Opinion
No. 1-14-1409
08-31-2015
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DARYL FRYER, Defendant-Appellee.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 11 CR 20175 Honorable Sharon M. Sullivan, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Connors and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Trial court properly granted the defendant's petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)) seeking relief from the defendant's 2012 conviction for being an armed habitual criminal. The 2012 conviction could not stand because it relied on a prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of weapon pursuant to a statutory provision held unconstitutional by our supreme court in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. The prior conviction was void ab initio and could not serve as a predicate offense to support the defendant's armed habitual criminal conviction. ¶ 2 The People of the State of Illinois (the State) appeals from an April 2014 order of the circuit court of Cook County granting defendant-appellee Daryl Fryer's petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)) and vacating the defendant's 2012 conviction under section 24-1.7 of the Criminal Code of 2012 for being an armed habitual criminal (AHC). See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2012). The trial court concluded that the AHC conviction could not stand because it was based, in part, on a prior conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) pursuant to a statutory provision held unconstitutional by our supreme court in People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 The defendant's 2012 AHC conviction at issue in this appeal was based, in part, on two predicate convictions in 2005 and 2009. In September 2005, in a prior case, the defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of AUUW for violating a statutory provision which, at the time, criminalized the possession of an uncased, loaded, accessible firearm outside of one's home. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) (West 2004). In exchange for that plea, the defendant received a sentence of 18 months' probation. In a separate case in 2009, the defendant was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF). The predicate for that UUWF offense was a 2006 conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. The factual bases for these prior offenses are not at issue in this appeal. ¶ 5 The AHC charge at issue in the instant case arose from the defendant's arrest by Officer Tovar of the Chicago Police Department in the early morning hours of November 2, 2011. According to Officer Tovar, at approximately 3:00 a.m., he and his partner were dispatched to the 8500 block of South Damen Avenue in Chicago following a call to police from the defendant's girlfriend regarding a domestic disturbance. ¶ 6 Officer Tovar and his partner spoke with the defendant's girlfriend at the scene, who told them that she had been in a "verbal altercation" with the defendant, after which the defendant had left with her vehicle, a black Ford Explorer. According to Officer Tovar, as he was speaking to the defendant's girlfriend, she suddenly yelled out and pointed out a black Ford Explorer traveling northbound on Damen Avenue, and told the officers that it was her vehicle. Officer Tovar testified that he observed the vehicle make a turn westbound on 86th Street without using a turn signal. Officer Tovar and his partner returned to their police car and followed the Ford Explorer, which they observed make a second turn, again without using a turn signal. ¶ 7 The officers stopped the Ford Explorer. Officer Tovar testified that he approached the vehicle and saw the defendant in the driver's seat. Officer Tovar asked the defendant for his driver's license and proof of insurance, but the defendant was unable to produce either document. According to Officer Tovar, at that time he observed an open container of beer in the Ford Explorer's center console. ¶ 8 Upon seeing the alcoholic beverage, Officer Tovar asked the defendant to exit the vehicle. After the defendant complied, Officer Tovar observed the handle of a handgun wedged between the driver's seat and the center console. Officer Tovar recovered the handgun, a loaded .38 caliber revolver, and arrested the defendant. ¶ 9 As a result of that arrest, on December 2, 2011, the defendant was charged with a total of nine counts: one count of being an AHC, two counts of UUWF, and six counts of AUUW. The AHC offense is committed where one "receives, sells, possesses, or transfers any firearm after having been convicted a total of 2 or more times" of certain enumerated offenses. