Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, No. SCN250317, Daniel B. Goldstein, Judge.
HALLER, J.
Jeffrey S. Gapner entered a negotiated guilty plea to driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and admitted (1) he had a prior drunk driving conviction within the past 10 years (§§ 23626 & 23550.5, subd (a)) and (2) his blood alcohol level was.15 percent or more (Veh. Code, § 23578). As part of the plea bargain the court indicated it would impose a sentence of 16 months in state prison and would recommend Gapner be placed in a fire camp run by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The court imposed a 16-month prison term and recommended placement in a fire camp.
Statutory references are to the Vehicle Code.
Gapner obtained a certificate of probable cause.
FACTS
On August 5, 2008, Oceanside police officers observed Gapner failing to stop at a stop sign and made a vehicle stop. While speaking with Gapner, an officer smelled alcohol. Gapner stumbled as he tried to get out of his vehicle. The officers conducted a field sobriety test, which Gapner failed. Twice during the field sobriety test, an officer had to reach out to prevent Gapner from falling. The officers recovered an empty vodka bottle, two empty beer cans and an empty whisky bottle from the inside of the vehicle. At the police station, Gapner submitted to a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) test, which showed he had a blood alcohol level of.23 percent within an hour of the incident.
On July 22, 1999, Gapner pleaded guilty to felony drunk driving.
DISCUSSION
Appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief summarizing the facts and proceedings below. Counsel presents no argument for reversal, but asks this court to review the record for error as mandated by People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, counsel refers to as possible, but not arguable, issues: (1) whether Gapner's guilty plea was constitutionally valid; (2) whether Gapner's waiver of his constitutional rights to a jury trial was the product of undue coercion based upon the court's promise to recommend placement in a fire camp; (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying probation and imposing a prison sentence; and (4) whether Gapner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel's representations concerning the acceptance of the guilty plea.
We granted Gapner permission to file a brief on his own behalf. He has not responded.
A review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Anders v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 738, including the possible issues referred to by appellate counsel, has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. Gapner has been adequately represented by counsel on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., McDonald, J.