Opinion
H047083
06-15-2020
IN RE G.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G.A., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. 19JV000511)
I. INTRODUCTION
The minor, G.A., appeals from a dispositional order placing him on probation with various terms and conditions, following a finding by the juvenile court that he committed robbery. On appeal, the minor contends that a probation condition requiring him "to comply with all directives of [his] Probation Officer" is unconstitutionally overbroad.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order.
II. BACKGROUND
In May 2019, a petition was filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that the minor, then age 15, committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). A contested jurisdictional hearing was held in June 2019. The evidence at the hearing reflected that the minor and several other young males approached the victim, who was selling ice cream at a park. One of the males grabbed the victim's neck. The others went through the victim's pockets and lunch box and took his money. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegation that the minor had committed robbery.
A disposition hearing was held on July 2, 2019. Prior to the hearing, the probation officer prepared a report recommending, among other orders, that that the minor be placed under the supervision of the probation officer with various terms and conditions. The 42 terms and conditions recommended by the probation officer included the following: "You are to comply with all directives of your Probation Officer." At the disposition hearing, the minor's counsel did not object to any of the recommended probation terms and conditions and stated that they were "appropriate terms in this situation." The juvenile court adopted the probation officer's recommended disposition. The minor was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation with various terms and conditions, including that he "comply with all directives of [his] Probation Officer."
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Parties' Contentions
The minor contends that the probation condition requiring him "to comply with all directives" of his probation officer is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. The minor argues that the probation condition improperly gives the probation officer "unfettered authority to establish probation conditions, including conditions that limit [his] constitutional rights to travel and free association, without closely tailoring those limitations to the condition's purpose." As an example, the minor contends that the probation officer could prohibit him from visiting restaurants with his siblings.
The Attorney General contends that the probation condition at issue simply requires the minor to comply with the directives of his probation officer and "is meant to enable the . . . probation officer to enforce the other specified conditions of probation that were ordered by the court at the dispositional hearing." The Attorney General argues that the probation condition "does not give [the minor's] probation officer the power to impose entirely new probation conditions" or "to give irrational or unreasonable directives." Rather, the probation condition "merely allows the probation officer to give [the minor] directives that are reasonably related to those conditions previously imposed by the juvenile court and authorizes nothing more."
In reply, the minor contends that if the probation condition " 'authorizes nothing more' " as argued by the Attorney General, then the condition is superfluous because a probation officer already has the power to enforce court-ordered probation conditions and to impose reasonably related directives. The minor argues that the probation condition's wording "does not specify or even suggest any limitation on the probation officer's directives." The minor requests that the probation condition be stricken, or that it be modified in accordance with the Attorney General's interpretation to state: "You are to comply with all directives of your probation officer that are reasonably related to compliance with the other probation conditions imposed by the juvenile court."
B. General Legal Principles Regarding Probation Conditions
"A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person's constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad." (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 (Sheena K.); accord, In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118.) "The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant's constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement." (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.)
A defendant may raise for the first time on appeal a facial constitutional defect in a probation condition if the claim involves " ' "pure questions of law that can be resolved without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court." [Citations.]' " (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) We review the constitutionality of a probation condition de novo. (People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723.)
C. Analysis
In this case, the minor contends that the probation condition requiring him to "comply with all directives of [his] Probation Officer" is unconstitutionally overbroad because it "gives [his] probation officer unfettered authority to establish probation conditions, including conditions that limit [his] constitutional rights to travel and free association, without closely tailoring those limitations to the condition's purpose." The minor requests that the probation condition be stricken or modified.
We are not persuaded by the minor's argument that the probation condition is unconstitutionally overbroad.
First, the minor has unreasonably misconstrued the meaning of the probation condition. "A probation condition should be given 'the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.' [Citation.]" (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382.) The probation condition at issue here - that the minor "comply with all directives of [his] Probation Officer" - does not on its face give the probation officer "unfettered" authority to establish new probation conditions as suggested by the minor. The probation condition simply requires the minor's compliance with the probation officer's directives. (See People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240 (Kwizera) [determining that a probation condition requiring the defendant to " '[f]ollow such course of conduct as the probation officer may prescribe' " did "no more" than "enable the department to supervise compliance with the specific conditions of probation"].)
Second, a probation officer cannot unilaterally add a new term or condition of probation. (In re Pedro Q. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1368, 1372-1373.) Further, any directive issued by the probation officer must be "reasonably related to previously imposed terms." (Id. at p. 1373.) In this case, nothing in the probation condition at issue suggests that the scope of the probation officer's authority to issue directives has been broadened to include directives that are unrelated to previously imposed terms. (See People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 996 [a "probation officer cannot issue directives that are not reasonable in light of the authority granted to the officer by the court"]; Kwizera, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1240, 1241 [a probation condition requiring the defendant to " '[f]ollow such course of conduct as the probation officer may prescribe' " was "reasonable and necessary to enable the department to supervise compliance with the specific conditions of probation" and did not authorize "irrational[]" directives by the probation officer].)
Lastly, given that the only reasonable, objective meaning of the probation condition is that the minor must comply with those directives of the probation officer that are reasonably related to previously imposed terms, we find it unnecessary to modify the probation condition in this regard as requested by the minor. (See People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 503, fn. omitted [declining to modify probation conditions "simply to make explicit what the law already makes implicit"].)
In conclusion, we determine that the probation condition is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
IV. DISPOSITION
The dispositional order of July 2, 2019 is affirmed.
/s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
PREMO, ACTING P.J. /s/_________
ELIA, J.