We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. People v. Diaz, 2007 Guam 3 ¶ 10 (citing People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 8).IV. ANALYSIS

This court "reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to ascertain whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 P 6. This standard is highly deferential to the jury's verdict and not deferential to the trial court's decision to deny the motion for a judgment of acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Guam has said that its "[d]uty is to interpret statutes in light of their terms and legislative intent." People v. Kim, 2015 Guam 25 ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 8). "When interpreting a statute, 'the plain language of a statute must be the starting point.'"

[12] This court has a duty "to interpret statutes in light of their terms and legislative intent." People v. Angoco, 2007 Guam 1 ¶ 49 (quoting People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 8). However, "[i]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts must look first to the language of the statute itself.

"Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo." People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 8. "The trial court's denial of a defendant's motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."

Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 8 (quoting Ada v. Guam Tel. Auth., 1999 Guam 10 ¶ 10)). "The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo." People v. Perez, 1999 Guam 2 ¶ 6 (citations omitted).

Similarly, "issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo." People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18, P 8 (quoting Ada v. Guam Tel. Auth., 1999 Guam 10, P 10). It is "our duty to interpret statutes in light of their terms and legislative intent" and thus, "absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the plain meaning prevails." Flores, 2004 Guam 18 at P 8 (citations omitted).

An attempt conviction requires proof of the defendant's "intent to engage in conduct which would constitute such crime" and "a substantial step toward commission of the crime." Id. § 13.10; see People v. Flores , 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 12. That is exactly what happened here when Lopez intentionally communicated with "Brit" from within the Territory of Guam in furtherance of his goal of sexual penetration.

[*P42] Under Guam law, an attempt to commit a criminal act is a crime separate and apart from the crime constituting the actual commission of the criminal act. See People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 12 (referring to "the crime of attempt"); People v. Angoco, 2004 Guam 11 ¶ 25 n.8 (noting that "[a]ttempted robbery is a lesser-included offense of robbery"); 9 GCA § 13.10 (2005) ("A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to engage in conduct which would constitute such crime were the circumstances as he believes them to be, he performs or omits to perform an act which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of the crime."); 8 GCA § 105.58 (2005) (noting that an "attempt" to commit a crime may be a lesser included offense of the actual crime); cf. People v. Songeni, 2010 Guam 20 ¶ 15 ("[I]t is clear that an 'attempted crime' under Guam law differs from the crime of which it is an inchoate version only insofar as it was not a completed version of that crime."). Only the separate crime of attempt requires proof of a "substantial step" in furtherance of its commission.

Additionally, we have stated "[o]ur duty is to interpret statutes in light of their terms and legislative intent." People v. Flores, 2004 Guam 18 ¶ 8 (quoting Carlson v. Guam Tel. Auth., 2002 Guam 15 ¶ 46 n.7). Unless there is "clear legislative intent to the contrary, the plain meaning prevails." Id. (quoting Sumitomo Constr. Co. v. Gov't of Guam, 2001 Guam 23 ¶ 17).