Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County Super. Ct. No. RIF137391. Donald George Umhofer, Judge. Retired judge of the San Luis Obispo Super. Ct., assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6, of the Cal. Const.
Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel and James D. Dutton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Gaut J.
1. Introduction
Sheriff Rhodes stopped a car driven by Demirel Gafar which contained Shawn Paulino as a passenger. The car was stopped by Sheriff Rhodes because the windows were so dark they obstructed the driver’s view. Gafar did not have a driver’s license but claimed he did have a printout of his license. After obtaining Gafar’s printout, Rhodes did a computer check on Gafar and the passenger, Shawn Paulino, which disclosed that Paulino had a felony warrant for a stolen vehicle.
Officer Rhodes arrested Paulino and then obtained Gafar’s consent to search his car. The search turned up a packet of methamphetamine, a smoking pipe, and marijuana. Both men were arrested.
We affirm Gafar’s conviction and his sentence to the upper term of four years in state prison.
2. Facts
Gafar was driving his father’s BMW when Sheriff Rhodes stopped him because the windows were too heavily tinted. After the stop, and because of the heavy tint of the windows, Sheriff Rhodes asked Gafar to walk back to his patrol car rather than Rhodes personally walking to the car. Gafar told the sheriff he did not have a regular driver’s license but did have a printout of the license and he authorized Rhodes to go to the BMW to pick up the printout. In that process, Officer Rhodes saw the passenger, Shawn Paulino, whom he knew had been arrested for possession of drugs a year or so earlier.
Officer Rhodes obtained a computer confirmation of the licenses of the two men. That confirmation disclosed that there was an outstanding felony warrant for Paulino for a stolen vehicle. Rhodes placed Paulino under arrest at that time. After placing Paulino under arrest, Rhodes asked Gafar for permission to search the BMW. Gafar granted the request. When a backup police unit arrived, a search of the BMW began. The officer found plastic baggies containing methamphetamine in the back seat, a glass smoking pipe, and a bottle containing marijuana. Gafar was then also arrested.
Deputy Rhodes requested a tow truck to tow the BMW. When the tow operator turned on the car ignition, a panel under the steering column opened disclosing a loaded.44-caliber handgun and several plastic bindles consisting of 95 grams of methamphetamine.
When Gafar was searched after his arrest, he had over $1,000 in his pocket plus credit cards and business cards.
2. Propriety of the Detention
Gafar contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because his detention was unreasonable and unlawfully prolonged. As to whether Gafar’s rights were violated, Vehicle Code section 26708, subdivision (a)(1) expressly provides that “A person shall not drive any motor vehicle with any object or material placed, displayed, installed, affixed, or applied in or upon the vehicle that obstructs or reduces the driver’s clear view through the windshield or side or rear windows.” Section 26708, subdivision (a)(1) authorized Rhodes to stop the Gafar vehicle.
Gafar contends that even though the stop was appropriate, it did not justify the search of Gafar or his vehicle. We disagree. The record is clear that when Gafar was unable to produce a driver’s license, he directed Officer Rhodes to Gafar’s own car to retrieve a printout of the license. When Rhodes went to Gafar’s car, he saw Paulino in the car and asked him to step out of the car and sit on the curb. Rhodes found the printout for Gafar’s vehicle license in the car and returned to his car.
Rhodes testified that when he saw Paulino, he recognized him from an arrest for drug possession at a local motel in Moreno Valley and believed that he was then either on parole or on probation. When Rhodes ran the computer check of the two men, he learned that Paulino had an outstanding felony warrant for his arrest and Rhodes then placed him under arrest.
After the computer check and the arrest of Paulino, Rhodes requested and received Gafar’s consent to search his car for any weapons that might be in the car. During the search of the vehicle, methamphetamine, methamphetamine pipes, and marijuana were found. At that time Rhodes arrested Gafar.
Gafar contends that he was stopped because of a traffic violation for which he could not be taken into custody. He claims that his detention after Rhodes received the computer check on himself and Paulino was unlawful and that the delay between the arrest of Paulino and his right to leave exceeded constitutional limits because the delay extended beyond the period reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
Gafar contends that there was no reason for Rhodes to search his car after Paulino’s arrest. That contention ignores the fact that Rhodes was aware of Paulino’s prior arrest for possession of drugs and his felony warrant for a stolen vehicle. For that reason, Rhodes was entitled to and did obtain Gafar’s permission to search the vehicle to determine whether there were any drugs or weapons in the vehicle. The search resulted in finding methamphetamine, pipes, and marijuana.
Although the search of the car may have delayed the usual time for a vehicle stop, Rhodes estimated that even including the time for the search of Gafar’s automobile, no more than 15 minutes elapsed from the time Rhodes stopped Gafar’s car and the subsequent inspection of the car.
Gafar contends that the mere fact Rhodes suspected Paulino was on probation or parole did not establish that Paulino was doing something illegal by sitting as a passenger in a car with illegally tinted windows. That contention, however, ignores the fact that Rhodes received information from his computer check that Paulino was wanted on an outstanding felony warrant. That information was more than “mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch,” as suggested by Gafar. Nor was the search of Gafar’s car an unlawful detention as Gafar contends. The mere presence of Paulino in the car with Gafar created a reasonable suspicion based upon Officer Rhodes’s knowledge that Paulino had been recently arrested for possession of drugs.
Gafar asserts that he was subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure. That assertion ignores the fact that he expressly authorized the search of his car. In addition, the presence of Paulino in the car was enough to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. As the court indicated in In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894, “if the circumstances are ‘consistent with criminal activity’ they permit–even demand–an investigation: the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances ‘in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties.’ (People v. Flores[(1974) 12 Cal.3d 85,] 91.) No reason appears for a contrary result simply because the circumstances are also ‘consistent with lawful activity,’ as may often be the case.”
The evidence in this case confirms that Sheriff Rhodes stopped the vehicle in question because of a violation of Vehicle Code section 26708. After confirmation of the warrant for Paulino’s arrest, Gafar consented to allow the car search. There was no evidence that Gafar’s consent to the search was involuntary. California cases invalidating consent involve coercive circumstances or “facts such as an illegal arrest or a false claim of authority to search.” (People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 110.) There was no evidence here of coercion.
Gafar contends that he should have been allowed to leave once Paulino was held on a warrant for his arrest. Gafar relies upon the case of Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 to argue that his detention was excessive and that a traffic stop beyond the time necessary to address the reason for the stop was inappropriate. In the Supreme Court case of United States v. Sharpe (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 685-686, citing Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 700, the court stated that “[i]f the purpose underlying a Terry stop–investigating possible criminal activity–is to be served, the police must under certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the brief time period involved in Terry [v. Ohio, supra, ] and Adams [v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 147].” The same applies here. As soon as Officer Rhodes received the information regarding Paulino, Rhodes arrested him. Immediately thereafter Rhodes requested Gafar’s permission to search Gafar’s car. As the California Supreme Court observed in People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 584, “... the officer is still entitled to examine the driver’s license and registration, carry out any appropriate equipment inspection and tests, and satisfy himself that the motorist fully understands the conduct to be avoided before permitting him to go his way.”
The traffic stop and Sheriff Rhodes’s conduct during the traffic stop were appropriate.
4. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ramirez P. J., King J.