Opinion
A099883.
10-23-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DANA M. GALEA, Defendant and Appellant.
In May of 1999, Galea pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possessing methamphetamine for sale (sale offense). The court placed Galea on 36 months of supervised probation. About one month before the end of his probationary term, the police arrested Galea after he was found in possession of methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, scales, and $257. The trial court summarily revoked Galeas probation. Galea then pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possessing methamphetamine (possession offense). At sentencing, the trial court rejected Galeas argument that he was eligible for probation under Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000. The court sentenced Galea to three years in prison on the possession offense, and imposed a consecutive term of eight months on the earlier sale offense after formally revoking probation on that offense. The court then suspended execution of the sentence and committed Galea to the narcotics addict program at the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) for a term not to exceed three years and eight months. The trial court awarded Galea presentence credit of 177 days, representing 119 days he spent in custody from the date of his arrest on the possession offense to sentencing, plus 58 days good time credit under section 4019 of the Penal Code. The total presentence custody credit of 177 days was applied to the sentence imposed upon the possession offense. On appeal, Galea contends the trial court erred by denying his request for credit of an additional 177 days for the same period of presentence custody to be applied against the sentence imposed upon his earlier sale offense. We affirm the judgments.
Penal Code section 2900.5 provides that a convicted person shall receive credit against a term of imprisonment for all days spent in custody before sentence (subd. (a)), but "[c]redit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed" (subd. (b)). Although the trial court gave Galea presentence custody credit of 177 days, he argues he is entitled to an additional credit of 177 days because he was not sentenced for "multiple offenses." He asserts he was "sentenced . . . for one offense, possession of methamphetamine, and a probation violation based on having committed that same offense." Therefore, because he was given "dual sentences based on the same conduct," he is entitled to "dual credit for time served." We disagree.
Galea was sentenced for two different offenses: possession of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine for sale. That Galeas current drug possession conduct resulted in a separate possession conviction and the revocation of his probationary term on the earlier sale offense is not relevant. The sentence imposed "following revocation of probation . . . is imposed . . . for the original conviction offense and not the separate offense which caused probation to be revoked." (People v. Blunt (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1594, 1600.) Because Galea was sentenced for multiple offenses for which consecutive sentences were imposed in the same proceeding (Pen. Code, § 2900. 5 (subd.(b)), he is entitled to "[o]nly one set of credits." (People v. Adrian (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 868, 876.)
The cases cited by Galea do not support his request for additional credit. People v. Riolo (1983) 33 Cal.3d 223, 225, and People v. Lacebal (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1063, concern the calculation of the number of days the defendants spent in custody. Galea does not argue that he spent more than 119 days in custody before sentence. People v. Bruner (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1178 (Bruner) and In re Joyner (1989) 48 Cal.3d 487 (Joyner) concern the calculation of "presentence credits for concurrent terms imposed in multiple proceedings." (Joyner, supra, at p. 495, italics added; Bruner, supra, at p. 1194.) Here, we are concerned with presentence credits to be applied against consecutive terms imposed in a single proceeding. In the latter situation, "only one of the terms shall receive credit for presentence custody." (Bruner, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1192, fn. 9.)
DISPOSITION
The judgments are affirmed.
We concur: Corrigan, Acting P. J., and Pollak, J. --------------- Notes: In his appellate briefs, Galea also challenged the trial courts ruling that he was not eligible for probation under Proposition 36. In a letter dated October 15, 2003, Galea withdrew the argument, noting that he was released from CRC and he is currently on parole. Consequently, we do not address the issue in this opinion.