People v. Fryer

19 Citing cases

  1. Bhagwat v. State

    338 Md. 263 (Md. 1995)   Cited 22 times
    Noting that a special verdict would have avoided the confusion as to which basis the jury found the defendant guilty

    See Jones v. United States, 386 A.2d 308, 316 n. 7 (D.C.App. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 263, 62 L.Ed.2d 181 (1979) ("There is no question that the government's use of a plea bargain in order to induce or encourage a witness' silence cannot be tolerated."); United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Inarguably, governmental impairment of the accused's ability to call witnesses in his [or her] behalf cannot be tolerated."); People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App.3d 1051, 187 Ill.Dec. 786, 795, 618 N.E.2d 377, 386 (1993) ("It is one thing to condition a plea agreement on a witness' abstaining from testifying falsely; it may be quite another thing to condition a plea agreement on the witness' abstaining from testifying at all."); or due process, United States v. Henricksen, 564 F.2d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); State v. Fort, 101 N.J. 123, 501 A.2d 140, 144 (1985).

  2. U.S. v. Rednour

    No. 09 C 4665 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 30, 2010)

    Although it need not reach this claim, the court notes that the sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge has no obvious merit. Under Illinois law, "medical evidence is not necessary to prove a defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault." People v. York, 312 Ill. App. 3d 434, 440, 727 N.E.2d 674, 680 (2d Dist. 2000) (citing People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1058, 618 N.E.2d 377, 382 (1st Dist. 1993)). III. Trial Court Error in Sentencing Consecutively Rather Than Concurrently

  3. People v. Simms

    192 Ill. 2d 348 (Ill. 2000)   Cited 424 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that a trial court may cure errors in closing arguments by giving proper instruction on the law, informing the jury that closing arguments are not evidence, or sustaining the defendant's objections

    " Burton, 201 Ill. App.3d at 122. Accord People v. Giles, 261 Ill. App.3d 833, 845 (1994); People v. Franzen, 251 Ill. App.3d 813, 830 (1993); People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App.3d 1051, 1060 (1993); People v. Bock, 242 Ill. App.3d 1056, 1075-76 (1993). See also People v. Bofman, 283 Ill. App.3d 546, 550-51 (1996); People v. Robinson, 265 Ill. App.3d 882, 888-89 (1994); People v. Adams, 265 Ill. App.3d 181, 187 (1994); People v. Calva, 256 Ill. App.3d 865, 870 (1993).

  4. People v. McLaurin

    184 Ill. 2d 58 (Ill. 1998)   Cited 91 times
    Holding that multiple convictions for intentional murder and home invasion were proper because, although both involved the same physical act of setting a fire, the physical act of entering the dwelling of the victim was a separate act that supported the home invasion offense

    The defendant must make at least some plausible showing of how the testimony of the witness would have been both material and favorable to his defense. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1202, 102 S.Ct. at 3446; People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App.3d 1051, 1064 (1993). Evidence is material when it tends to raise a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

  5. People v. Munson

    171 Ill. 2d 158 (Ill. 1996)   Cited 117 times
    Finding of preconceived plan upheld, in part, because the defendant drove the murder victim to an isolated area so that the killing would not be observed

    Both Wright and Smith are cited for the proposition that where a peremptory challenge is demeanor based, there must be confirmation on the record that the court also observed that demeanor. We have not heretofore required confirmation on the record that the trial court observed the same demeanor as did the State. (See People v. Fryer (1993), 247 Ill. App.3d 1051, 1062 (rejecting defendant's argument that demeanor-based explanation requires confirmation by the court).) A person's demeanor, subjective as it is, is subject to more than one interpretation.

  6. People v. Linderman

    2019 Ill. App. 180472 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    However, it is well established that the lack of an injury does not disprove sexual assault. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 260 Ill. App. 3d 176, 189 (1994); People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1058 (1993). Moreover, there was no testimony that defendant ejaculated during the incident.

