Opinion
H043696
05-19-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SEAN ALDEN GARDNER, Defendant and Respondent.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING REQUEST FOR PUBLICATION [CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 19, 2017, be modified as follows: 1. On page 6, in the disposition, the word "denying" is changed to "granting" so the sentence reads:
III. Disposition
The order granting the motion to suppress evidence is reversed. This modification changes the judgment. The request for publication is denied. __________
Date
/s/_________
Mihara, J.
/s/_________
Premo, Acting P. J.
/s/_________
Elia, J.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. AP001926)
Defendant Sean Alden Gardner was charged with misdemeanor elder abuse (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (b)(1)). After the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, the People appealed the order to the appellate division of the superior court (appellate division). The appellate division affirmed the order and denied the People's application for certification. This court granted the People's petition to transfer. We conclude that the officers' entry into defendant's home was justified by the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the order is reversed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
At about 10:00 p.m. on October 9, 2014, Officers Idean Momtaheni and Corinne Abernathy responded to a request to conduct a welfare check on Ms. S. They were informed that Ms. S.'s friend had reported that she had not heard from Ms. S. "in a while," the caller had tried unsuccessfully to contact Ms. S. by phone, and "it was unusual for [the caller] not to be able to reach her." The caller also reported that the woman was an alcoholic and diabetic and she lived with defendant, her son.
When Officer Abernathy arrived, the lights were on in the mobile home. She knocked on the front door and announced police presence, but there was no response. At that point, Officer Momtaheni arrived. He was familiar with Ms. S., because he had previously been to the address to conduct a welfare check. At that time, Ms. S. and defendant were intoxicated and asleep in their beds. He had also responded on a medical call with fire and paramedic personnel, but he did not remember the nature of the medical call. The officer knew that Ms. S. was elderly. The officers looked for other ways to make contact with Ms. S. and walked around the mobile home. Officer Abernathy noticed that a sliding door was open and Officer Momtaheni saw an open bathroom window. After the officers announced that police were on the scene, they heard a faint, female voice saying "Help. Sean. Can you please come here?" Officer Momtaheni said, "Sunnyvale Police" again, but there was no response. The officers decided that they needed to enter the residence to check on the woman's welfare.
The officers entered through the unlocked front door. Officer Momtaheni announced, "Sunnyvale Police. Is everyone okay?" After there was no response, the officer started to walk towards the bedrooms. They entered the first bedroom on the left and saw an elderly woman, who appeared "frail and weak," lying on the bed. The woman was "covered in feces" and there were feces on the floor and the bed. Ms. S. asked Officer Mohtaheni to bring her food from the kitchen, because she was hungry. She stated that she had last eaten on Saturday and it was currently Thursday. Ms. S. told Officer Abernathy that she lived with her son and she was unable to recall how long she had been in bed. The officers requested medical assistance for Ms. S. and placed her on a medical health hold due to her inability to care for herself.
Officer Momtaheni went to check if there was anyone else in the home and whether anyone was caring for the woman. When the officer entered defendant's bedroom, he woke defendant up. Defendant's speech was "slurred." Defendant was eventually arrested for elder abuse.
The trial court noted that the officers knew that Ms. S.'s friend reported that she had not heard from Ms. S. in " 'a while,' " which was "unusual," and that Ms. S. was diabetic and an alcoholic. The trial court concluded that "there lacks evidence in this case that there was sufficient reason to believe that [Ms. S.] was in danger at this time." Thus, the trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
The appellate division affirmed the order granting the motion. It concluded that "the totality of the circumstances known to the officers before their warrantless entry does not support an objectively reasonable belief that [Ms. S.] was seriously injured, threatened with injury, or in need of medical assistance so as to justify the intrusion."
II. Discussion
Defendant contends that the trial court properly granted his motion to suppress evidence.
"In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] And in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search was reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citation.]" (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120.)
The federal and state Constitutions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. (U.S. Const., 4th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 13.) A warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable. (Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 587.) In the case of a warrantless search of a home, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that the search "was justified by some exception to the warrant requirement." (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830.)
