Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 06WF3137, Thomas M. Goethals, Judge.
Allison K. Stanley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Scott C. Taylor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
O’LEARY, ACTING P. J.
Carrie Dunn Ford appeals from her conviction for possession of methamphetamine for sale. While conceding she possessed the methamphetamine, Ford argues there is insufficient evidence to support the finding it was for sale as opposed to her personal use. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Ford checked into a motel in Fountain Valley. She paid cash for a one-night stay in room No. 304. The next morning, Fountain Valley Police Officer Steve DeSantis stopped at the motel because it has a history of high levels of narcotics activity. After speaking with the motel’s manager, DeSantis and another officer went to room No. 304.
DeSantis knocked on the door, and Ford answered after about one minute. DeSantis asked Ford if she had anything illegal in the room. Ford responded that she had methamphetamine on the nightstand. Upon entering the room, DeSantis noticed three separate baggies of methamphetamine and a methamphetamine pipe on the nightstand. Although DeSantis did not think Ford was high when she answered the door, he believed she was a drug user based on the combination of her stained and decayed teeth, and the used methamphetamine pipe.
The three bags of methamphetamine were of two different sizes. The large bag weighed approximately eight grams and each of the two smaller bags weighed approximately two grams. In addition to the bags of methamphetamine and the pipe, DeSantis found a large plastic bag containing 24 smaller baggies inside a computer bag, and a California identification card and $38 in cash inside Ford’s purse.
On both direct and cross-examination, DeSantis testified to his considerable experience with narcotics-related crimes during his 10 years as a police officer. He had 300 hours of training regarding methamphetamine, and was responsible for training new officers in recognizing the physical substance, the signs of use, and the indicia of possession for sale. On cross-examination, DeSantis agreed his primary area of focus is in gang-related crimes.
DeSantis testified the typical methamphetamine purchase ranges from a “teener” (1.75 grams) to an “8-ball” (3.5 grams). The typical dose is one-tenth of a gram. An average user will dose twice a day, and the typical amount of possession of methamphetamine for personal use is between one-quarter of a gram and three grams. DeSantis testified a hardcore methamphetamine user might use up to three grams a day. He also testified most drug dealers are also users.
Despite the lack of common tools of the drug dealing trade in Ford’s room, such as counter surveillance technology, scales, phones, cutting tools, cutting agents, and pay/owe sheets, DeSantis believed Ford possessed the methamphetamine for the purpose of sale because of the large quantity of the drug, the packaging materials, and the packaging of the two smaller bags which were a typical purchasing size. Even without the extra 24 baggies, the quantity of methamphetamine possessed alone led DeSantis to believe the drugs were possessed for sale.
The motel manager testified there was no evidence of any complaints during Ford’s stay. Ford could not make any outgoing telephone calls from her room because she had not paid the required deposit. There was no record of Ford receiving any telephone calls during her stay, and the closest pay phone was 75 yards away.
Ford was found guilty of one count of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (§ 11364). In a bifurcated trial, the court found true various enhancement allegations pertaining to Ford’s prior drug-related convictions and prison terms. She was sentenced to a total prison term of five years.
All further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.
DISCUSSION
Ford asserts neither the testimony of DeSantis nor the surrounding circumstances suggest she possessed the methamphetamine with the intent to sell. We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion she possessed the methamphetamine for the purpose of sale.
Standard of Review
When evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must review the entire record in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and decide whether there exists substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 562 (Johnson).) For evidence to be “substantial,” it must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 139.) Where the evidence of guilt is primarily circumstantial, the standard of review is the same. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 668.)
Possession for Sale
Ford was convicted of possession of methamphetamine for sale. For the jury to convict Ford, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Ford possessed a controlled substance; (2) she knew of its presence; (3) she knew the substance was a controlled substance; (4) she possessed the controlled substance with the intent to sell it; (5) the controlled substance was methamphetamine; and (6) the controlled substance was in a usable amount. (§ 11378; People v. Parra (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 222, 226 (Parra).)
