People v. Ford

8 Citing cases

  1. In re Walters

    39 Cal.App.4th 1546 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 10 times
    Ordering trial court to terminate probation

    , In re White, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 210; In re Perez (1966) 65 Cal.2d 224, 227, fn. 1 [ 53 Cal.Rptr. 414, 418 P.2d 6]; People v. Mahan (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 28, 31-33 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 428]; People v. Rogers (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 1015, 1018 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 48]), or to the probation officer, who must then inform the trial court of the probationer's prison commitment (see, e.g., In re Wimbs (1966) 65 Cal.2d 490, 497-498, fn. 5 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 222, 421 P.2d 70]; People v. Willett (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1, 6 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 603]; People v. Ruster, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at pp. 868-869; People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283] ). "It is an unenviable chore to consider section 1203.2a.

  2. In re Brown

    19 Cal.App.3d 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 14 times

    " ( In re White, supra, 1 Cal.3d 207, 211, fn. omitted. See also People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283].)

  3. Pompi v. Superior Court

    139 Cal.App.3d 503 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 15 times
    In Pompi, the court lost jurisdiction due to the probation officer's failure to comply with section 1203.2a and the court granted the defendant's mandate to vacate an order of commitment and directed it to terminate probation.

    (1) The legislative purpose underlying section 1203.2a is to prevent the inadvertent denial of the benefit of concurrent sentencing under Penal Code section 669 and is structured to preclude the mechanical imposition of consecutive sentences by depriving the court of further jurisdiction over the defendant if the court fails to act within 60 days following notification of defendant's confinement. (See In re White (1969) 1 Cal.3d 207, 211 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 780, 460 P.2d 980]; People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283]; People v. Martinez (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 736, 741-742 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 362, 121 Cal.Rptr. 443].) However, in the absence of a defendant's strict compliance with the statutory requirements, no ouster of jurisdiction will result. (See, e.g., People v. Ruster (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 865, 871 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 572]; In re Brown (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 659, 665 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 71].)

  4. In re Hoddinott

    12 Cal.4th 992 (Cal. 1996)   Cited 101 times

    To the extent prior appellate decisions indicated the probation-granting court loses jurisdiction over a previously unsentenced defendant only if the court or probation officer fails to act after defendant has made a proper request for absentee sentencing, we disapprove such statements in those cases. (See In re Walters (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1554, fn. 7 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 279]; Willett, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at pp. 8-9; People v. Johnson, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 515; People v. Jones, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1456; People v. Ruster, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d at pp. 870-871; In re Brown,supra, 19 Cal.App.3d at p. 665; People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283].) According to the statute's second paragraph, the probation officer also "may" report the probationer's confinement to the court upon "learning" of it from any source.

  5. Hayes v. Superior Court

    6 Cal.3d 216 (Cal. 1971)   Cited 59 times
    In Hayes, the defendant was placed on probation in 1968, for an offense committed in San Bernardino County in California.

    Moreover, the procedure seeks to give prisoners the benefit of prompt sentencing or other final disposition while avoiding the government's expenditure of time and funds to produce imprisoned defendants for unnecessary court appearances. ( People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283]; Senate Fact Finding Com. on Judiciary Report, Post-Conviction Procedures (Jan. 1963) p. 51, Appendix to Journal of Sen. (1963 Reg. Sess.) vol. 1, hereafter cited as Sen. Com. Rep.

  6. People v. Jones

    189 Cal.App.3d 1453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    Jones was such a person as would have been eligible for the application of section 1203.2a, should he have so elected. (1) It has been held, as to such state prison inmates' requests for sentencing, that there must be " strict compliance" with section 1203.2a ( Pompi v. Superior Court (1982) 139 Cal.App.3d 503, 507 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 52]; People v. Ruster (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 865, 871 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 572]), "in the manner prescribed by the section" ( People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283]) upon "a proper notification in writing" ( In re Brown (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 659, 665 [ 97 Cal.Rptr. 71]), and upon "adequate notice" ( Pompi v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 507). The need for "a properly attested request" has been emphasized.

  7. People v. Como

    49 Cal.App.3d 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 16 times
    In Como, the court found the document insufficient where it reported the sentence, but not the commitment or confinement.

    The only provision which imposes a duty upon the probation officer to report is the second paragraph, which requires him to act within 30 days after having been notified by the defendant, his counsel or a prison representative. (See People v. Ford (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 946 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 283].) The record does not show any such notice was given to the probation officer in the case at bench so that the concluding sentence of the section has no application here.

  8. People v. Valdespino

    15 Cal.App.3d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)   Cited 2 times
    In Valdespino, the California court was faced with a situation where imposition of sentence was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for two years.

    In the judicial history of Penal Code section 1203.2a no court has suggested that it implements, or relates in any way to, the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial. (See In re White, 1 Cal.3d 207, 81 Cal.Rptr. 780, 460 P.2d 980; In re Perez, 65 Cal.2d 224, 232, 53 Cal.Rptr. 414, 418 P.2d 6: In re Osslo, 51 Cal.2d 371, 380, 334 P.2d 1; In re Roberts, 40 Cal.2d 745, 255 P.2d 782; People v. Williams, 24 Cal.2d 848, 151 P.2d 244; In re Morgan, 267 Cal.App.2d 438, 73 Cal.Rptr. 196; People v. Von Latta, 258 Cal.App.2d 329, 348, 65 Cal.Rptr. 651; People v. Rogers, 252 Cal.App.2d 1015, 1020-1021, 61 Cal.Rptr. 48; People v. Ford, 239 Cal.App.2d 944, 49 Cal.Rptr. 283; People v. Wendes, 237 Cal.App.2d 814, 47 Cal.Rptr. 310; People v. Fisherman, 237 Cal.App.2d 356, 362, 47 Cal.Rptr. 33; In re Ramey, 234 Cal.App.2d 459, 44 Cal.Rptr. 473; People v. Sogoian, 232 Cal.App.2d 430, 436, 42 Cal.Rptr. 736; People v. De Waele, 224 Cal.App.2d 512, 516, 36 Cal.Rptr. 825; In re Klein, 197 Cal.App.2d 58, 17 Cal.Rptr. 71; People v. Knight, 193 Cal.App.2d 248, 14 Cal.Rptr. 77; In re klein, 75 Cal.App.2d 600, 171 P.2d 471.) It is noted that the Legislature, in enacting section 1203.2a, specifically refrained from extending its operation to probationers who are sentenced to a county jail for a subsequent offense.