Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Super. Ct. No. SF014157A, Jerold L. Turner, Judge.
Marcia R. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez and Leanne Le Mon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Levy, J.
INTRODUCTION
During a routine traffic stop appellant Arturo Murillo Garcia was arrested for driving without a valid California license. Kern County Sheriff Deputy Enrique Bravo decided to impound the vehicle. Bravo and his partner conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. A plastic baggie containing methamphetamine was found next to the driver’s side door. Bravo asked appellant if the baggie belonged to him. Appellant replied “that he forgot he had it there.”
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant pled no contest to one count of transporting methamphetamine. In exchange, other pending charges were dismissed and appellant was sentenced to two years imprisonment. Prior to appellant’s change of plea, the court heard and denied a suppression motion in which he challenged the legality of the arrest and inventory search. Appellant challenges this ruling. We are not persuaded and will affirm.
The facts are derived from Bravo’s testimony at the suppression hearing; he was the only witness. The defense did not call any witnesses or offer any documentary evidence.
At approximately 1:00 p.m. on September 29, 2007, Bravo and his partner observed appellant, who was driving a white Nissan Frontier, commit two traffic violations. Bravo conducted a traffic enforcement stop. Appellant was the only person in the vehicle. Bravo asked appellant for his driver’s license and registration. Appellant said he had a Mexican driver’s license. Bravo asked appellant how long he had been in California. Appellant replied, “[A]bout four years.” Bravo asked appellant if he was employed because he “needed to find out his residency, where he lived, if he was here on vacation, if he was working here.” Bravo asked appellant if he knew that if you were going to be in California for more than 10 days you were required to have a California driver’s license. Appellant “[s]aid yes, I knew.” Appellant showed Bravo a Mexican document. Bravo did not recall if it was a driver’s license or an identification card. Bravo did not have any way of determining whether appellant had a valid Mexican driver’s license. Bravo “ran [appellant’s name] through dispatch and dispatch told me he did not have a driver’s license.” Bravo arrested appellant and placed him in the patrol vehicle.
Bravo was aware that he possessed discretion to decide whether to impound appellant’s vehicle and he decided to impound it. The vehicle’s location on the street did not pose a traffic hazard. Bravo and his partner conducted an inventory search of the vehicle solely to ensure there was not any dispute concerning the contents of the vehicle when it was returned to its owner. The inventory search was not conducted to look for drugs. The decisions to impound the vehicle and to conduct an inventory decision were made in a manner that was “consistent with the way that [Bravo was] taught.” Bravo did not have any prior knowledge of or contact with appellant prior to this traffic stop.
The trial court ruled that the arrest was valid under a violation of Vehicle Code section 12500, subdivision (a) and that the impoundment and inventory search were legal. It reasoned, “[T]he officer I believe was making his decision to impound based upon standardized procedures and also the California Vehicle Code. There was no other licensed driver to operate the vehicle, obviously, under the facts of the case. Given that and the circumstances of the case the impoundment and the search of the vehicle … [were] proper….”
Unless specified all statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
DISCUSSION
I. The standard of review is undisputed.
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. [Citations.]” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)
II. The arrest is supported by probable cause.
Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer warrant a reasonably objective belief that an offense has been or is being committed by the suspect. (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230.)
In relevant part, subdivision (a) of section 12500 provides that in order to lawfully drive on a California highway, a California resident must obtain a California driver’s license within 10 days of establishing residency in this state. Presence in California for six months or more in any 12-month period gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of residency. (§ 516, see also § 12505.) Subdivision (a) of section 12502 exempts nonresidents over the age of 18 from this requirement provided they possess a valid driver’s license issued by the foreign jurisdiction in which they reside.
Appellant argues that the arrest is not supported by probable cause because the People did not establish that appellant is a California resident. We are unconvinced. Bravo’s testimony supports an objectively reasonable belief that appellant was a California resident on the date of his arrest. Bravo asked appellant how long he had been in California and appellant replied that he had been here for about four years. Based on appellant’s unqualified statement that he had been in California for about four years, Bravo could reasonably conclude that appellant was a California resident. Appellant did not make any statements to Bravo or provide any evidence at the suppression hearing rebutting the inference of residency arising from his statement to Bravo that he had been in California for about four years.
Also, no evidence was presented establishing that appellant possessed a valid Mexican driver’s license. Bravo testified that appellant presented some form of Mexican identification but he did not know if it was a driver’s license. Bravo also testified that he did not possess the ability to ascertain whether appellant possessed a valid Mexican driver’s license. Appellant did not submit any proof at the suppression hearing demonstrating that he possessed a valid Mexican driver’s license.
Accordingly, we conclude that the arrest for violation of section 12500, subdivision (a) was supported by probable cause.
III. The vehicle impound and inventory search are lawful.
Next, appellant argues that the inventory search was unconstitutional because resulted from Bravo’s decision to impound the vehicle and there was “no standardized procedure in place to govern the decision whether to impound a vehicle in low level misdemeanor cases. Moreover, the circumstances demonstrate that the decision to impound the vehicle was not objectively reasonable ….” We are not persuaded.
An inventory search is an incidental administrative step following impound of a vehicle. (Illinois v. LaFayette (1983) 462 U.S. 640, 643-644.) An inventory search of an impounded vehicle is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment provided law enforcement has a standardized policy regarding the impound decision and search. (Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 374-375.)
It is established that section 22651 provides the required standardized criteria governing vehicular impoundment. (People v. Green (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367, 375; People v. Benites (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309, 327; People v. Salcero (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 720, 723.) In relevant part, section 22651 provides that a peace officer may impound a vehicle when the driver is arrested and taken into custody or when the officer issues the driver a notice to appear for violation of section 12500. (§ 22651, subds. (h)(1), (p).) In People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, our high court upheld the constitutionality of impounding a vehicle when neither the driver nor the passenger of the vehicle produced a valid driver’s license. (Id. at p. 892.)
The decision to impound the vehicle was reasonable under the circumstances of this case because appellant was the vehicle’s sole occupant. Thus, there was no other person present with a valid license to take control of the vehicle while appellant was taken to jail. Also, the record does not contain any indication that Bravo decided to impound the vehicle as a ruse to search for evidence of criminal activity. Bravo testified that he conducted the inventory search solely to protect against a possible claim when the vehicle was returned to its owner that items had been taken from it. Bravo also testified that he had no prior knowledge of appellant and that he did not conduct the inventory search to look for drugs. Appellant did not present any evidence contradicting this testimony.
Appellant’s reliance on United States v. Caseres (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1064 (Caseres) and People v. Williams (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756 (Williams) is misplaced. In Caseres, the vehicle at issue was parked on a residential street two houses away from the defendant’s house. (Caseres, supra, 533 F.3d at p. 1067.) And in Williams, the vehicle was legally parked at the curb in front of the defendant’s home. (Williams, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.) In this case, there is no evidence that appellant’s vehicle was parked in a residential zone or that it was stopped near appellant’s residence.
Accordingly, we conclude that impound of appellant’s vehicle and the subsequent inventory search served a valid community caretaking function and did not infringe any of appellant’s constitutional rights. (People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 892; People v. Green, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 373-375.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Kane, J.