I must concede that the dicta that seemingly support a contrary view have caused confusion among state courts that have attempted to decipher our pronouncements concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause's role in the area of multiple punishments.See People v. Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674, 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978); id., at 683-687, 272 N.W.2d, at 569-571 (Bronson, J., concurring); id., at 687-696, 272 N.W.2d, at 571-575 (Walsh, J., dissenting); Ennis v. State, 364 So.2d 497 (Fla.App. 1978); id., at 500 (Grimes, C. J., concurring); and State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 393 A.2d 1372 (1978); id., at 725-726, 393 A.2d, at 1380-1381 (Murphy, C. J., concurring). In each of these state cases, the panels divided on the meaning of this Court's pronouncements respecting the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple punishments.
Restrictions of a substantive nature on the Legislature's prerogative to define offenses and fix punishments are contained elsewhere. See US Const, Ams VIII, XIV; Const 1963, art 1, ยงยง 16-17; Whalen v United States, supra, 689, fn 3; People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674, 685, fn 5; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978) (opinion of BRONSON, J.). This principle was implicit in our two most recent cases on the subject, People v Jankowski, 408 Mich. 79; 289 N.W.2d 674 (1980), and Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich. 374; 280 N.W.2d 793 (1979), app dis sub nom Brintley v Michigan, 444 U.S. 948; 100 S Ct 418; 62 L Ed 2d 317 (1979).
We agree. See, for example, People v Brintley, 85 Mich. App. 714; 272 N.W.2d 582 (1978); People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978), People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich. App. 654; 272 N.W.2d 605 (1978), and Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 85 Mich. App. 727; 272 N.W.2d 587 (1978). Most of the cases construing the statute as merely a sentence enhancing or sentence augmenting device have done so only to avoid perceived constitutional problems.
However, once again, this argument has been rejected. E.g., People v Jackson, 94 Mich. App. 24; 287 N.W.2d 357 (1979); Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 92 Mich. App. 433; 285 N.W.2d 318 (1979), lv den 408 Mich. 905 (1980); People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978). Defendant last argues that his right to confrontation was violated when, during cross-examination, Detroit Police Sergeant Gilbert Hill testified that Pegram had told him that defendant had shot Hesterley.
Defendant first claims that the felony-firearm statute is unconstitutional because it violates the double jeopardy prohibition and alters and amends existing laws without reenacting and republishing them as required by Const 1963, art 4, ยง 25. Contrary to defendant's position, the statute withstands attack on both grounds. Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 406 Mich. 374; 280 N.W.2d 793 (1979), People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich. App. 654; 272 N.W.2d 605 (1978), People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978). We also reject defendant's argument that the felony-firearm statute is inapplicable when the firearm involved belonged to the complainant rather than defendant.
Defendant also contends that the felony-firearm act is unconstitutional for failure to comply with art IV, ยง 25 of the Michigan Constitution requiring republication or reenactment of former laws when they are altered by new ones. This point was addressed by the Court of Appeals in People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978), wherein it was held that this provision does not apply to amendments by implication, as in the instant case. Finally, defendant asserts that his sentence was predicated on inaccurate information.
This Court has consistently rejected such a contention, and we do so here. People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich. App. 654, 659-660; 272 N.W.2d 605 (1978), People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674, 680-681; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978), People v Blount, 87 Mich. App. 501, 504-505; 275 N.W.2d 21 (1978), People v Harris, 88 Mich. App. 280, 282; 276 N.W.2d 582 (1979), People v Tavolacci, 88 Mich. App. 470, 472; 276 N.W.2d 919 (1979), Wayne County Prosecutor v Recorder's Court Judge, 92 Mich. App. 119; 284 N.W.2d 507 (1979). Third, defendant claims that the felony-firearm statute is unconstitutional because it violates his right against double jeopardy.
We find no merit to defendant's argument that conviction of the two crimes constitutes double jeopardy. See People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978), and People v Dillon, 87 Mich. App. 579; 275 N.W.2d 28 (1978). Similarly, we reject defendant's argument that the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), involves amendment without republication, in violation of Const 1963, art 4, ยง 25.
Does the felony-firearm statute violate the constitutional prohibition against revising, altering or amending other statutes by reference to title only? This issue has been decided contrary to defendants' claim in numerous recent cases, e.g. People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich. App. 654, 660; 272 N.W.2d 605 (1978); People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674, 680-681; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978). II.
Four opinions found the statute nonviolative of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. People v Walter Johnson, 85 Mich. App. 654; 272 N.W.2d 605 (1978), People v Gary Hughes, 85 Mich. App. 674; 272 N.W.2d 567 (1978), People v Mitchell, 85 Mich. App. 757; 272 N.W.2d 601 (1978), People v McDowell, 85 Mich. App. 697; 272 N.W.2d 576 (1978). On September 21, 1978, Chief Judge DANHOF advised the Supreme Court of the split and requested that leave be granted and the issue decided.