The Fultz court therefore reasoned that in a bench trial "there must be some indication in the record which demonstrates actual prejudice." ( 32 Ill. App.3d 317, 333, 336 N.E.2d 288; accord, People v. Fugate (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 103, 105-06, 395 N.E.2d 1199.) Noting that the confession's admissibility was determined by the trial judge as an issue of law after a hearing on the motion and before the confession was admitted into evidence, the Fultz court concluded that no actual prejudice existed in that case. In the instant case, the allegedly incompetent evidence of which defendant now complains is the following testimony of Officer Mischikovski: that defendant's mother told him defendant could not have committed the rape because he was in school the entire day; that the school principal told him that to the best of his knowledge defendant was not in school on that date, but that he could not be positive; that another teacher told the officer defendant was supposed to be in Mr. Jerdee's class during the first or second periods; and, that Mr. Jerdee told him defendant was not in school during those periods.

In his post-conviction petition, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue for the admission of the etchings on the grounds that hearsay is admissible at motions to suppress and other pretrial hearings. Defendant argues that this position was amply supported by existing law at the time of the suppression hearing, citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 172-75, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 250-52, 94 S.Ct. 988, 993-95 (1974); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 93 L.Ed. 1879, 69 S.Ct. 1602 (1949); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1975); Fed.R.Evid. 104(a), 1101(d)(1); People v. Jones, 75 Ill. App.2d 332, 337-38 (1966); People v. Fugate, 77 Ill. App.3d 103, 105 (1979); and People v. Lesure, 271 Ill. App.3d 679, 680, 683 (1995). Defendant also contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to argue that the etchings were admissible to rebut the State's evidence that defendant did not complain of injury or protest his treatment to the paramedic, the assistant State's Attorneys, or the detectives.

) As the United States Supreme Court has observed, a conviction after a plea of guilty rests upon a defendant's own admission in open court that he committed the acts with which he is charged. ( McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 766, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1446.) Defendant cites the case of People v. Fugate (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 103, 395 N.E.2d 1199, for the proposition that a defendant may not be convicted on the basis of a confession alone. This rule is inapplicable, however, to guilty plea convictions which rest upon a defendant's judicial admission.

The competency of a witness is to be determined by the trial court, and his ruling will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Fugate (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 103, 106, 395 N.E.2d 1199, 1202. • 9 The trial court here conducted an in camera hearing as to the competency of the complaining witness before she was allowed to testify before the jury.

In ruling that she was competent, the court specifically relied upon the criteria set forth in People v. Seel (1979), 68 Ill. App.3d 996, 1004, 386 N.E.2d 370, 376; that is, it determined that she had the "ability * * * to receive correct impressions from [her] senses; [the] ability to recollect these impressions; [the] ability to understand questions and express answers; and [the] ability to appreciate the moral duty to tell the truth." This determination is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and may be arrived at either through conducting a preliminary inquiry or observing the witness' demeanor and ability to testify during trial ( People v. Luigs (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 700, 421 N.E.2d 961) and will not be disturbed absent a showing that it abused its discretion ( People v. Fugate (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 103, 395 N.E.2d 1199). Here, while defendant does not expressly purport to challenge the trial court's ruling as to competency, he implicitly attacks that ruling by his reliance on White, wherein the court expressed "grave doubts" about the witness' competency, as well as his reliance on the facts that Diane was retarded; that a psychiatrist found her answers "confusing and conflicting"; and that Diane appeared to tire toward the end of her testimony.

"[B]oth the circumstances and the confession may be considered in determining whether the whole evidence proves that a crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime." People v. Fugate (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 103, 107-08, 395 N.E.2d 1199, 1203. At trial, several facts were elicited which corroborate the defendant's confession.