Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. SCD192525, Albert T. Harutunian, III, Judge.
O'ROURKE, J.
A jury convicted Glenn Francis of two counts of using personal identifying information of another. (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a).) The court sentenced him to 180 days in jail and three years' probation.
On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for discovery of police officer's personnel files under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mark Heliger allowed his friend, Glenn Francis, to stay at his mother's house after she died. Heliger subsequently discovered that Francis had made purchases on a credit card bearing his mother's name, and reported the matter to San Diego Police Department Detective Tom Odaniell, who investigated.
At trial, Heliger testified that on July 21, 2005, pursuant to a search warrant, Detective Odaniell searched Heliger's mother's house. Another detective cursorily searched Francis's car and returned the car keys to Heliger. About 20 minutes later, Heliger opened the trunk of the car and found a satchel with checkbooks, bank statements and credit card statements with his parents' names on them. Heliger took the satchel to Detective Odaniell. Odaniell's trial testimony was in accord.
Francis moved in limine to obtain discovery of Detective Odaniell's personnel files from the San Diego Police Department under Evidence Code section 1043 and Pitchess. Specifically, the motion requested:
"1. Copies of all records, reports, investigative reports, and tape recordings filed, pending, completed, or otherwise made, and all other writings pertaining to any interviews of Mark Heliger that were completed as part of an internal affairs complaint filed by Glenn Francis against San Diego Police Department Detective Tom Odaniell (ID # 4167) [¶] 2. Copies of all records, reports, investigative reports, and tape recordings filed, pending, completed, or otherwise made, and all other writings pertaining to any interviews of Det. Tom Odaniell (ID # 4167) that were completed as part of an internal affairs complaint filed by Glenn Francis against San Diego Police Department Detective Tom Odaniell (ID # 4167)."
Francis's motion sought the statements that Odaniell and Heliger made to the investigators because Francis believed Heliger lied in claiming Francis obtained the credit cards, and Francis's defense to the charges was that Heliger had committed the charged crimes. Defense counsel's declaration in support of Francis's Pitchess motion stated that at some undefined time after Detective Odaniell's search of the house and car, Francis "filed a complaint against Detective Odaniell," which "initiated an internal affairs investigation regarding [Detective] Odaniell's conduct in this case." The declaration further stated that Heliger and Odaniell were interviewed during the investigation and, "In order to properly defend Glenn Francis and impeach Mark Heliger, I need all statements made by Mark Heliger in this case."
The trial court denied the motion, ruling that under Pitchess, Francis had not provided a proper factual foundation for the discovery.
DISCUSSION
In Pitchess, the California Supreme Court held that "a criminal defendant has a limited right to discovery of peace officer personnel records in order to ensure 'a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.' " (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1038, fn. 3, quoting Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d. at p. 535.) Based on the accused's need for disclosure as well as an officer's privacy expectations, and to prevent abuses, the Legislature codified the court's decision in Pitchess and set out procedures designed to implement the court's discovery rule. (Pen. Code, §§ 832.5, 832.7, 832.8; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1047; see People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226).)
To obtain Pitchess information, the defendant must file a written motion. (Evid. Code, § 1043 subd. (a).) It must describe "the type of records or information sought" and include "[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records." (Evid. Code, § 1043, subds. (b)(2) & (3).) This good cause showing is a "relatively low threshold for discovery." (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 83.) If the defendant establishes good cause, the court must review the records in camera to determine what, if any, information should be disclosed. (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b).) When presented with such a motion, the trial court rules as to whether there is good cause for disclosure. (Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 1045.)
This court has explained that a good cause showing "exists if the defendant demonstrates both (1) a 'specific factual scenario' that establishes a 'plausible factual foundation' for the allegations of officer misconduct [citations], and (2) that the misconduct would (if credited) be material to the defense.... [T]he materiality element requires the defendant to establish a logical link between the pending charge and the proposed defense, and to articulate how the requested discovery will support the proffered defense. [Citation.] Accordingly, defense counsel's supporting declaration must propose a defense and articulate how the requested discovery may be admissible as direct or impeachment evidence in support of the proposed defense, or how the requested discovery may lead to such evidence. [Citation.] Thus, a defendant meets the materiality element by showing: (1) a logical connection between the charges and the proposed defense; (2) the requested discovery is factually specific and tailored to support the claim of officer misconduct; (3) the requested discovery supports the proposed defense or is likely to lead to information that will do so; and (4) the requested discovery is potentially admissible at trial." (Giovanni B. v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 312, 319.)
We review the trial court's disclosure ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 827; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220; Haggerty v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1086 (Haggerty).) An abuse of discretion only exists where the court acted in an "arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice." (People v. Jordan (1986) 42 Cal.3d 308, 316.)
We agree with the trial court that Francis did not provide a proper factual foundation for his Pitchess motion. The declaration supporting the motion fails to explain the nature of the misconduct that Odaniell allegedly committed. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel clarified that the motion was not brought because Detective Odaniell had committed misconduct, stating, "this is not a case in which the defendant is claiming misconduct on the part of the officer and is seeking access to items in his personnel records for that reason." It is unclear what information in Odaniell's personnel file relating to the misconduct investigation is relevant to support Francis's proposed defense for the charge of identity theft, or can lead to information that will do so. Moreover, the discovery Francis sought — "copies of all records, reports, investigative reports and tape recordings filed in the investigation" — was not factually specific and tailored to support the request.
Further, Francis seeks "all statements made by Mark Heliger regarding this investigation" during the internal police investigation. But we explained in Haggerty, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 1079 that in the more typical Pitchess context in which a criminal defendant seeks discovery of prior third party complaints to prove the arresting officer had a history of engaging in violent acts to support the criminal defendant's excessive force/self defense claims, the courts have generally limited the criminal defendant to "the names, addresses and telephone numbers of the prior complainants/witnesses unless the defendant shows he or she has been unsuccessful in obtaining the relevant information" based on the rationale that "the actual documents of third party complaint information often have minimal relevance and constitute a substantial invasion of officer privacy." (Haggerty, supra, at p. 1090.) Here, the disclosure rules governing the typical Pitchess motion would apply. Francis did not make a showing that he was unable to obtain information about whether Heliger was guilty of the charged crimes by other means, including by cross-examining Heliger at trial.
Even assuming the trial court had granted Francis's Pitchess motion, it was presented with no basis for disclosing all of Mark Heliger's statements that Francis sought; but rather it would disclose only the identifying information included in Odaniell's personnel files. But Francis did not request Mark Heliger's identifying information, which Francis presumably knew based on their friendship, and therefore he was not prejudiced by the denial of the Pitchess motion. "To obtain relief, then, a defendant who has established that the trial court erred in denying Pitchess discovery must also demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the evidence been disclosed." (People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 182.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P. J., McDONALD, J.