One exception to the warrant requirement is "the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. ' "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." ' [Citations.] Accordingly, law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. [Citations.]" (Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 (Brigham).) "This 'emergency aid exception' does not depend on the officers' subjective intent or the seriousness of any crime they are investigating when the emergency arises. [Citation.] It requires only 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing,' [citation], that 'a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid,' [citation]." (Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. 45, 47 (Michigan).) "Officers do not need ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception." (Id. at p. 49.) " '[A]n objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger" suffices. (Ibid.)
Defendant argues that there was substantial evidence to support the finding that the warrantless entry into his home was unreasonable, because the officers' belief that they needed to enter the home to conduct a welfare check was speculative.
In Brigham, supra, 547 U.S. 398, officers responded to a call about a loud party and saw through a window an altercation inside the residence in which four adults were attempting to restrain a juvenile. (Id. at pp. 400-401.) The juvenile broke free and hit one of the adults, who then spit blood into a sink. (Id. at p. 401.) After the other adults continued to attempt to restrain the juvenile and pushed him against a refrigerator with great force, an officer entered the residence. (Ibid.) The Brigham court concluded that "the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing both that the injured adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment required them to wait until another blow rendered someone 'unconscious' or 'semi-conscious' or worse before entering." (Id. at p. 406.)
In Michigan, supra, 558 U.S. 45, officers responded to a call of a disturbance and were directed to a residence where a man was " 'going crazy.' " (Ibid.) The officers saw a damaged truck, damaged fence posts, broken windows with the glass still on the ground as well as blood on the truck, on the clothes inside the truck, and on a door to the house. (Id. at pp. 45-46.) The officers then saw the defendant, who was screaming and throwing things, inside the residence. (Id. at p. 46.) He also had a cut on his hand. (Ibid.) After the officers knocked and asked the defendant whether he needed medical assistance, he ignored the question and told them to get a warrant. (Ibid.) The Michigan court concluded that the emergency aid exception applied, because it was "reasonable to believe that [the defendant] had hurt himself (albeit nonfatally) and needed treatment that in his rage he was unable to provide, or that [the defendant] was about to hurt, or had already hurt, someone else." (Id. at p. 49.)
In People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, officers responded to a call that a man had possibly been shot twice. (Id. at p. 603.) When the first officer arrived, a man was tending to a woman who had been shot several times. (Ibid.) Another man was also present on the porch. He was bleeding from his head and told the officers that two men were involved and had already fled. (Ibid.) After seeing blood near the door handle, an officer asked the injured man three times whether anyone was inside and received somewhat evasive responses. (Ibid.) The officer could not see into the house and since both victims were screaming and the situation was chaotic, the officer also could not focus on whether he could hear any sounds coming from inside the house. (Id. at pp. 603-604.) Under these circumstances, the Troyer court held that "an objectively reasonable basis existed to enter the residence to search for additional victims." (Id. at pp. 608-609.)
While the officers in Brigham, Michigan, and Troyer observed physical injuries to the victims prior to entering the residence, there is nothing in these cases suggesting that the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement applies only when there is reason to believe that an occupant has just been or is about to be a victim of a violent crime. The circumstances known to the officers in the present case supported an objectively reasonable belief that Ms. S. was seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. The officers knew that Ms. S. was elderly, diabetic, and addicted to alcohol. Though they did not know how long it had been since her friend had heard from Ms. S. or how many times she had attempted to reach her, they knew that Ms. S.'s silence was sufficiently unusual for her friend to contact authorities about her concern for Ms. S.'s safety. When the officers arrived, the lights were on in the mobile home, the sliding door was ajar, and a window was open, thus indicating that someone was inside the residence. However, no one responded to the officers' knocking on the front door or the announcements of their presence. After hearing a woman's faint request for help from her son, Officer Momtaheni said, "Sunnyvale Police." There was still no response. Under these circumstances, the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Ms. S. was inside the home and either incapacitated or confused due to a medical emergency. In our view, it would have been a dereliction of duty for the officers to have left the premises without conducting a welfare check of Ms. S. Thus, the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motion to suppress evidence.
III. Disposition
The order denying the motion to suppress evidence is reversed.
/s/_________
Mihara, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Premo, Acting P. J. /s/_________
Elia, J.