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (2012). In this case, the State relied on the defendant's 2005 AUUW conviction and his 2009 UUWF conviction as the two predicate convictions to support the AHC charge. ¶ 10 The defendant moved to quash the November 2011 arrest and suppress evidence from that arrest. The court conducted a hearing on that motion on June 5, 2012, at which the defendant and Officer Tovar testified regarding the events of the night of the arrest. The defendant denied getting into an altercation with his girlfriend, but admitted that he was driving a black Ford Explorer when he was pulled over. Contrary to Officer Tovar's subsequent testimony that the vehicle made turns without signaling, the defendant testified that he had observed all traffic laws. According to the defendant, the police did not ask him for a driver's license until after he had complied with their request to exit the Ford Explorer. However, the defendant acknowledged that he told the police that his license was suspended. The defendant also denied that there was an open container of beer in the Ford Explorer. ¶ 11 After Officer Tovar testified, the defendant's counsel argued that there was no valid basis for stopping the Ford Explorer, claiming that the witness testimony and police reports conflicted as to whether the stop was based on a report of a domestic disturbance or the vehicle's failure to use a turn signal. The State argued that the stop was justified on both grounds, and that the defendant's handgun had been in plain view. The trial court, finding that Officer Tovar's testimony was credible, concluded that stopping the Ford Explorer was justified and that the handgun had been in plain view. Thus, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. ¶ 12 At that point, the defendant's counsel requested a conference with the court and the State's attorney to discuss a possible guilty plea agreement. After the conference, the defendant entered a guilty plea to the AHC charge in exchange for an eight-year prison sentence. As part of the plea agreement, the State declined to prosecute the eight remaining UUWF and AUUW charges. ¶ 13 In connection with the plea, the parties stipulated that, had the matter proceeded to trial, the State would have introduced certified copies of conviction reflecting the defendant's 2005 conviction for AUUW and his 2009 conviction for UUWF. After the defendant entered his guilty plea to the AHC charge, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, to be followed by three years of mandatory supervised release. ¶ 14 On December 9, 2013, the defendant, acting pro se, filed a section 2-1401 petition that is the subject of this appeal. That petition argued that the AHC conviction pursuant to the defendant's guilty plea could not stand because it was predicated, in part, on a 2005 AUUW conviction for violation of a statutory provision since held unconstitutional by our supreme court in Aguilar. The petition sought that the AHC conviction "be expunged *** due to the recent findings in People v. Aguilar that finds the constitutionality of the statute of [AUUW] void" and that "[w]ithout the use of the [defendant's] prior conviction of [AUUW], elements do not exist to establish Armed Habitual Criminal." On December 18, 2013, the trial court appointed the public defender to represent the defendant. ¶ 15 On February 21, 2014, the defendant's counsel filed a "supplemental motion for relief from judgment" as a supplement to the initial pro se petition. That submission argued that relief from the AHC conviction was warranted solely because the 2005 AUUW conviction was based on a statute held unconstitutional in Aguilar and that "[w]ithout this previous invalid conviction for [AUUW], Mr. Fryer's guilty plea to [AHC] in this case cannot stand." The supplemental motion did not seek to collaterally attack either the 2009 or 2005 convictions; rather, the defendant argued that "vacating Mr. Fryer's 2012 guilty plea to [AHC] does not involve vacating his conviction in the 2005 [AUUW] case but is premised exclusively on the fact that one of the elements in the prosecution of the case *** from 2012 has been found to be void." ¶ 16 On April 4, 2014, the State moved to dismiss the section 2-1401 petition. In that motion, the State acknowledged that in Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, our supreme court held that the AUUW statutory provision that was the basis of the