighbors to the north. He stated that he did have a large number of people coming in and out of the house, but they were family members.
Officer Lockie asked defendant if he could enter the house and search his room for drugs or other illegal items. Defendant replied, “Yeah, sure.” Upon entry and a subsequent search, Officer Lockie found methamphetamine. This culminated in defendant’s no contest plea and conviction.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the search was invalid because he was illegally detained and could not give valid consent. We disagree, concluding the search was valid because defendant was not detained prior to his consent to the search.
I
Standard Of Review
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of law whether there has been an unreasonable search and/or seizure.” (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.)
II
Defendant Was Not Illegally Detained During His Initial Conversation With The Police
Defendant argues that “[w]hen Officer Lockie stopped [defendant] in the front yard of his home, he performed a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment.” He contends the presence of the three police officers, and Officer Lockie’s accusation that there was drug dealing at the house, “transform[ed] what might otherwise be a consensual encounter into a detention.” Defendant further argues the detention was illegal, as the officers did not have “specific and articulable facts causing an officer to suspect that some activity relating to crime has taken place and that the person he intends to [detain] is involved in that activity.”
The People contend defendant was not detained. Instead, they characterize it as a “‘knock and talk’ consensual encounter.” They argue that since defendant was not detained, he could therefore give a valid consent.
“A person is detained for purposes of the Fourth Amendment only if ‘in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ [Citations.] ‘“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen[,] may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”’ [Citation.] Approaching a person, requesting to speak with him, asking for permission to search him, or . . . asking if he has a gun, do not transform an otherwise consensual encounter into a detention.” (People v. Coulombe (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 52, 57, fn. 3.)
Defendant argues this case is analogous to Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777. In Wilson, a police officer approached the defendant in the airport and asked the defendant if he could have a minute of his time. (Id. at p. 781.) The officer then advised the defendant that he was a narcotics agent, he was conducting a narcotics investigation, and he had received information that the defendant was going to arrive from Florida that day “carrying a lot of drugs.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
The Wilson court held that merely stopping the defendant was not a detention for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, but after informing the defendant of his suspicions of illegal activity, the officer had performed a detention. (Wilson v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 790-791.) The court stated, “[c]ommon sense suggests to us that in such a situation, an ordinary citizen, confronted by a narcotics agent who has just told him that he has information that the citizen is carrying a lot of drugs, would not feel at liberty simply to walk away from the officer.” (Id. at p. 790.)
While any person can be intimidated by the presence of police officers, a “knock and talk” is not a per se detention. (See People v. Rivera (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304, 308-310.) Our Supreme Court has held “[e]ven if acting on an anonymous, uncorroborated tip, police may knock on the door of a residence, speak with the occupant, and request permission to enter and search.” (Ibid.) Citing Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three held “the ‘knock and talk’ procedure does not rise to the level of an investigative detention requiring an articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” (People v. Jenkins (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 368, 372, citing U.S. v. Cormier (9th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 1103, 1109.) The proper inquiry in such a case is whether the police encounter with the defendant was consensual under the totality of the circumstances. (Rivera, at p. 310.)
Here, defendant approached the police officers who were at his door. They were wearing their badges and police tactical vests with the word “Police” marked on the front and back. Defendant did not need to approach the officers or talk to them. Officer Lockie informed defendant he was investigating a complaint. He then asked if defendant would allow the officers to search his room and property for any drugs or illegal items. A request to enter and search a home “carries the implication that permission may be withheld.” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704.) Defendant immediately agreed to allow a search. The officers did not at any point tell or imply to defendant that he could not leave.
Looking to the totality of the circumstances, the officers did not detain defendant when they came to the house and asked to search it. A reasonable person would have believed he was free to end the encounter or to refuse to allow the search. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence from the search.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., MORRISON, J.