  7. People v. Young

    2019 Ill. App. 162782 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    But it is well established that lack of injury does not disprove sexual assault. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 260 Ill. App. 3d 176, 189 (1994); People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1058 (1993). Moreover, Dr. Patwari testified that it was reasonable for a sexual assault as described by D.J. to cause no injury or only internal injury that would not have been discovered in an external exam. ¶ 59 In a similar vein, Young argues that D.J.'s testimony was not substantiated by forensic testing.

  8. People v. Simington

    2017 Ill. App. 5th 140200 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017)

    Medical evidence is not required to sustain a conviction for these offenses, and a lack of injury does not disprove sexual abuse. People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1058 (1993); People v. Davis, 260 Ill. App. 3d 176, 189 (1994). Moreover, Christanelli testified that 90% to 95% of children's sexual abuse examinations will be normal, even where the perpetrator admitted the abuse, because the perpetrator generally tries not to physically injure the child and because children heal quickly.

  9. People v. Garcia

    2012 Ill. App. 103590 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 8 times
    Finding penetration without evidence of vaginal trauma

    ) 720 ILCS 5/12–12(f) (West 2006); see, e.g., People v. Hillier, 392 Ill.App.3d 66, 69, 331 Ill.Dec. 108, 910 N.E.2d 181 (2009) (“A jury may reasonably infer than an act of penetration occurred based on testimony that the defendant ‘rubbed,’ ‘felt’ or ‘handled’ the victim's vagina.” (quoting People v. Bell, 234 Ill.App.3d 631, 636, 175 Ill.Dec. 659, 600 N.E.2d 902 (1992))); People v. Fryer, 247 Ill.App.3d 1051, 1058, 187 Ill.Dec. 786, 618 N.E.2d 377 (1993) (finding the defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to show penetration because there was no medical evidence “untenable,” since “[i]t has been expressly rejected”); People v. Diaz, 201 Ill.App.3d 830, 834, 146 Ill.Dec. 1029, 558 N.E.2d 1363 (1990) (“Although medical testimony is of value in cases of sexual abuse, even where there is no such testimony, the testimony of the victim alone will support a conviction unless that testimony is unbelievable as a matter of law.”); People v. Morgan, 149 Ill.App.3d 733, 738, 103 Ill.Dec. 50, 500 N.E.2d 1121 (1986) (“It is not necessary that corroborating medical evidence be admitted to prove that penetration did occur.”). For instance, the defendant in People v. Moore, 199 Ill.App.3d 747, 773, 145 Ill.Dec. 767, 557 N.E.2d 537 (1990), argued that without evidence of trauma and with the victim's hymen still intact there could not have been penetration.

  10. People v. Garcia

    2012 Ill. App. 103590 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)

    720 ILCS 5/12-12(f) (West 2006); see, e.g., People v. Hillier, 392 Ill. App. 3d 66, 69 (2009) ("A jury may reasonably infer than an act of penetration occurred based on testimony that the defendant 'rubbed,' 'felt' or 'handled' the victim's vagina." (quoting People v. Bell, 234 Ill. App. 3d 631, 636 (1992)); People v. Fryer, 247 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1058 (1993) (finding the defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to show penetration because there was no medical evidence "untenable," since "[i]t has been expressly rejected"); People v. Diaz, 201 Ill. App. 3d 830, 834 (1990) ("Although medical testimony is of value in cases of sexual abuse, even where there is no such testimony, the testimony of the victim alone will support a conviction unless that testimony is unbelievable as a matter of law."); People v. Morgan, 149 Ill. App. 3d 733, 738 (1986) ("It is not necessary that corroborating medical evidence be admitted to prove that penetration did occur."). For instance, the defendant in People v. Moore, 199 Ill. App. 3d 747, 773 (1990), argued that without evidence of trauma and with the victim's hymen still intact there could not have been penetration.