defendant's 2005 conviction was facially unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the State argued that the defendant's section 2-1401 petition with respect to his 2012 AHC conviction did not give the circuit court jurisdiction to address his AUUW conviction in the prior 2005 case. The State argued that the section 2-1401 petition should be rejected "as an improper attack on a judgment which is outside this Court's jurisdiction," and that Aguilar did not apply "retroactively to cases on collateral review." ¶ 17 Separately, the State urged that the 2012 AHC conviction was valid, notwithstanding our supreme court's 2013 decision in Aguilar, because at the time of the defendant's guilty plea in 2012, "the Class 4 form of AUUW had yet to be declared unconstitutional." Relying on federal case law, the State urged that "it is the status of the prior felony conviction at the time the defendant possessed the firearm that controls, regardless of whether that prior conviction might later be found to be constitutionally invalid." Because the 2005 predicate AUUW conviction was valid at the time of the 2012 AHC guilty plea, the State argued that the subsequent Aguilar decision did not undermine that plea. ¶ 18 The parties argued their positions at a hearing on April 11, 2014. The defendant's counsel urged that the appropriate relief was to vacate the plea to the AHC conviction and conduct further proceedings on the remaining charges, conceding that "the State would be free to reinstate" the charges that had been dropped in connection with the plea. Defense counsel cited several post-Aguilar appellate court decisions that reversed convictions for AHC or UUWF when predicated on prior AUUW convictions under the statutory provision held invalid by Aguilar. Defendant's counsel urged that under such precedent, his 2005 AUUW conviction was void ab initio and thus "can be attacked at any time either directly or collaterally." With respect to the State's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to challenge the 2005 conviction, the defendant's counsel stated: "He's not trying to challenge the '05 conviction. He's trying to challenge the guilty plea that is premised upon the '05 conviction." ¶ 19 The State reiterated its argument that the 2012 AHC conviction was proper because, as of the defendant's November 2011 arrest, the defendant's prior felonies were valid because Aguilar had not been decided. The State again argued that the court "does not have jurisdiction *** to go back and look at the '05 conviction." ¶ 20 At a hearing on April 25, 2014, the trial court granted the defendant's section 2-1401 petition. The trial court noted that to support the charge of AHC, "the State's proffer included two predicate offenses, one of which was for [AUUW] under 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1)," which "is the statute declared unconstitutional under People v. Aguilar," 2013 IL 112116. The trial court observed that "this same scenario" was presented in the appellate court decision People v. Fields, 2014 IL App (1st) 110311, and that Fields had "found that the Class 4 [AUUW], which was void based upon Aguilar, could not serve as the predicate felony" for the AHC offense. The trial court specifically quoted Fields in stating that " '[a] void conviction for a Class 4 form of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon found to be unconstitutional in Aguilar cannot now, nor can it ever, serve as a predicate offense for any charge.' " Id. ¶ 44. ¶ 21 The trial court reasoned that in the defendant's case, "[h]ere one of the elements, one of the predicate offenses offered by the [S]tate is the exact form of the statute held to be void ab initio in Aguilar. This void conviction cannot stand as proof of one of the necessary elements of armed habitual criminal." Thus, the trial court granted the section 2-1401 petition and vacated the defendant's 2012 guilty plea to the AHC offense. The trial court also reinstated all charges against the defendant, including the AHC charge to which he had pleaded guilty. ¶ 22 On May 9, 2014, the State filed a notice of appeal from the order granting the section 2-1401 petition, and the trial court stayed further proceedings pending resolution of the appeal.
The initial pro se petition also alleged (incorrectly) that the 2005 AUUW conviction was also the predicate felony offense to support the defendant's 2009 UUWF correction. However, the defendant's counsel subsequently acknowledged to the trial court that the 2009 UUWF conviction was premised on a "drunk driving offense."
