Opinion
2021-05647 Ind 4404/12
10-14-2021
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gordon Francis, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal No. 14359 Case No. 2018-4661
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Megan D. Byrne of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Rebecca Hausner of counsel), for respondent.
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York (Megan D. Byrne of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Rebecca Hausner of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Gische, J.P., Moulton, González, Kennedy, Scarpulla, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Melissa Jackson, J.), rendered July 18, 2018, as amended August 23, 2018, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the second degree, and sentencing him to a term of 25 years to life, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348-349 [2007]).
There is no basis for disturbing the jury's credibility determinations, or its evaluation of forensic and circumstantial evidence.
After considering the factors set forth in People v Taranovich (37 N.Y.2d 442, 445 [1975]), we conclude that the court properly denied defendant's speedy trial motion. Although the delay while the case was pending was substantial, and defendant was incarcerated, the delay was satisfactorily explained. Most of the delay was attributable to motion practice, defense counsel's schedule, and DNA testing to which defendant consented. The review of over 2, 000 recorded phone calls by counsel and the defense expert's review of the report on the DNA evidence also contributed to the delay. Furthermore, defendant has not established that the delay impaired his defense. Given the seriousness of the charges and the need to develop DNA and other evidence as fully as possible, we find that the delay did not violate defendant's constitutional rights.
The court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statement. The record supports the court's finding that the statement was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, notwithstanding that his arraignment on his arrest for a sex offender registration violation was briefly delayed by interrogation regarding the homicide for which he was a suspect (see People v Jin Cheng Lin, 26 N.Y.3d 701, 723-725 [2016]). There was nothing unlawful about arresting defendant on one case, for which there was probable cause, in order to speak to him about another case (see People v Torres, 145 A.D.3d 442 [1st Dept 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 953 [2017]).