Opinion
A102202.
10-20-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSE LUIS GALVAN, Defendant and Appellant.
In 1999, in the Napa County Superior Court, defendant entered pleas of guilty to driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)) and to causing injury while driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23153). Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was admitted to probation for five years.
In June of 2002, the Napa County Superior Court was notified by the Solano County Superior Court that defendant "has been charged with violation of Section 23152 of the Vehicle Code on May 30, 2002 in this Court." The Napa court summarily revoked defendants probation. In actuality, at the time this letter was sent defendant had already been convicted and was serving the six-month jail sentence imposed by the Solano court. In January 2003, defendant was moved from Solano to Napa. Defendant’s probation was formally revoked in February of 2003. The following month defendant was sentenced to state prison for a total term of 16 months. Having filed a timely notice of appeal, defendant presents two contentions dealing with Penal Code section 1203.2a. He first contends that the Napa court had no jurisdiction because it did not comply with the statute’s procedures for revoking probation and sentencing a former probationer. Defendant’s second contention is that if section 1203.2a is applied to him he is denied equal protection.
Section 1203.2a establishes its scope in its first words; it applies to “any defendant who has been released on probation [and] is committed to a prison in this state or another state for another offense . . . . The statute and its procedures apply only when the probationer is sentenced to state prison by another jurisdiction. It does not apply to a mere arrest (In re Roberts (1953) 40 Cal.2d 745, 748), or a commitment to the California Rehabilitation Center (People v. Vasquez (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 897), or a sentence that is served in a county jail (People v. Madrigal (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1054; People v. Blanchard (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1842, 1847; People v. Ellestad (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 663). The Solano court sentenced defendant to a term in the county jail, not state prison. Thus section 1203.2a does not apply.
The court in People v. Blanchard, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th 1842, explained why probationers subsequently sentenced to county jail are not entitled by equal protection to treatment under the statute.
“The Legislature specifically refrained from extending the operation of section 1203.2a to probationers who are sentenced to a county jail for a subsequent offense. . . . Blanchard contends equal protection considerations mandate application of section 1203.2a to probationers who are subsequently incarcerated for misdemeanors. We disagree.
“ ‘ “In the absence of a classification that is inherently invidious or that impinges upon fundamental rights, a state [statute] is to be upheld against equal protection attack if it is rationally related to the achievement of legitimate governmental ends.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The &# 8216;rational basis’ test applies to Blanchard’s equal protection challenge, as the benefit afforded subsequently convicted probationers under section 1203.2a does not constitute a fundamental right and the statute is not ‘inherently invidious.’ We believe there is a rational basis for the Legislature’s decision to limit the benefits of section 1203.2a to probationers committed to prison.
“Probationers sentenced to county jail for a subsequent offense are not subject to a long term of imprisonment before an additional sentence (or other sanction) for the first conviction can be fixed. Since a county jail term may not exceed one year [citation] and is more often much shorter, a probationer sentenced to a county jail term typically would have such a determination in a relatively short time. Thus, the concurrent sentencing concerns underlying section 1203.2a are not sufficiently implicated in cases where probation is violated by a misdemeanor conviction to warrant application of the statute to such cases.
“Moreover, if section 1203.2a were judicially extended to encompass probationers sentenced to county jail, the minimal benefit the statute would afford such probationers would be outweighed by the increased burden on our judicial and penal systems. Subjecting probation officers to the reporting requirements of section 1203.2a in cases where the defendant’s subsequent offense is a misdemeanor resulting in county jail incarceration, in addition to cases involving felony convictions, would impose increased costs and burdens on probation departments.
“Furthermore, the state’s compelling interest in punishing probation violations and the underlying offenses giving rise to probation should not be thwarted by loss of jurisdiction under section 1203.2a where a defendant’s subsequent offense is a misdemeanor resulting in a relatively short period of incarceration. In such misdemeanor cases the state’s interest in punishing and deterring crime outweighs the defendants minimal interest in discretionary concurrent sentencing under section 669 through application of section 1203.2a.
“We conclude equal protection considerations do not mandate extension of the benefits of section 1203.2a to probationers who are sentenced to county jail.” (Id. at pp. 1847-1848.) We agree with this analysis.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MCGUINESS, P.J., PARRILLI, J. --------------- Notes: All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.