The pro se petition's prayer for relief also sought "expunging" of the prior 2005 and 2009 convictions. However, after counsel was appointed, the defendant did not pursue that argument. --------
¶ 23 ANALYSIS
¶ 24 We note that we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3), which permits an appeal from an order granting relief sought by a section 2-1401 petition if filed within the time allowed by Rule 303. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 2006). The State's notice of appeal was filed within 30 days and thus is timely pursuant to Rule 303(a). Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a) (eff. May 30, 2008). ¶ 25 Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure "establishes a comprehensive, statutory procedure that allows for the vacatur of a final judgment older than 30 days." People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (2007) (citing 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2002)). "Section 2-1401 requires that the petition be filed in the same proceeding in which the order or judgment was entered, but it is not a continuation of the original action." Id. "[S]ection 2-1401 is a civil remedy that extends to criminal cases as well as to civil cases." Id. at 8. Furthermore, section 2-1401(f) expressly provides that "[n]othing contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a void 9 order or judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that relief." 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2012). ¶ 26 Our supreme court has recently explained that the applicable standard of review with respect to a section 2-1401 petition depends upon the type of challenge asserted in that petition. See Warren County Soil and Water Conservation District v. Walters, 2015 IL 117783. When a section 2-1401 petition presents a fact-dependent challenge to a final judgment, the petition must set forth allegations supporting the existence of a meritorious defense, as well as due diligence in presenting the defense and in filing the petition. Id. ¶ 51 (citing Smith v. Airoom, 114 Ill. 2d 209, 221 (1986)). In that context, "[t]he quantum of proof necessary to sustain a section 2-1401 petition is a preponderance of the evidence, and the circuit court's ultimate decision on the petition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Id. ¶ 27 However, Warren County recognized that a section 2-1401 petition "may also raise a legal challenge to a final judgment or order," id. ¶ 41, and proceeded to explain that de novo review applies in such cases. As an example, the court referred to Vincent (226 Ill. 2d 1), in which a criminal defendant asserted that his sentence of five consecutive 20-year prison terms was void, as "representative of a case involving a purely legal challenge to a final judgment under section 2-1401." Warren County, 2015 IL 117783, ¶ 42. Warren County explained that "Vincent must be viewed in its narrow context of a section 2-1401 petition that raises a purely legal challenge to a judgment by alleging that it is void under subsection (f) of section 2-1401. [Citation.] When viewed in this context, our decision to apply de novo review is consistent with established principles of appellate review for cases involving purely legal decisions." Id. ¶ 47. ¶ 28 In this case, the defendant's section 2-1401 petition, which was premised on the voidness of the 2005 AUUW conviction that was used as a predicate for his 2012 AHC conviction, raised 10 a purely legal challenge to that subsequent conviction. Thus, unlike a fact-dependent challenge, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion, we apply a de novo standard of review to the defendant's purely legal challenge to his 2012 conviction. Similarly, we note that such a petition need not establish the "due diligence" required of a fact-dependent section 2-1401 petition. See id. ¶ 48. ¶ 29 As the section 2-1401 petition at issue is dependent upon our supreme court's 2013 decision in Aguilar, we briefly review that decision and subsequent precedent from our court assessing its impact. In Aguilar, our supreme court determined that section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A) of the AUUW statute, in prohibiting possession of an "uncased, loaded and immediately accessible" firearm outside the home, 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), (d) (West 2008), violated the second amendment of the United States Constitution. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶¶ 20-21. Our supreme court in Aguilar relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), which recognized that the second amendment protects the right of citizens to bear arms for self-defense outside the home. See Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, ¶¶ 20-21. Since section 24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), and its resulting Class 4 AUUW offense, "categorically prohibit[ed] the possession and use of an operable firearm for self-defense outside the home," our supreme court concluded that it "amount[ed] to a wholesale statutory ban on the exercise of a personal right that is specifically named in and guaranteed by the United States Constitution." Id. ¶ 21. Accordingly, our supreme court held that this statutory provision and its resulting Class 4 AUUW offense were