Therefore, absent plain error, defendant has waived this contention. People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 553 (2001). Defendant argues that the restitution order is void and therefore may be attacked at any time. He claims that the order is void because it was beyond the trial court's sentencing authority. See People v. Jones, 176 Ill. App. 3d 460, 465 (1988) (restitution order reviewed despite failure to preserve issue where trial court improperly reserved for a date after sentencing hearing consideration of defendant's ability to pay).

" However, "[t]he State correctly points out that the defendant has waived these objections because he did not raise them at the sentencing hearing." People v. Eades, 123 Ill. App. 3d 113, 119 (1984); see also People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 553 (2001). Moreover, where it can be inferred from the record that the trial court properly determined that restitution was warranted, the court's failure to explicitly state its reasons for ordering restitution will not render its restitution order void.

To preserve a sentencing issue for appellate review, the defendant must raise the issue in a postsentencing motion. People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 552, 745 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (2001), appeal denied, 195 Ill. 2d 561, 754 N.E.2d 1288 (2001). Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides, however, that we may review "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights," even though the defendant did not object to such errors in a posttrial motion.

First, English and Ruiz fail to take into account the well-established principle that a trial court's failure to apply a sentencing statute correctly does not necessarily render the sentence wholly invalid as a matter of law. Where the court imposes an excessive sentence because of a mistake of law or fact, the sentence is merely voidable, and the error can be waived. See People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 552 (2001), citing People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149 (1993). Second, while a sentence, or portion thereof, not authorized by statute is void ( People v. Thompson, 209 Ill. 2d at 23), it is void only to the extent that it exceeds what the law permits.

¶ 34 We agree that Monroe forfeited his argument on the double enhancement claim. See People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 553 (2001) (sentencing claim of improper restitution forfeited where not specifically mentioned in post-sentencing motion). We also have held, however, that claims of improper double enhancements are reviewable as second-prong plain error.

Id. If, however, an order is improper because of a mistake of either law or fact, it is voidable and the error can be forfeited. People v. Fouts, 319 Ill.App.3d 550, 552, 253 Ill.Dec. 750, 745 N.E.2d 1284 (2001). As the State notes, the restitution order was entered without objection and defendant did not challenge the restitution amount in her motion to reconsider the sentence.

Id. If, however, an order is improper because of a mistake of either law or fact, it is voidable and the error can be forfeited. People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 552 (2001). As the State notes, the restitution order was entered without objection and defendant did not challenge the restitution amount in her motion to reconsider the sentence.

Id. If, however, an order is improper because of a mistake of either law or fact, it is voidable and the error can be forfeited. People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 552 (2001). As the State notes, the restitution order was entered without objection and defendant did not challenge the restitution amount in her motion to reconsider the sentence.

The record indicates that S.G.'s grandfather drove S.G. from Arkansas to Illinois and back numerous times during the pendency of the defendant's criminal proceedings and incurred additional expenses driving S.G. to and from an anger management support group that had met eight times at a location approximately 40 miles from their home in Arkansas. On appeal, correctly noting that a restitution order that is not authorized by statute is void and can be challenged as such at any time (see People v. Fouts, 319 Ill. App. 3d 550, 552 (2001)), the defendant contends that the trial court's restitution order is void because S.G.'s grandfather is not a "victim" for purposes of the statute that authorizes restitution ( 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 2008)). The defendant alternatively suggests that the restitution order should be set aside because the trial court failed to consider his ability to pay restitution and failed to specify, inter alia, a payment schedule.