Opinion
B320531
10-31-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMES BELTON FRIERSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Daniel Milchiker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. GA043389, Dorothy L. Shubin, Judge. Remanded with instructions.
Daniel Milchiker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S. Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CURREY, P. J.
In 2001, a jury convicted defendant and appellant James Belton Frierson of two counts of stalking and two counts of misdemeanor disobeying a court order. Under the Three Strikes law, the trial court sentenced Frierson to consecutive sentences of 25 years to life in state prison on the two stalking counts. On appeal, a different panel of this court modified the judgment by staying sentencing on one of those counts under Penal Code section 654. (People v. Frierson (July 2, 2002, B149977) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2020, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) alerted the trial court that it had incorrectly awarded Frierson 251 days of custody credit and 124 days of conduct credit because, at the time he was sentenced, he was serving a term in state prison and was thus ineligible for custody credits. In its letter to the trial court, the CDCR stated: "When notified by the [CDCR] that an illegal sentence exists, the trial court is entitled to reconsider all sentencing choices[.]"
Frierson filed a motion requesting a full resentencing. Along with his motion, Frierson included exhibits documenting his efforts to participate in rehabilitation programs in prison, as well as letters of support from various members of his community outside prison. At a 2022 hearing, the trial court struck the unauthorized custody credits and denied Frierson's motion for resentencing. In support of its ruling denying Frierson's motion for resentencing, the court concluded the CDCR was only requesting correction of the credit award, the court did not have jurisdiction to resentence Frierson, and even assuming the court did have jurisdiction to resentence Frierson, it was exercising its discretion to not do so.
On appeal, Frierson argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for full resentencing. The Attorney General counters that the CDCR's notice did not trigger resentencing procedures, did not vest the trial court with jurisdiction to resentence Frierson, and did not give rise to an appealable order. Accordingly, the Attorney General argues the matter should be dismissed.
It is unclear whether the CDCR's letter granted the trial court jurisdiction to fully resentence Frierson. One could reasonably interpret the letter to mean, as the trial court concluded, that the CDCR was not granting jurisdiction for a full resentencing hearing. Indeed, the letter made no explicit reference to Penal Code section 1172.1, the statute authorizing the CDCR to grant trial courts resentencing jurisdiction. Another reasonable interpretation is that the CDRC did intend to grant the trial court jurisdiction to exercise its discretion whether to hold a full resentencing hearing. As noted above, the letter included the following general language: "When notified by the [CDCR] that an illegal sentence exists, the trial court is entitled to reconsider all sentencing choices[.]" One could reasonably interpret this language to mean the CDCR intended to grant the trial court jurisdiction to conduct a full resentencing hearing under Penal Code section 1172.1 even though it did not explicitly mention the statute in its letter. Compounding the confusion is the fact that the letter references a nearly 40-year-old Court of Appeal opinion, People v. Hill (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 831 (Hill). But Hill offers no definitive clarification whether the CDCR intended to grant the trial court jurisdiction to fully resentence Frierson, or rather, merely intended the trial court to strike the conduct award without conducting any further resentencing. In short, we cannot determine whether the CDCR granted the trial court jurisdiction and discretion to fully resentence Frierson under Penal Code section 1172.1.
Penal Code section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides, in pertinent part: "When a defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense, has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . the court may . . . at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary[,] . . . resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody, and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence."
Having noted this ambiguity, we move on to the trial court's alternative ruling - that even assuming it had jurisdiction to fully resentence Frierson, it was exercising its discretion not to do so. This ruling likewise presents a challenging question -whether or not it was an abuse of discretion. The trial court did not explain the rationale for its ruling, so we cannot conclude from the record whether the ruling was arbitrary or irrational. (See People v. Charles (2015) 61 Cal.4th 308, 333 [trial court abuses discretion if its ruling is arbitrary or irrational].)
DISPOSITION
We remand to permit the trial court to explain the rationale for its ruling.
In doing so, we do not foreclose the possibility that, on remand, the trial court may conclude it might resentence Frierson if it had the jurisdiction to do so. If so, the court may inquire of the CDCR whether the agency intended or intends to grant resentencing jurisdiction to the court. If the answer is yes, the trial court may exercise its discretion whether to hold a full resentencing hearing. (See Pen. Code, § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1) [trial court may resentence defendant at any time upon recommendation by CDCR].) If it chooses to do so, it may hold a hearing at which it resentences Frierson. If it instead decides at that time not to resentence Frierson, it shall explain the rationale behind its ruling. (See Pen. Code, § 1260 [granting appellate courts broad discretion to fashion remedy that best serves principles of fairness and justice].)
We concur: COLLINS, J., ZUKIN, J.