Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County Nos. FWV700946 & FWV700799, Raymond P. Van Stockum and Katrina West, Judges.
Linda Acaldo, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and James D. Dutton and Ivy B. Fitzpatrick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
McKinster, Acting P.J.
Defendant Guadalupe Adolf Garcia appeals after he was convicted of shoplifting offenses in two separate cases. He contends that the court in each case erred in admitting evidence of uncharged offenses (i.e., the offenses which were the subject of the other case). We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Target Shoplifting Case
On January 25, 2007, a store security officer saw defendant enter the store. Defendant, carrying a shopping basket, placed a compact disc player and headphones in his basket. He did so quickly, without appearing to examine the package to check the price. Defendant left the electronics department and went to the domestics department. There, he appeared to take something from his pocket and cut the plastic casing from the CD player. He discarded the packaging on a shelf and put the CD player inside his jacket. He then removed the headphones from their packaging, and left the domestics department.
Defendant left the store without making any attempt to pay for the CD player or headphones. The security officer approached defendant and identified himself. Defendant stated, “‘Yeah, you got me,’” and accompanied the officer back inside the store. The security officer searched defendant, finding the CD player, headphones, batteries, and a music disc, as well as a pair of scissors. Defendant claimed he stole the merchandise to get money for his mother.
A San Bernardino County Sheriff’s deputy arrived at the store and took defendant’s statement. Defendant initially gave a false name and date of birth. Later, he admitted his true name and birthdate. Defendant told the deputy that his mother was sick in the hospital and he needed money to go see her. He admitted that he intended to steal when he went into the store, and that he used the scissors to cut open the packaging. He further admitted hiding the items in his clothing and leaving the store without paying for the items.
Defendant was charged in case No. FWV700799 with second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and petty theft with a prior (Pen. Code, § 666). The information also charged defendant with a prior serious felony (burglary) conviction.
The Wal-Mart Shoplifting Case
On May 5, 2007, a store security officer trainee noticed defendant inside the Rancho Cucamonga Wal-Mart store. Defendant was pushing a shopping cart containing several CD’s. Defendant pushed his cart through the toy department to the men’s department. Defendant took a belt from the rack. Defendant then went to the automotive department, where he lifted his shirt, fastened the belt around his bare midriff, and pulled his shirt down over the belt. Defendant attempted to open some of the CD’s in his cart, but replaced them into the shopping cart. As he proceeded through the store, defendant took an energy drink can and put it into his pocket. He returned to the toy department where he apparently noticed a security officer watching him. Defendant abandoned his shopping cart and went out of the store through the outdoor garden department. Although there is a cash register in that department, defendant left the store without making any attempt to pay for the belt or the energy drink. The store security officers later found the price tag for the belt in defendant’s shopping cart.
Outside the store, the Wal-Mart security officers and a police officer confronted defendant. They found the belt around his waist and the energy drink can in his pocket. At first, defendant denied stealing the belt, claiming it was his. Later, he admitted going into the store to steal a belt; his own belt had broken and he needed a new one. Defendant had only 95 cents when he entered the store.
As a result of this incident, defendant was charged in case No. FWV700946 with second degree burglary and petty theft with a prior. The information also alleged that he committed the new offense while on bail (from the Target theft charges), and that he had suffered a prior serious felony (burglary) conviction, and a theft conviction.
Trial on the Target Charges
At the trial on the Target charges, defendant moved to exclude evidence of the Wal-Mart charges. The court denied this motion. Evidence of the Wal-Mart charges was admitted at defendant’s trial. Defendant’s motion to bifurcate trial on the prior conviction allegations was granted, and he admitted those allegations separately. The jury in the Target case convicted defendant of petty theft with a prior, but could not reach a verdict on the second degree burglary charge. The court declared a mistrial on the burglary count and dismissed it.
Trial on the Wal-Mart Charges
Defendant moved before trial to bifurcate the issues of prior convictions and commission of the offense while on bail. The court granted these motions.
The prosecution sought to admit evidence of the Target offenses at the Wal-Mart trial. The court granted this request over defendant’s objection.
A jury convicted defendant of both burglary and petty theft with a prior. During trial, defendant admitted the on-bail special allegation, in exchange for dismissing the prison priors.
The court presiding at the Wal-Mart trial imposed sentence on both cases. The court sentenced defendant to the midterm of two years on the burglary count in the Wal-Mart case, plus the midterm of two years for the on-bail special allegation. The court sentenced defendant to two years in state prison on the conviction of petty theft with a prior in the Wal-Mart case, but stayed that sentence under Penal Code section 654. The court imposed a sentence of one-third the midterm, or eight months, on the conviction of petty theft with a prior in the Target case, plus one year for the prior conviction (stayed), to run consecutively to the sentence on the Wal-Mart offenses.
Defendant appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
The crux of defendant’s contentions on appeal is that the court erred in admitting certain evidence (evidence of other bad acts) at each of his trials. Generally, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292.)
Defendant argues, in contrast, that the admission of the evidence of the uncharged offenses in each of his trials deprived him of his due process guaranty to a fair trial. Thus, he argues, the court should apply the Chapman standard of review, i.e., that the People must prove any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705].
Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive. First, he has failed to show any error. As we shall show, the evidence was properly admissible in each trial. Second, even assuming error, under any standard of review the admission of the evidence was harmless.
II. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Admitting Evidence of Other Offenses at Trial
Defendant urges that the admission, in each trial, of evidence relating to the other, was erroneous under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Defendant contends that the trial court did not appropriately assess the prejudice flowing to him from admission of the uncharged acts. Because there was other substantial evidence to present concerning defendant’s intent (e.g., his confessions in each case), it was unnecessary to admit the evidence of the uncharged offenses in order to establish intent. (Citing People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 856.)
Defendant is wielding a double-edged sword, however. In each case, he was caught red-handed in the middle of his theft. He was observed for a considerable period of time by store security officers who saw him cut open packaging (Target case) and secreting items in his clothing (both cases). He was confronted in each case immediately upon leaving the store and the stolen items, as well as tools (scissors in the Target case), were found on his person. The packaging (Target) or price tags (Wal-Mart) were found discarded inside the store immediately where defendant had been seen. Defendant confessed in each case. In the face of such overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence, it is inconceivable that a different result would have been reached, under any standard of review, even had the evidence not been admitted.
In any case, the evidence was properly admitted. Although evidence of other bad acts is inadmissible to show a mere character, disposition or propensity to commit crime (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a)), evidence of other acts is admissible when relevant to prove another fact, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)
Defendant’s intent to steal was placed in issue by his not guilty plea in each case. (Pen. Code, § 1019; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 260.) The question of when he formed the intent to steal, i.e., before he entered the store, was a critical issue to the burglary charges in each case. Defendant’s primary defense strategy in each case was to argue that he did not form the intent to steal before he entered the store; in other words, he had not committed burglary. The issues of knowledge and absence of mistake were also fundamental to the trial of the charged offenses in each case. The jury in the Target case was unable to reach a verdict on the burglary charge, and that count was ultimately dismissed. The split verdict in the Target case illustrates that cross-admission of the evidence of the other offenses was not overly inflammatory.
The challenged evidence was admitted for a proper purpose. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. Even if the court had erred, however, the ruling was harmless under any conceivable standard of review.
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
We concur: Gaut, J., King, J.