Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. VA102122, Michael L. Schurr, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.).
William S. Pitman for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BIGELOW, J.
After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence recovered during the execution of a search warrant, Victor Flores pled no contest to one count of possession of cocaine for sale. The trial court thereafter suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Flores on formal probation, on the condition that he serve 180 days in jail. We affirm.
FACTS
A. The Affidavit In Support Of The Search Warrant
On June 19, 2007, Whittier Police Department Detective Jerry Reyes presented to a magistrate the following “statement of probable cause” affidavit in support of a search warrant:
“During the ten-day period between June 10th and June 19th, I received information from a confidential informant [(CI)]. The CI told me that a subject, known to him/her only as ‘Victor’, further described as a male Hispanic, who is approximately 35 years of age, approximately 5’8” tall and weighing approximately 175 pounds with black hair and brown eyes, is selling methamphetamine from the business known as ‘Jiffy Lube’ located at 11705 Colima Road, in the unincorporated City of Whittier, County of Los Angeles, State of California.
“The CI told me that ‘Victor’ is an employee of ‘Jiffy Lube’, and that ‘Victor’ normally conducts business from his... vehicle, described as a full size, blue Chevrolet or GMC sports utility vehicle. The CI said that he/she has seen ‘Victor’ store methamphetamine in the vehicle while he is at work, and that the methamphetamine is prepackaged and ready for sales at all times.
“The CI said that he/she has purchased methamphetamine at this location from this ‘Victor’ on prior occasions. The CI said that he/she is very familiar with methamphetamine, and is fully aware of its appearance, odors, and effects on the body. The CI further told me that he/she knew that the substance he/she purchased from this subject was methamphetamine by the way the drug made him/her feel when the CI ingested the methamphetamine. The CI told me that he/she has also been present at this location when ‘Victor’ has prepared and packaged methamphetamine for other drug users.
“The CI said that he/she would be willing to purchase methamphetamine on behalf of the Whittier Police Department from ‘Victor’ at ‘Jiffy Lube’ located at the 11705 Colima Road address. Prior to the purchase, I searched the CI’s person and vehicle and did not find any illegal drugs, contraband or U.S. currency. I then provided the CI with prerecorded funds from the Whittier Police Department Narcotic fund. Officers then followed the CI to 11705 Colima Road and watched him/her enter and exit the business. Officers then followed the CI to a predetermined location where the CI handed me a container that contained a white crystal like substance resembling methamphetamine. The CI told me that he/she purchased the methamphetamine from ‘Victor’ in exchange for the ‘buy money’. The white crystal like substance was tested using a ‘NIK’ presumptive test kit and resulted in a positive reading for methamphetamine.
[¶]... [¶]
“Based upon the above [facts], it’s your affiant’s opinion that a subject known only as ‘Victor’ described as a male Hispanic, approximately 35 years of age, standing approximately 5 ft 8 inches tall, weighing approximately 175 pounds, with black hair, brown eyes, believed to be working at 11705 Colima Road, City of Whittier, County of Los Angeles, and State of California is selling methamphetamine... out of said business on an ongoing basis. I further believe that methamphetamine and other items related to the sales of methamphetamine will be found on the person and/or in the vehicle of the above-described subject and at the ‘Jiffy Lube’ business located at 11705 Colima Road, in the unincorporated City of Whittier, County of Los Angeles, State of California.”
B. The Search Warrant
On June 19, 2007, the magistrate issued a search warrant which expressly stated that Detective Reyes’s affidavit was “attached and incorporated,” and which commanded any police officer in the County of Los Angeles to search the following:
“THE PREMISES known as ‘Jiffy Lube’ located at, 11705 Colima Road, Whittier, California, 90604, described as a[n] automotive service and repair station commercial building and including all rooms, attics, service areas, restrooms, lunch areas, lockers, storage areas, files, safes, and attached, or unattached trash areas and trash containers.
“THE PERSON known only as a ‘Victor’, a male Hispanic, approximately 35 years of age, approximately 5 ft 7 inches tall, approximately 175 pounds, with black hair, brown eyes, believed to be working at 11705 Colima Road, in the unincorporated City of Whittier, County of Los Angeles, and State of California 90605.
“The search is include all rooms, attics, safes, basements, locked-boxes, and other parts therein, including any garages, outbuildings, trash containers or other storage areas and any vehicles that can be shown to be directly related to the business at 11705 Colima Road in the unincorporated City of Whittier, County area of Whittier, County of Los Angeles, and State of California.”
C. The Search
On June 20, 2007, Detective Reyes went to the Jiffy Lube to execute the search warrant. Upon arriving at the premises, Detective Reyes detained Flores, searched him, and asked him about his vehicle. In response to the detective’s questions, Flores stated that his vehicle, a Chevy Silverado, was parked behind the Jiffy Lube, and gave his keys to the detective. When Detective Reyes searched the Silverado, he found 15 baggies containing methamphetamine and cocaine, along with “pay/owe” sheets for drug sales.
D. The Criminal Case
In January 2008, the People filed an information charging Flores with one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale, and one count of possession of cocaine for sale. In March 2008, Flores filed a written motion to suppress the drugs discovered during the search of his Chevy Silverado at the Jiffy Lube. On March 24, 2008, the trial court heard arguments on the motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the search warrant was vague and overbroad, but nonetheless constitutionally valid because it incorporated Detective Reyes’s affidavit, which, found the court, provided sufficient information to overcome the vagueness on the face of the warrant itself.
