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People v. Fletcher

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Sep 6, 2024
No. B332992 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 6, 2024)

Opinion

B332992

09-06-2024

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DJUANE LAMAR FLETCHER, Defendant and Appellant.

Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. LA079640 Martin Larry Herscovitz, Judge. Reversed.

Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

BENDIX, J.

Defendant Djuane Lamar Fletcher appeals from an order following a hearing under Penal Code section 1172.75. Although the trial court struck defendant's previously imposed one-year enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), defendant contends the court should have reconsidered his entire sentence. The Attorney General agrees with defendant that remand for full resentencing is required. We also agree, and therefore reverse and remand. We do not reach the parties' other contentions.

Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.

BACKGROUND

On June 16, 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no contest to carjacking and admitted to prior conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced him to the upper term of nine years, plus a five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and a one-year enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), for a total of 15 years. The court suspended execution of sentence and placed defendant on five years of formal probation.

On March 28, 2017, the trial court revoked defendant's probation and imposed the previously suspended 15-year sentence, awarding defendant credits for actual custody and good time/work time.

On August 17, 2023, the trial court held a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75. Defendant's counsel argued defendant was entitled to reconsideration of his entire sentence. Counsel requested the court not only strike the enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) as mandated by section 1172.75, but also resentence defendant to the midterm of five years and strike the five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). The People agreed the court should strike the section 667.5 enhancement, but argued the court should leave the remaining 14-year sentence in place given the circumstances of the commitment offense and defendant's prior criminal activity.

Section 1172.75 was previously codified as former section 1171.1, and that latter citation appears on the court's minute order.

The court struck the one-year enhancement under section 667.5 but did not further modify the sentence. The court stated, "The People and the defendant are entitled to the benefit of their bargain. The benefit of the bargain was 15 years. The Legislature changed that and said we're going to retroactively strike one year priors, that's fine; that reduced this to 14 years, . . . [and] the court is doing [that]. [¶] But to go beyond that, the court really doesn't have jurisdiction to touch the rest of the sentence, in my opinion, based upon the fact that this was an agreed upon sentence by both the People and the defendant and both sides are allowed . . . the benefit of their bargain." The court further stated, "This case was final on appeal a long time ago. So for those reasons, the court feels that it has no discretion other than to strike [the] one-year prior. So the court will strike the one year prior and leave the rest of the sentence intact."

Defense counsel objected, arguing the striking of the one-year enhancement allowed for full resentencing. The court did not change its ruling, stating the Court of Appeal could "decide whether the court has jurisdiction or not."

Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Section 1172.75 renders invalid any enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b) imposed prior to January 1, 2020 except in circumstances involving sexually violent offenses, a circumstance not present here. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) The statute provides a mechanism for courts to recall sentences that include such enhancements and resentence defendants. (Id., subds. (c)-(d).) The statute instructs resentencing courts to strike the now-repealed enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and, inter alia, to "apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing." (§ 1172.75, subds. (d)(1), (2).) The court may consider postconviction factors such as the record of rehabilitation, and whether the defendant's age, time served, or diminished physical condition reduce the risk of future violence. (Id., subd. (d)(3).)

The statute provides additional resentencing guidance under subdivision (d) that we do not summarize here.

"By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly 'invalid' enhancements." (People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.) This is consistent with the general rule that "when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing 'a full resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.' [Citation.]" (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893; accord, Monroe, at pp. 401-402.)

In the instant case, the trial court struck defendant's enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (b), but concluded the court lacked discretion to further modify defendant's sentence because it resulted from a plea agreement. Opinions issued after the trial court ruled have concluded to the contrary, applying the full-resentencing principle even in the case of sentences pursuant to plea agreements. (See People v. Montgomery (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 768, 771-772 (Montgomery), review granted May 29, 2024, S284662; People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 964 (Carter); People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 565 (Coddington).)

The Attorney General agrees with defendant the trial court should have conducted a full resentencing hearing. We accept this concession. On remand, the trial court shall conduct a full resentencing hearing.

The Attorney General additionally asserts that, should the trial court on remand further reduce defendant's sentence beyond merely striking the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, the People should be entitled to withdraw from the plea agreement. There is a split of authority on this issue: Montgomery and Carter held the People may not withdraw from a plea bargain when a court under section 1172.75 reduces the sentence beyond striking the section 667.5 enhancement (Montgomery, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 772, review granted; Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 964), whereas Coddington reached the opposite conclusion (Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 565). The issue currently is pending before the Supreme Court.

Because the trial court has yet to conduct a full resentencing hearing, and therefore, has yet to decide whether to reduce defendant's sentence beyond striking the section 667.5 enhancement, we decline to decide in this appeal whether, in that event, the People may withdraw from the plea agreement.

Defendant contends the trial court erred by not recalculating his credits when it resentenced him. Defendant may raise this issue on remand.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed, defendant's sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing hearing.

We concur: ROTHSCHILD, P. J., KLINE, J. [*]

[*] Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.


Summaries of

People v. Fletcher

California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division
Sep 6, 2024
No. B332992 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 6, 2024)
Case details for

People v. Fletcher

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DJUANE LAMAR FLETCHER, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, First Division

Date published: Sep 6, 2024

Citations

No. B332992 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 6, 2024)