Opinion
G057815
08-03-2020
In re F.T., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. F.T., Defendant and Appellant.
Johanna R. Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 18DL1872) OPINION Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed. Johanna R. Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
F.T. appeals from an order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The juvenile court found true an allegation that she committed misdemeanor grand theft when she was nearly 13 years old. F.T. makes a single argument in this appeal: the prosecution did not present clear and convincing evidence that she knew her conduct was wrongful as required by Penal Code section 26.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We disagree. Given the attendant circumstances of the theft and F.T.'s background and age, we find the juvenile court's finding to be supported by substantial evidence. Thus, we affirm the order.
I
FACTS
A. The Underlying Event
On the evening of September 14, 2018, David Galdamez, a loss prevention officer at Target in Westminster, was viewing live video from the store's surveillance cameras. He observed a group of three people filling a shopping cart with merchandise: F.T., who was then about three months away from her 13th birthday, a 15-year-old female, and another female who appeared to be about 18 years old. F.T. filled the cart with merchandise from the jewelry and electronics department without checking any prices. She also appeared to tell her companions what to grab or handed them items to put into the cart.
After filling the cart with merchandise, F.T. and the 15-year-old girl walked past several manned checkout aisles until they reached one that was unmanned but had a light on. The girls stopped at the unmanned checkout aisle and stood by the filled cart for about 45 seconds. Next, they stepped away from the cart and appeared to look around for another 10 seconds. The girls then returned to the cart and pushed it through the unmanned aisle and exited the store without paying for the merchandise.
The third companion wandered away from the shopping cart after it was filled, and Galdamez stopped surveilling her. Her whereabouts are irrelevant to this appeal.
Galdamez stopped the girls in Target's parking lot and identified himself as a security officer for the store. He told them that they did not pay for the merchandise and took possession of the shopping cart. The girls were detained in the store's loss prevention office until the police arrived. Galdamez estimated the stolen merchandise totaled around $1,200. B. Procedural History
In December 2018, the prosecution filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging F.T. committed one count of felony grand theft. (§ 487, subd. (a).) After the presentation of evidence at the jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the allegations in the petition to be true but reduced the offense to a misdemeanor.
The juvenile court found there was clear and convincing evidence that F.T. knew her conduct was wrongful under section 26. Among other things, the court was persuaded by video evidence showing F.T.'s exit from the store. As the court described it, the video showed that F.T. "tr[ied] to be tricky in going to the checkout stand, . . . parking her cart, putting that cart in a checkout stand where there is no one there, looking around, and when the coast looks clear, go[ing] back and grab[bing] the cart and tak[ing] it to the very furthest checkout stand and then go[ing] out [without paying] . . . ." The court reasoned that if F.T. did not know her conduct was wrongful, "she would have just grabbed everything and walked out like it was no big deal. But she didn't do that. What she did is she engaged in a premediated plan by the checkout stand . . . ."
A DVD containing five video clips was introduced at the hearing as exhibits 3A - E. The juvenile court submitted the DVD to this court per our order filed July 10, 2020.
At the disposition hearing, F.T. moved for reconsideration of the section 26 issue but the motion was denied. F.T. was declared a nonward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725 and ordered to obey certain terms and conditions of probation. F.T. now appeals, arguing the court incorrectly found there was clear and convincing evidence that she knew her conduct was wrongful.
II
DISCUSSION
Under section 26, a child under the age of 14 is incapable of committing a crime unless there is clear and convincing evidence "that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." (§ 26; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378 (Lewis).) "Section 26 embodies a venerable truth . . . that a young child cannot be held to the same standard of criminal responsibility as [her] more experienced elders. A juvenile court must therefore consider a child's age, experience, and understanding in determining whether [she] would be capable of committing conduct proscribed by section 602." (In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 864.)
"In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of [her] conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence . . . ." (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.) "Although a minor's knowledge of wrongfulness may not be inferred from the commission of the act itself, 'the attendant circumstances of the crime, such as its preparation, the particular method of its commission, and its concealment' may be considered. [Citation.] Moreover, a minor's 'age is a basic and important consideration [citation], and, as recognized by the common law, it is only reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer [she] approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that [she] appreciates the wrongfulness of [her] acts.'" (Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
The juvenile court's section 26 ruling is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. (In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 297-298.) Under this standard, "[w]e review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment and affirm the trial court's findings that the minor understood the wrongfulness of [her] conduct if they are supported by . . . evidence that [is] reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof." (In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 538.) "Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the finding].'" (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331-332.) "The substantial evidence standard of review is generally considered the most difficult standard of review to meet, as it should be, because it is not the function of the reviewing court to determine the facts." (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 589.)
Here, we find the juvenile court's ruling to be supported by substantial evidence.
F.T. was not a passive observer in the theft but an active participant. She put merchandise in the cart and also appeared to direct her two companions to grab other items. This is not a situation where a person walked out of the store with a few trivial items. The trio put roughly $1,200 of merchandise in their cart. F.T. then actively attempted to sneak out of the store with the merchandise, which is supported by the video evidence and testimony presented at the hearing.
The video evidence shows that after filling their shopping cart, F.T. and her companion pushed the cart to an unmanned checkout register. They stopped there for almost a minute before walking away from the cart to apparently look around. They subsequently returned to the shopping cart and walked through the unmanned register and out the store without any further pauses. As the juvenile court found, this evidence shows that F.T. tried to conceal the theft. Indeed, Galdamez, who has participated in about 350 theft investigations at Target over three years, testified that the two girls appeared to be "trying to leave the store without anyone seeing them passing through the [checkout] lanes." F.T.'s knowledge can be inferred from the attendant circumstances of the theft. (Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 378.) Her attempts to conceal the theft indicate she knew her conduct was wrongful.
Moreover, F.T.'s mother testified at the hearing that F.T. is a smart girl who attends a Christian church and that she has talked to F.T. about "essential" portions of the Bible. It is difficult to believe that a smart girl, nearly 13 years old, who attends church and has some knowledge of the Bible would not know stealing is wrong. (See Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 378.) F.T.'s mother also testified that she was disappointed to learn that F.T. had been arrested for stealing. It can be inferred from her disappointment over the theft that she had taught F.T. stealing is wrong. Generally, she would have no reason to be disappointed if she had never taught F.T. this principle.
F.T.'s mother asserted her Fifth Amendment right when asked whether she had ever taught F.T. that stealing is wrong. She could not recall whether she had taught F.T. that the Bible says stealing is wrong. --------
III
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
MOORE, J. WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. IKOLA, J.