The only issue on appeal is whether Ford had the intent to sell the methamphetamine; Ford does not deny she knowingly possessed the controlled substance. “Intent to sell may be established by circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (People v. Harris (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 371, 374.)
Sufficiency of the Evidence
A successful sufficiency of the evidence challenge requires there be no substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding, and that is not the case here. (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 562.) The testimony of an experienced police officer constitutes substantial evidence when determining whether the facts of a case indicate the possession of a controlled substance was for the purpose of sale. (People v. Douglas (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1691, 1695.) Previous cases rely on the opinions of experienced officers regarding narcotics possession with the purpose of sale based on quantity, packaging, and normal use, and we adhere to the precedent. (People v. Newman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 48, 53 (Newman), disapproved on another point in People v. Daniels (1975) 14 Cal.3d 857, 862; Parra, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 227.)
DeSantis’s testimony falls within the scope of these prior decisions because his opinion rested on the large quantity of methamphetamine, the packaging of the methamphetamine, and the packaging materials Ford possessed. Although Ford questions DeSantis’s expertise, we defer to the trier of fact on credibility issues. (See Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) Although DeSantis’s main investigatory focus was in gang-related crime, his 300 hours of training and responsibilities as a training officer for methamphetamine-related crimes provided sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude he was experienced in investigating drug-related crime. The jury could reasonably rely on that experience and therefore his testimony regarding the possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale constitutes substantial evidence.
Ford attempts to distinguish her case from others in which the testimony of experienced officers was held to be substantial evidence. Ford argues the quantities of controlled substances possessed in those cases were much larger, and the circumstantial evidence in those cases does not perfectly align with her case. We are not convinced by her distinctions.
First, where the quantity of a controlled substance greatly exceeds that normally possessed for personal use, a conclusion the substance was possessed with the specific intent to sell is appropriate. (Parra, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 227; People v. Ingram (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 673, 681 (Ingram).) In the instant case, Ford possessed approximately 10 to 12 grams of methamphetamine. According to DeSantis’s testimony, that amount translates to between 100 and 120 doses. Because a typical user doses twice a day, the amount in Ford’s possession would last the average user 50 to 60 days.
Although 10 to 12 grams of methamphetamine is less than the quantity found in some cases to greatly exceed possession for personal use (e.g., Parra, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 225 [one kilogram of cocaine]; Ingram, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 681 [331.1 grams of cocaine]), the amount of methamphetamine possessed by Ford is far greater than an average methamphetamine user would possess for personal use. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment below, and “[i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s finding, [we] may not reverse the judgment merely because . . . the circumstances might also support a contrary finding. [Citations.]” (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1139.) A jury could have believed Ford’s claim she was a heavy drug user capable of ingesting the large amount she possessed on her own, but this jury did not. Because a rational jury could also reasonably conclude the approximately 100 average doses Ford possessed to be far greater than the possession required for normal use, we cannot reverse the jury’s verdict.
Second, despite the absence of many of the additional circumstantial factors found in other cases to support the charge of possession with intent to sell (e.g. scales, cellphones, cutting tools, cutting agents, pay/owe sheets, etc.), those circumstantial factors only support the inference of possession for sale and are not dispositive. (See Ingram, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d at p. 681 [presence of a scale not essential element of possession for sale].) In Parra, the officers relied upon multiple factors in concluding defendants possessed cocaine with the intent to sell: (1) the packaging of the substance; (2) the amount of the substance; (3) the concealment of the substance; (4) the lack of drug paraphernalia; and (5) that neither defendant appeared to be under the influence of narcotics. (Parra, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.) Ford suggests all these elements are necessary to support an inference of intent to sell. She asserts the presence of drug paraphernalia in her room indicates she did not intend to sell the drugs, but rather to use them. We do not adopt Ford’s position. No one specific factor was required to support the inference in Parra that defendant’s possession was with the intent to sell. Quantity and packaging are alone sufficient to support the inference, and the fact Ford might have also used the drugs does not negate the inference. (Newman, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 53; Parra, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 227.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: FYBEL, J., IKOLA, J.