, In re White, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 210; In re Perez (1966) 65 Cal.2d 224, 227, fn. 1 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 414, 418 P.2d 6]; People v. Mahan (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 28, 31-33 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 428]; People v. Rogers (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 1015, 1018 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 48]), or to the probation officer, who must then inform the trial court of the probationer's prison commitment (see, e.g., In re Wimbs (1966) 65 Cal.2d 490, 497-498, fn. 5 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 222, 421 P.2d 70]; People v. Willett (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 603]; People v. Ruster, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at pp. 868-869; People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283] ). "It is an unenviable chore to consider section 1203.2a.
" ( In re White, supra, 1 Cal.3d 207, 211, fn. omitted. See also People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283].)
(1) The legislative purpose underlying section 1203.2a is to prevent the inadvertent denial of the benefit of concurrent sentencing under Penal Code section 669 and is structured to preclude the mechanical imposition of consecutive sentences by depriving the court of further jurisdiction over the defendant if the court fails to act within 60 days following notification of defendant's confinement. (See In re White (1969) 1 Cal.3d 207, 211 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 780, 460 P.2d 980]; People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283]; People v. Martinez (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 736, 741-742 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 362, 121 Cal.Rptr. 443].) However, in the absence of a defendant's strict compliance with the statutory requirements, no ouster of jurisdiction will result. (See, e.g., People v. Ruster (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 865, 871 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 572]; In re Brown (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 659, 665 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 71].)
To the extent prior appellate decisions indicated the probation-granting court loses jurisdiction over a previously unsentenced defendant only if the court or probation officer fails to act after defendant has made a proper request for absentee sentencing, we disapprove such statements in those cases. (See In re Walters (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1554, fn. 7 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 279]; Willett, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 8-9; People v. Johnson, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 515; People v. Jones, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1456; People v. Ruster, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at pp. 870-871; In re Brown,supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 665; People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283].) According to the statute's second paragraph, the probation officer also "may" report the probationer's confinement to the court upon "learning" of it from any source.
Moreover, the procedure seeks to give prisoners the benefit of prompt sentencing or other final disposition while avoiding the government's expenditure of time and funds to produce imprisoned defendants for unnecessary court appearances. ( People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283]; Senate Fact Finding Com. on Judiciary Report, Post-Conviction Procedures (Jan. 1963) p. 51, Appendix to Journal of Sen. (1963 Reg. Sess.) vol. 1, hereafter cited as Sen. Com. Rep.
Jones was such a person as would have been eligible for the application of section 1203.2a, should he have so elected. (1) It has been held, as to such state prison inmates' requests for sentencing, that there must be " strict compliance" with section 1203.2a ( Pompi v. Superior Court (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 503, 507 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 52]; People v. Ruster (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 865, 871 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 572]), "in the manner prescribed by the section" ( People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283]) upon "a proper notification in writing" ( In re Brown (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 659, 665 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 71]), and upon "adequate notice" ( Pompi v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 507). The need for "a properly attested request" has been emphasized.
The only provision which imposes a duty upon the probation officer to report is the second paragraph, which requires him to act within 30 days after having been notified by the defendant, his counsel or a prison representative. (See People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283].) The record does not show any such notice was given to the probation officer in the case at bench so that the concluding sentence of the section has no application here.
In the judicial history of Penal Code section 1203.2a no court has suggested that it implements, or relates in any way to, the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial. (See In re White, 1 Cal.3d 207, 81 Cal.Rptr. 780, 460 P.2d 980; In re Perez, 65 Cal.2d 224, 232, 53 Cal.Rptr. 414, 418 P.2d 6: In re Osslo, 51 Cal.2d 371, 380, 334 P.2d 1; In re Roberts, 40 Cal.2d 745, 255 P.2d 782; People v. Williams, 24 Cal.2d 848, 151 P.2d 244; In re Morgan, 267 Cal.App.2d 438, 73 Cal.Rptr. 196; People v. Von Latta, 258 Cal.App.2d 329, 348, 65 Cal.Rptr. 651; People v. Rogers, 252 Cal.App.2d 1015, 1020-1021, 61 Cal.Rptr. 48; People v. Ford, 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 49 Cal.Rptr. 283; People v. Wendes, 237 Cal.App.2d 814, 47 Cal.Rptr. 310; People v. Fisherman, 237 Cal.App.2d 356, 362, 47 Cal.Rptr. 33; In re Ramey, 234 Cal.App.2d 459, 44 Cal.Rptr. 473; People v. Sogoian, 232 Cal.App.2d 430, 436, 42 Cal.Rptr. 736; People v. De Waele, 224 Cal.App.2d 512, 516, 36 Cal.Rptr. 825; In re Klein, 197 Cal.App.2d 58, 17 Cal.Rptr. 71; People v. Knight, 193 Cal.App.2d 248, 14 Cal.Rptr. 77; In re klein, 75 Cal.App.2d 600, 171 P.2d 471.) It is noted that the Legislature, in enacting section 1203.2a, specifically refrained from extending its operation to probationers who are sentenced to a county jail for a subsequent offense.