Opinion
2012-02638, Ind. No. 7002/08.
10-15-2014
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Carlos FONSECA, appellant.
Maureen Galvin Dwyer, Northport, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.
Maureen Galvin Dwyer, Northport, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Edward A. Bannan of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, SANDRA L. SGROI, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Opinion Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Crecca, J.), rendered February 27, 2012, convicting him of endangering the welfare of a child and sexual abuse in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention that the accusatory instrument did not provide sufficient notice as to when the crimes were allegedly committed is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Gargano, 222 A.D.2d 694, 695, 636 N.Y.S.2d 350 ; People v. Bass, 179 A.D.2d 568, 569, 579 N.Y.S.2d 55 ). In any event, taking into consideration all of the relevant circumstances (see People v. Watt, 81 N.Y.2d 772, 774–775, 593 N.Y.S.2d 782, 609 N.E.2d 135 ), the time period of four months for the crimes charged in the accusatory instrument was not so lengthy as to require dismissal (see People v. O'Keefe, 276 A.D.2d 647, 714 N.Y.S.2d 514 ; People v. Bolden, 194 A.D.2d 834, 598 N.Y.S.2d 603 ).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials. A review of the totality of the circumstances (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 413, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 38, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318 ) demonstrates that the defendant's statements to the police, which were given after he was informed of, and waived, his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ), were voluntarily made (see CPL 60.45[2][a], [b][i] ; People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d at 414, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 ).
The Supreme Court's Molineux ruling (see People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 ) was a provident exercise of its discretion. The potential for prejudice was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence, which tended to establish the absence of mistake or accident, completed the narrative of the event, and provided background information necessary to explain the relationship between the defendant and the complainant (see People v. Green, 56 A.D.3d 490, 490, 868 N.Y.S.2d 73 ; People v. Dahlbender, 23 A.D.3d 493, 494, 805 N.Y.S.2d 597 ).
The Supreme Court did not err in permitting expert testimony about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. Such testimony was properly offered for the purpose of providing an explanation for the post-crime behavior of the complainant that might have appeared to be unusual or which the jurors otherwise may not have understood (see People v. Spicola, 16 N.Y.3d 441, 465, 922 N.Y.S.2d 846, 947 N.E.2d 620 ; People v. Carroll, 95 N.Y.2d 375, 387, 718 N.Y.S.2d 10, 740 N.E.2d 1084 ).
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ; CPL 470.05[2] ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).
The remaining contentions raised in the defendant's main brief are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit. The contentions raised in the defendant's pro se supplemental brief are based on matter dehors the record and, therefore, cannot be reviewed on direct appeal.