facially unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 30 Our appellate court has since held that an AUUW conviction arising from the statutory subsection held unconstitutional in Aguilar cannot serve as a predicate offense to support a 11 subsequent conviction for AHC. In People v. Fields, this court held: "[W]e cannot allow defendant's 2005 Class 4 AUUW conviction, *** based on a statute that was found to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in Aguilar, to stand as a predicate offense for defendant's armed habitual criminal conviction ***. A void conviction for the Class 4 form of AUUW found to be unconstitutional in Aguilar cannot now, nor can it ever, serve as a predicate offense for any charge." Fields, 2014 IL App (1st) 110311, ¶ 44. Later, in People v. Cowart, this court expressly reaffirmed Fields and reversed an AHC conviction on the same grounds, likewise concluding that an AUUW conviction under the invalidated statute "cannot serve as a predicate offense for any charge." (Emphasis added). People v. Cowart, 2015 IL App (1st) 113085, ¶¶ 47-48. In other decisions, this court has similarly held that a Class 4 AUUW conviction invalidated by Aguilar cannot constitute a predicate felony to support a conviction for UUWF. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130203; People v. McFadden, 2014 IL App (1st) 102939, ¶ 43 ("we are bound to apply Aguilar and vacate [the UUWF conviction] because the State did not prove an essential element of the offense where it alleged *** a predicate offense that has been declared unconstitutional and void ab initio."); People v. Claxton, 2014 IL App (1st) 132681. ¶ 31 In this appeal, the State acknowledges that the defendant's 2005 AUUW conviction was premised on the same statutory provision that was held unconstitutional in Aguilar. Nonetheless, the State makes two primary arguments for its contention that the trial court erroneously granted the defendant's section 2-1401 petition. First, the State urges that "[s]ince the 2-1401 petition was limited to the judgment of the AHC conviction entered in 2012, the trial court did not have jurisdiction in the matter of the 2005 AUUW conviction." This argument is flawed, as the defendant did not seek to vacate the guilty plea in the prior 2005 case, and the circuit court did 12 not purport to do so when it granted the section 2-1401 petition. Rather, the defendant challenged the use of that 2005 guilty plea to establish one of the predicate offenses of the AHC charge in the 2012 case that is the subject of his section 2-1401 petition. The circuit court did not need to exercise jurisdiction over the 2005 case to determine that the plea entered in that case (since held void by Aguilar) could not serve as a predicate offense to support the 2012 AHC conviction. ¶ 32 We note that we recently rejected a similar argument by the State in People v. Cowart, 2015 IL App (1st) 113085, which also challenged an AHC conviction predicated on a violation of the AUUW provision invalidated by Aguilar. In response to the State's argument that our court "ha[d] no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the defendant's predicate prior AUUW offense," our decision "emphasize[d] that the defendant's prior conviction for AUUW *** is not at issue here, nor do we make any findings as to whether Aguilar would be applicable to that conviction on a collateral attack. We also emphasize that we are not vacating the defendant's AUUW conviction *** pursuant to Aguilar." Id. ¶ 49. Similarly, in this case, the defendant has not raised a collateral attack against the 2005 AUUW guilty plea. Thus, the State's jurisdictional argument does not preclude us from deciding whether the plea from the 2005 AUUW case could support the subsequent AHC conviction in 2012. ¶ 33 The State's second argument for reversal of the trial court has also been rejected by our appellate court. Specifically, the State argues that Aguilar, decided in 2013, does not undermine the defendant's earlier AHC conviction because, at the time of the defendant's November 2011 arrest, his prior AUUW conviction was still valid. The State argues that it is "the status of the person's prior conviction at the time he or she possesses the firearm that controls, regardless of whether that prior conviction is later vacated, expunged, or declared void ab initio." Thus the 13 State argues that the only relevant inquiry is whether the defendant's prior 2005 AUUW conviction was valid at the time of the defendant's November 2011 arrest that gave rise to the instant case. ¶ 34 In support of this argument, the State relies primarily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), and decisions from other federal courts and other state courts, arguing that these cases "measure the status of the prior felony conviction at the time the person possesses the firearm, regardless of whether that prior conviction is later invalidated." In Lewis, a defendant convicted under a federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by a felon challenged that conviction, arguing that there was a constitutional violation in the prosecution of the prior predicate felony. The Lewis defendant argued that he had been convicted of the prior felony in 1961 without being provided counsel, a process which the Supreme Court subsequently declared unconstitutional. Id. at 57-8 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). The defendant argued that his lack of legal representation in the prior felony case precluded its use as a predicate offense for a subsequent charge under the federal felon-in-possession statute. