The legislature's failure to use the phrase "mental illness" in enacting subsection (B) is not constitutionally fatal. We have previously noted that the requirement that there be a finding that an acquittee "would benefit from inpatient care" provides a sufficient foundation for commitment. (See People v. Gamble (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 543, 546-47, 453 N.E.2d 839.) This requirement, together with the requirement that there be a finding that respondent is "reasonably expected to inflict physical harm upon himself or another," are meaningful criteria which preclude arbitrary commitment decisions.
Moreover, we recognize that additional safeguards are justified for persons found not guilty by reason of insanity who are involuntarily committed to state mental health facilities. People v. Gamble, 117 Ill. App. 3d 543 (1983). The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal is to treat the patient's mental illness, while protecting the patient and society from the patient's potential dangerousness.
For civil commitment the court must find the respondent mentally ill, but an insanity acquittee may be committed even if his condition does not qualify as a mental illness, as long as he "would benefit from inpatient care" ( 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4(a)(1)(B) (West 1994)). An insanity acquittee may be committed if the court reasonably expects him to inflict serious physical harm at some time in the future (730 ILCS 5/1-2-4 (a)(1)(B) (West 1994)); see People v. Gamble, 117 Ill. App.3d 543, 453 N.E.2d 839 (1983)), but the court will civilly commit the respondent only if he is expected to inflict harm in the near future ( 405 ILCS 5/1-119(1), 3-700 (West 1994)). The Unified Code of Corrections also shifts responsibility for release decisions to the criminal courts, while mental health professionals retain greater responsibility for decisions regarding release of persons civilly committed.
) Accordingly, section 6-2 is rationally based upon a legitimate legislative purpose and does not create an arbitrary classification. See People v. Carter (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 403, 481 N.E.2d 1012; People v. Smith (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 805, 465 N.E.2d 101; People v. Gamble (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 543, 453 N.E.2d 839. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
These statutory classifications are rational and withstand an equal protection challenge. People v. Gamble (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 543, 453 N.E.2d 839. For the reasons stated, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Application of the extended-term statute is determined by the "offense" rather than by the extent or nature of defendant's participation ( People v. Gray (1980), 87 Ill. App.3d 142, 153, 408 N.E.2d 1150, appeal denied (1980), 81 Ill.2d 604, cert. denied (1972), 405 U.S. 930, 30 L.Ed.2d 804, 92 S.Ct. 983), and there is no question but that the offense in the present case was accompanied by conduct coming within the statutory language. Courts have recognized that the dangerousness manifested by an insanity acquittee's criminal acts justifies additional safeguards prior to his release from detention. See People v. Gamble (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 543, 545, 453 N.E.2d 839, appeal denied (1983), 96 Ill.2d 562; People v. Thiem (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 956, 403 N.E.2d 647. • 3 Defendant also argues that utilization of the extended-term statute to set the maximum period of criminal commitment violates his right to equal protection of the laws where the legislature has prohibited such a length of commitment for a defendant found unfit to stand trial.