When Flores’s counsel stated that he “would like to call the officer,” the trial court denied the request, ruling there would be “no testimony. This [matter] is on the four corners of the search warrant.... [The defense] didn’t file a motion to traverse the warrant. The warrant [sic] is to suppress it based on the four corners of the search warrant and [the court is] not going to take any testimony. [The court] is deciding this case based on the wording of the search warrant. So, no, [the officer] is not going to take the stand.”
On September 29, 2008, Flores waived his constitutional trial rights, and pled no contest to one count of possession of cocaine for sale. In accord with the negotiated plea agreement, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Flores on formal probation for a period of three years, on the condition he serve 180 days in jail, and then dismissed the methamphetamine count.
Flores filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Flores contends the search warrant was invalid because it was overbroad and nonspecific with regard to the vehicles at the Jiffy Lube which could be searched, and that the “good faith exception” to an invalid warrant under United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897 “cannot save” the search pursuant to the invalid warrant. In an ancillary vein, Flores contends that, in the absence of a valid warrant, his initial detention and interrogation by Detective Reyes, without the warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, must be ruled involuntary. For these reasons, argues Flores, the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress, and his conviction must be reversed. We disagree.
I. The Warrant
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes the issuance of a search warrant without language “ ‘particularly describing the place to be searched.’ ” The purpose of this particularity requirement is to prohibit the police from conducting an “exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” (Andresen v. Maryland (1976) 427 U.S. 463, 480; Maryland v. Garrison (1987) 480 U.S. 79, 84.) The issue of whether a search warrant satisfies the particularity requirement is determined by an examination of the language of the search warrant itself. (See People v. MacAvoy (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 746, 754-757; see also Thompson v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 101, 109.) Evidence seized pursuant to an invalid search warrant must be suppressed, unless the executing officer reasonably could have considered the warrant valid, and reasonably could have relied on the warrant. (United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 923.)
We agree with Flores that the search warrant in his case was facially deficient because it authorized a search of “any vehicles that can be shown to be directly related to the business at 11705 Colima Road.” This description, as the trial court found, was both vague and overbroad in that it essentially gave the police the authority to search every vehicle at the Jiffy Lube, including vehicles owned by employees who had no connection to the drug investigation, as well as vehicles owned by customers who, by happenstance, were patronizing at the Jiffy Lube at the time the police executed the warrant.
We part with Flores, however, when he argues that the trial court incorrectly ruled that, although the search warrant was facially vague and overbroad, it nonetheless passed constitutional muster because it incorporated Detective Reyes’s supporting statement of probable cause, which provided a sufficiently particular description of area which was to be searched, namely, Flores’s blue Chevrolet or GMC sports utility vehicle. Although Flores is correct that a search warrant which does not satisfy the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is constitutionally invalid notwithstanding the particularity in the supporting the affidavit (Thompson v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at p. 109), the rule is different where the warrant uses “suitable words... which incorporate the affidavit by reference,” and the affidavit “accompanies” the warrant at the time it is executed. (People v. MacAvoy, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 755.) When the affidavit is incorporated into the warrant, and is attached to the warrant when it is executed, the affidavit acts to clarify the generality of the description in the warrant, and gives notice to the person whose property is being searched of the particular area the officer is entitled to search, and, thus, limits the discretion of the officer executing the warrant. (Ibid., citing Matter of Property, etc. (9th Cir. 1981) 644 F.2d 1317, 1319.) In summary, an affidavit which meets the twin requirements of attachment and incorporation may be considered to remedy a warrant that otherwise does not on its face meet the constitutional demands of particularity. (People v. MacAvoy, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at p. 758.)
This is the trial court’s specific statement in the particularity issue: “Had the police searched a vehicle that was not described in the affidavit, [the court] would grant this motion without any further consideration at all....”
In the case before us today, the search warrant obtained and executed by Detective Reyes included language stating that his affidavit was both attached and incorporated into the warrant, and, for this reason, we decline to overrule the trial court’s conclusion that the warrant, with its affidavit, was constitutionally valid.
II. The Good Faith Exception To An Invalid Warrant
Assuming the warrant, with its attached and incorporated affidavit, was defective, we reject Flores’s contention that Detective Reyes could not have relied upon the warrant in good faith. Although no reasonable police officer could understand that he or she had been granted lawful authority by a warrant to search “any vehicle” at a certain business establishment, we are satisfied that, where the affidavit in support of the warrant is both attached and incorporated, and refers to one specific vehicle, the officer reasonably could have and would have understood that his or her authority had been limited to a search of that one vehicle, and the officer reasonably would have and could have understood that the warrant was constitutionally valid. (See United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 922-923 [a court’s good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization; in making this determination, all relevant facts and circumstances may be considered, including, for example, whether the application for the warrant been rejected by a different magistrate, or it is shown that the officer misled the magistrate to obtain the warrant].)
III. The Miranda Issue
Flores’s final alleged error on appeal requires us to answer this question: Was Detective Reyes permitted to ask Flores, prior to giving Miranda warnings to Flores, which vehicle at the Jiffy Lube belonged to him? Flores argues that we should answer this question “no,” on the ground Detective Reyes did not come to the Jiffy Lube armed with a valid search warrant. Given our conclusion above that the search warrant which Detective Flores executed was valid, we answer the question “yes.” None of the legal authorities cited by Flores persuade us that a police officer is prohibited by Miranda from asking a person a question to identify a place which, by a judicially issued warrant, the officer has been commanded to search.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: RUBIN, Acting P. J. FLIER, J.