The trial court's admission of other-acts evidence will be upheld on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. People v. Fretch , 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 47, 412 Ill.Dec. 349, 75 N.E.3d 329. ¶ 31 In a bench trial, such as this, a trial judge is presumed to know the law and to follow it, and this presumption is rebutted only when the record affirmatively shows otherwise.

To support the latter claim, the State cited People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 367 (1991) ("evidence of defendant's prior offenses against the victim or persons in the same class with the victim is admissible to negate a claim that the victim's injury was accidental or inadvertent."). In arguing specifically that the photographs were relevant to show "defendant's interest in a particular class of individual, specifically males," which in turn showed that he was touching defendant for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification, the State cited People v. Ressa, 2019 IL App (2d) 170439, Peoplev. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 76 ("[T]he law does not shield a defendant from proof of his particular tendencies or patterns of conduct, as they might bear logically on whether he acted in conformity with them in committing the charged offense."),and People v. Gumila, 2012 IL App (2d) 110761

Just the same, the law does not shield a defendant from proof of his particular tendencies or patterns of conduct, as they might bear logically on whether he acted in conformity with them in committing the charged offense." People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 76. The probative value of the other-crimes testimony outweighed the prejudicial effect.

However, the lone authorities cited by the State in support of its forfeiture argument involved claims of ineffective assistance asserted on direct appeal, rather than in a postconviction petition. See People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 136 (where posttrial motion was filed by new counsel rather than trial counsel, the portion of defendant's claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel that was not raised in posttrial motion was "procedurally barred" on direct appeal); People v. Salgado, 366 Ill.App.3d 596, 607 (2006) ("while defendant's posttrial motion contained allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, these specific matters were not raised in that motion, which was filed by counsel different from his trial counsel and could have been raised; therefore, they are waived for consideration on appeal." (citing People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186-86 (1988))). Thus, the authorities relied on by the State are procedurally inapposite to this appeal.

Third, and needless to say, we are not bound by an opinion of another appellate district. See People v. Fretch , 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 154, 412 Ill.Dec. 349, 75 N.E.3d 329. ¶ 61 The dissent's discussion of Johnson is puzzling.

Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 182. ¶ 49 People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, provides a thorough analysis of the admissibility of other crimes evidence to establish intent when a defendant denies committing the offense. The defendant in Fretch was convicted of several offenses based on evidence that he knowingly exposed his penis and masturbated in his front doorway in the presence of G.G., a female minor.

Again, defendant neither objected to this testimony or the prosecutor's argument at trial nor raised these specific issues in his posttrial motion. See People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 86, 75 N.E.3d 329 (stating the defendant's objection to the admission of other-crimes evidence did not relieve him of the responsibility of also objecting when he believed the State was improperly using the evidence at trial and in closing argument). Thus, this argument is forfeited.

People v. DeSomer , 2013 IL App (2d) 110663, ¶ 12, 397 Ill.Dec. 886, 43 N.E.3d 527. A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. People v. Fretch , 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 47, 412 Ill.Dec. 349, 75 N.E.3d 329.¶ 91 We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion.

The only cases the State cites in support of this theory of forfeiture are inapposite because they consider only whether the defendant forfeited ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal by failing to raise the claims in a posttrial motion. See People v. Ramos, 339 Ill.App.3d 891, 900 (2003); see also People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 136; People v. Salgado, 366 Ill.App.3d 596, 607 (2006). The State cites no authority finding a claim forfeited in postconviction proceedings because the defendant failed to develop a factual record in posttrial proceedings.

The jury, as finder of fact, was in a superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and resolve conflicts in their testimony, and we will not substitute our judgment on such matters. People v. Fretch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151107, ¶ 95. Hence, we find there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's determination that the State met its burden to prove that the defendant entered the home without authority.