[*P11] We review a Sixth Amendment constitutional speedy trial claim de novo. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9; People v. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ¶ 22. By contrast, "[a] trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."

We review a constitutional speedy trial claim de novo. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9 (citing People v. Mendiola, 1999 Guam 8 ¶ 22). IV. ANALYSIS

The People opposed Guerrero's motion, arguing that Guerrero had sufficiently waived his rights to a speedy trial, both at oral argument and in writing. Moreover, the People argued that any delay was caused by Guerrero himself, and therefore the motion should be denied under the good cause standard expressed in People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22. Guerrero submitted no reply. The trial court heard argument less than three weeks after the People filed its opposition brief.

A trial court's denial of a statutory speedy trial claim is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9. We also review the trial court's admission of prior bad acts under GRE 404(b) for abuse of discretion.

Second, the instant case deals with superseding indictments, which differ from reindictments or new indictments in terms of their effect on speedy trial calculations. This court, in People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22, discussed the differences between these events. "A superseding indictment is an indictment filed before the original or underlying indictment is dismissed," whereas a reindictment "is a new indictment . . . filed when the original or underlying indictment or charges are dismissed."

Rather, good cause is defined through case law and determined by the facts and circumstances of each case. People v. Nicholson, 2007 Guam 9 ¶ 13; People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 32. We have not previously defined good cause in the prompt arraignment context and it is difficult to find truly applicable cases from other jurisdictions because as this court has said, § 60.10 is of unknown origin.

Subsequently, in People v. Julian, we chose to attribute the court's delay in prompt arraignment to the People. 2012 Guam 26 ¶ 22 (citing People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 32); see also Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 32 (in the speedy trial context, "[d]elay attributable to the fault of the prosecution or improper court administration . . . does not constitute good cause." (emphasis added)).

Katzuta was originally prosecuted by a superseding indictment. RA, tab 36 at 1-3 (Superseding Indictment); see People v. San Nicolas, 2016 Guam 21 ¶ 17 (quoting People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 18) ("A superseding indictment is an indictment filed before the original or underlying indictment is dismissed."). As such, Katzuta should be entitled to a twelve-person jury if he filed a written request before the start of the first trial or retrial.

To supplement the argument that the subject matter from San Nicolas I was the same subject matter as the Superseding Indictment, the government elected to file a "superseding indictment" rather than an entirely new indictment. "A superseding indictment is an indictment filed before the original or underlying indictment is dismissed." People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 18 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). "In a reindictment case, a new indictment is filed when the original or underlying indictment or charges are dismissed."

"The trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." People v. Leslie, 2011 Guam 23 ¶ 12 (citing People v. Flores, 2009 Guam 22 ¶ 9).IV. ANALYSIS