The second paragraph of IPI Criminal 2d No. 3.02 should be given only when the evidence is entirely circumstantial. ( People v. Evans (1981), 87 Ill.2d 77; People v. Flowers (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 348; People v. Edmondson (1982), 106 Ill. App.3d 716.) Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts and circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer other connected facts which reasonably and usually follow according to common experience.

Consequently, James also had no "standing" to challenge the search. (See People v. Mezo (1988), 170 Ill. App.3d 679, 681, 525 N.E.2d 134, 135; People v. Carlton (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 1061, 1064, 479 N.E.2d 1178, 1180; People v. Flowers (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 348, 353, 444 N.E.2d 242, 246; People v. Norris (1981), 101 Ill. App.3d 664, 668-69, 428 N.E.2d 987, 990-91. See also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149-50, 58 L.Ed.2d at 405, 99 S.Ct. at 433-34.

When Lanigan was unable to produce his license, Officer Wasek had probable cause to believe that Lanigan had violated another traffic law requiring him to carry his license, and to detain Lanigan while he checked out Lanigan's information. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-101 (requiring a driver's license or permit for all persons driving motor vehicles); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-112 (requiring drivers' licenses to be in drivers' possession when operating motor vehicles and to be displayed upon demand); see also People v. Flowers, 111 Ill. App.3d 348, 354, 444 N.E.2d 242, 247 (1982) (finding reasonable basis for stopping car when brake lights were not operating and for arresting driver for failing to produce license); People v. Morrison, 57 Ill. App.3d 468, 472-73, 373 N.E.2d 520, 522 (1978) (finding probable cause to believe defendant committed a misdemeanor by failing to produce license after being stopped for traffic offense). Under Illinois law, Officer Wasek could have done more than merely issue a ticket in this situation — he was actually authorized to arrest Lanigan for driving without his license.

In pertinent part, those sections provide as follows: "For the purposes of this Section `display" mans the manual surrender of his license into the hands of the demanding officer for his inspection thereof." See also 625 ILCS 5/11-203 (Obedience to Officers) ILCS 5/11-202 (Required Obedience to Traffic Laws); see People v. Flowers, 111 Ill. App.3d 348, 67 Ill.Dec. 203, 444 N.E.2d 242 (1982); People v. Morrison, 57 Ill. App.3d 468, 15 Ill.Dec. 174, 373 N.E.2d 520 (1978). A law enforcement officer has probable cause to make an arrest when "the fact and circumstances within [his] knowledge and of which [he had] reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."

The courts distinguish these cases from those in which an owner of a vehicle lends it to the accused thereby conveying to the accused the right enjoy a possessory interest in the vehicle in the owner's absence. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 925 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1991) (accused driving car when owner present as passenger; no personal luggage in trunk; accused did not claim interest in crack cocaine found in trunk; no reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960 (1st Cir. 1982) (accused driving car owned by passenger; no evidence of accused's prior use of car; accused had no luggage or personal belongings in the car; accused claimed no interest in hashish seized; no reasonable expectation of privacy); Illinois v. Flowers, 67 Ill. Dec. 203, 444 N.E.2d 242 (Ct.App. 1982) (accused driving with owner present has no "standing"). We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the interior of the vehicle that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.

Other factors relevant in determining whether a reasonable privacy expectation exists, include whether defendant was legitimately present in the area searched; his possessory interest in the area or property seized; prior use of the area searched or property seized; ability to control or exclude others' use of the property; and a subjective expectation of privacy in the property. See United States v. Lochan (1st Cir. 1982), 674 F.2d 960, 965; People v. Flowers (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 348, 353. Guided by the foregoing factors, we conclude that defendant failed to carry his burden of establishing that he held a reasonable expectation of privacy in the pickup truck at the time it was searched and seized.

The foregoing items, which could have been used to gain access to the Walgreens as well as to the contents of the safes, all established a rational connection between defendant's possession of the stolen property and his participation in the burglary, showed that defendant's guilt of burglary more likely than not flowed from his unexplained possession of burglary proceeds, and generally corroborated defendant's guilt. See People v. Flowers, 111 Ill.App.3d 348, 355 (1982) (rational connection between the defendant's possession of stolen property and burglary established where he possessed tools that could have been used to make the forcible entry).

Since Lovely did not give up possession of the vehicle to McKee, McKee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle."); People v. Flowers , 111 Ill.App.3d 348, 353, 67 Ill.Dec. 203, 444 N.E.2d 242, 246 (1982). Having surveyed the case law, we hold that whether the non-owner driver of a vehicle has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the vehicle’s compartments and interior hinges on whether the owner has relinquished both possession of and control over the vehicle to the non-owner such that the non-owner driver formed a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared to accept as reasonable.

As running a red light was a reasonable basis for Sergeant Keag to stop and detain defendants, Soto does not have standing to contest the search. People v. Flowers, 111 Ill. App.3d 348, 354, 444 N.E.2d 242 (1982); Manikowski, 186 Ill. App.3d at 1010-11. Juarbe, as owner and driver of the vehicle, does have standing and we now turn to the lawfulness of the stop and search of the vehicle as it relates to his conviction.

An officer may always warn of a traffic violation or reprimand the driver without citing him, and the officer need not charge a minor violation when, after a stop, a more serious violation is discovered. See People v. Flowers (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 348, 352, 444 N.E.2d 242. • 5, 6 Defendant states that probable cause to justify the initial seizure of defendant was lacking because the officers would have had to notice that defendant had a license-applied-for sticker on the back window of his vehicle.