Opinion
D039024.
7-23-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FRONTIER PACIFIC INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
Frontier Pacific Insurance Company (Frontier) appeals an order from a motion to set aside a forfeiture. Frontier asserts the bond was exonerated when the trial court released a criminal defendant in violation of Penal Code section 1166. We affirm the order.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
Frontier also argued the trial court exonerated the bond by imposing additional conditions. However, Frontier withdrew that argument in April 2003.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Chong Mi Bruff obtained a bail bond from Frontier for $ 50,000 in connection with criminal charges for violating several provisions of the Vehicle Code. Bruff pleaded guilty, but was not jailed pending sentencing. When Bruff did not appear at the sentencing hearing, the court forfeited the bond. Subsequently, summary judgment was entered on the forfeiture against Frontier. Frontier sought to set aside the summary judgment, but the court denied its motion.
Entry of summary judgment in these circumstances is done pursuant to a contractual consent in the bond agreement to entry of judgment upon forfeiture, after notice and expiration of the statutory period. (People v. Amwest Surety Ins. Co. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 915, 919.)
DISCUSSION
Frontier asserts the court should have granted its motion because the bond was exonerated when the trial court did not comply with section 1166 after accepting Bruffs guilty plea. At the time Frontier filed its opening brief, the Courts of Appeal were split on the issue of whether the trial court had to comply with section 1166 when a defendant pleaded guilty. (Compare People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1286 (review granted Mar. 13, 2002, S103451, review dism. May 14, 2003, cause remanded) with People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1358 (review granted Mar. 13, 2002, S104487, judg. reversed by People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 954).) Since that time, however, the Supreme Court has concluded that section 1166 does not apply to guilty pleas. (People v. Seneca Ins. Co., supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 963.) Consequently, the argument that the trial court exonerated bail by not proceeding in accordance with section 1166 following a guilty plea is "without merit." (People v. Seneca Ins. Co., supra, at p. 963.) Simply stated, nothing in section 1166 abrogates Frontiers contract with the state to pay the bond if the defendant fails to appear. (People v. Seneca Ins. Co., supra, at pp. 963-964.) Because Bruff pleaded guilty, the court need not have complied with section 1166 and correctly denied the motion to vacate the summary judgment on that ground.
Section 1166 provides: "If a general verdict is rendered against the defendant, or a special verdict is given, he or she must be remanded, if in custody, or if on bail he or she shall be committed to the proper officer of the county to await the judgment of the court upon the verdict, unless, upon considering the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged and proven, the previous criminal record of the defendant, the probability of the defendant failing to appear for the judgment of the court upon the verdict, and public safety, the court concludes the evidence supports its decision to allow the defendant to remain out on bail. When committed, his or her bail is exonerated, or if money is deposited instead of bail it must be refunded to the defendant or to the person or persons found by the court to have deposited said money on behalf of said defendant."
Frontier acknowledged the Courts of Appeal were split on the issue of whether section 1166 applied to guilty pleas and noted the Supreme Court had taken review of the issue.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
McDONALD, J., AARON, J., We Concur.