Opinion
June 1, 1992
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Harrington, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
We reject the defendant's contention that the trial court should have suppressed his confession because at the time he made it he was suffering from symptoms of withdrawal from heroin. A confession will only be rendered inadmissible by intoxication where the "state of intoxication has risen to the degree of mania" (People v. Adams, 26 N.Y.2d 129, 137, cert denied 399 U.S. 931; People v. Molina, 140 A.D.2d 377, 377-378), or where it "resulted in the sudden loss of his capacity to understand either the nature of his legal rights or the consequences that would follow from their waiver (see generally, People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285; People v. Bing, 146 A.D.2d 178, affd 76 N.Y.2d 331; People v. Molina, 140 A.D.2d 377)" (People v. Husbands, 171 A.D.2d 756). Here, the only evidence of the defendant's heroin withdrawal submitted at the pretrial hearing was his claim made on a physical condition questionnaire, filled out several hours after he confessed, that he was suffering from heroin withdrawal and needed a doctor. However, Detective Vessa, who had observed numerous individuals undergoing withdrawal from heroin, found the defendant to be fully alert and not showing any symptoms of heroin withdrawal. This was corroborated by Detectives Shaw and Cresswell, who found the defendant to appear normal, with no signs of distress, no "track marks" on his arms, and "Lucid. Aware. Coherent". Therefore, the defendant's claim that his drug withdrawal rendered his confession involuntary is not supported by the record (see, People v. Monzon, 167 A.D.2d 357).
We likewise reject the defendant's contention that the trial court improperly restricted his cross-examination of the complainant. The court permitted cross-examination about whether the complainant herself had possessed or trafficked in illegal drugs and only precluded the defendant's counsel from questioning her as to her husband's activities and the charges against him. These were reasonable limitations on forays into collateral matters (see, e.g., People v. Chin, 67 N.Y.2d 22, 32).
We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be without merit. Lawrence, J.P., Eiber, O'Brien and Copertino, JJ., concur.