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed, affirming his conviction and holding that the federal statute imposed a "firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action," such as a pardon, regardless of whether the predicate conviction was susceptible to a collateral attack on constitutional grounds. Id. at 60-61. ¶ 35 The State has sought to rely on Lewis in a number of recent appeals concerning the effect of Aguilar with respect to AHC or UUWF convictions predicated on prior AUUW offenses. "Nevertheless, as this court has repeatedly noted, Lewis is inapplicable in that it involved a predicate felony susceptible to constitutional challenge rather than a conviction under a facially 14 unconstitutional statute, as is the case with Aguilar-based appeals involving the AUUW statute." (Emphasis in original.) People v. Richardson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130203, ¶ 23 (citing People v. Cowart, 2015 IL App (1st) 113085, ¶ 48; People v. Claxton, 2014 IL App (1st) 132681)). ¶ 36 In Claxton, this court elaborated on this distinction, explaining that "a statute is facially unconstitutional only if there are no circumstances where it could be validly applied," and thus may punish constitutionally protected conduct. Id. ¶ 18. Our court explained that "while cases stating a new constitutional rule are generally not applied retroactively to cases on collateral review *** substantive rules apply retroactively" because they "carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In Claxton, our court concluded that "[t]here is no more apt description of what our supreme court did in Aguilar than that it placed particular conduct *** beyond the State's power to punish," rendering resulting AUUW convictions void. Id. As this court stated more recently in Richardson: "Because Aguilar held that the Class 4 AUUW offense produced *** a class of persons subject to criminal liability for constitutionally protected conduct (firearm possession), its determination that those convictions are void ab initio should be applied retroactively to cases on appeal." Richardson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130203, ¶ 24. ¶ 37 The foregoing precedent has squarely rejected the arguments put forth by the State in this case. In addition, as the trial court recognized, our holding in Fields is directly on point: "A void conviction for the Class 4 form of AUUW found to be unconstitutional in Aguilar cannot now, nor can it ever, serve as a predicate offense for any charge." Fields, 2014 IL App (1st) 110311, ¶ 44. Even more recently, we found "no reason to depart from" Fields and similarly held: "Because the defendant's prior conviction for AUUW was based on a statute that was found to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in Aguilar, we cannot allow it to stand as a predicate offense 15 for the defendant's armed habitual criminal conviction in the instant case." Cowart, 2015 IL App (1st) 113085, ¶ 47. In this case, we again decline to depart from the reasoning of those recent decisions addressing the identical issue presented in this appeal. ¶ 38 We acknowledge certain procedural distinctions in this case from the recent precedent discussed, but we do not find that those distinctions alter our conclusion that the defendant's AHC conviction could not be premised on his 2005 AUUW conviction. First, we note that in this case, the defendant's AHC conviction arose from a negotiated guilty plea rather than a verdict after trial. The State emphasizes that, in conjunction with his 2012 plea in this case, the defendant stipulated to the existence of the prior 2005 AUUW conviction, which had not yet been invalidated by Aguilar. Nevertheless, as our court has held that a "void conviction for *** AUUW found to be unconstitutional in Aguilar cannot now, nor can it ever, serve as a predicate offense for any charge," the 2005 AUUW conviction cannot serve as a basis for the defendant's 2012 AHC conviction, even if that subsequent conviction was obtained through a plea agreement. (Emphasis added.) Fields, 2014 IL App (1st) 110311, ¶ 44. ¶ 39 In addition, we recognize that this case does not involve a direct appeal from the 2012 AHC criminal conviction, but that the defendant instead proceeded by filing a section 2-1401 petition. Nonetheless, our cited precedent on the effect of Aguilar, including the reversal of the AHC convictions on direct appeal in Fields and Cowart, remains compelling. Thus, we conclude that the trial court correctly granted the section 2-1401 petition so as to vacate the defendant's plea to the charge of AHC. We also note that, upon vacating the guilty plea, the trial court correctly reinstated all nine charges against the defendant, including the AHC charge, as the State may be able to prove the AHC offense on the basis of predicate convictions other than the 2005 AUUW conviction that was invalidated by our supreme court's decision in Aguilar. 16 ¶ 40 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 41 Affirmed.