We have stated that we review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to dismiss alleging a violation of the statutory speedy trial periods set forth in 8 GCA § 80.60. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9. We have not previously set forth a standard of review for the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss alleging unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, in violation of 8 GCA § 80.70(b).
Whether a Brady violation warrants a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 59 (quoting State v. Wilson, 200 P.3d 1283, 1292 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008)).
The trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9. We review de novo the issue of whether to set aside a conviction based on an inconsistent verdict.
The trial court's denial of a motion for new trial is similarly reviewed for abuse of discretion. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 59. Lastly, courts elsewhere review a trial court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to stay enforcement under the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bains v. Moores, 172 Cal. App. 4th 445, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 309, 337 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Avant! Corp. v. Super. Ct., 79 Cal. App. 4th 876, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 505, 513 (Ct. App. 2000) (applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to determine whether the trial court erred in denying party's motion to stay proceedings in light of pending related criminal proceeding.)
That is, "[t]he test for harmless error is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 112 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A harmless error inquiry typically involves analysis of numerous factors, including: (1) the overall strength of the prosecution's case; (2) the prosecutor's conduct with respect to the improperly admitted evidence; (3) the importance of the wrongly admitted evidence; and (4) whether such evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.
Rather, good cause is defined through case law and determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. People v. Nicholson, 2007 Guam 9 ¶ 13; People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 32. We have not previously defined good cause in the prompt arraignment context and it is difficult to find truly applicable cases from other jurisdictions because as this court has said, § 60.10 is of unknown origin.
We review a constitutional speedy trial claim de novo. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9 (citing People v. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ¶ 22). IV. ANALYSIS
Second, the instant case deals with superseding indictments, which differ from reindictments or new indictments in terms of their effect on speedy trial calculations. This court, in People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22, discussed the differences between these events. "A superseding indictment is an indictment filed before the original or underlying indictment is dismissed," whereas a reindictment "is a new indictment . . . filed when the original or underlying indictment or charges are dismissed."
A trial court's denial of a statutory speedy trial claim is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9. We also review the trial court's admission of prior bad acts under GRE 404(b) for abuse of discretion.
Subsequently, in People v. Julian, we chose to attribute the court's delay in prompt arraignment to the People. 2012 Guam 26 ¶ 22 (citing People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 32); see also Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 32 (in the speedy trial context, "[d]elay attributable to the fault of the prosecution or improper court administration . . . does not constitute good cause." (emphasis added)).