Similarly, courts have held that one who shares his home with another does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas of the home used exclusively by his roommate. See, e.g., Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1995) (grandparents lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in closet in their home used exclusively by granddaughter); People v. Fleming, 36 Ill. App.3d 612, 345 N.E.2d 10, 14-15 (1975) (where defendant and his brother shared an apartment and brother kept his bedroom locked and kept key in his possession, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the brother's bedroom). We conclude that Hicks was not a departure from the Supreme Court's earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
A person who claims to be aggrieved by the illegal search of another person's office, to which he has no access either personally or via storage of property, may not legitimately claim that his Fourth Amendment rights have been compromised. Cf. Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1995) (grandparents did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in closet in their home used exclusively by grandchild) and People v. Fleming, 36 Ill. App. 3d 612, 345 N.E. 2d 10, 14-15 (Ill.App.Ct. 1975) (where defendant and his brother shared an apartment and brother kept his bedroom locked and kept key in his possession, defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the brother's bedroom), both cited approvingly in United States v. HAQQ, 278 F.3d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (the "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends . . . upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation in the invaded place") (emphasis added). Given, as reported by Mr. Cleere, that defendant purportedly lacked the ability to access his former secretary's office, no less her safe in which the firearms — said to be hers — were found, it is clear that he lacks standing to seek the suppression of those items.
Courts have held that one who shares his home with another may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas of the home exclusively used by the roommate. See Haqq, 278 F.3d at 50 (citing Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1995) (grandparents lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in closet in their home used exclusively by granddaughter), and People v. Fleming, 345 N.E.2d 10, 14-15 (Ill.App. 3d 1975) (defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in brother's bedroom of apartment shared by brother and defendant, where brother kept bedroom locked and kept key in his possession)). Here, the Court finds that the area of the home searched by Officer Bickford was not exclusively used by McKiernan or Robinson.
Courts have held that one who shares his home with another may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas of the home exclusively used by the roommate. See Haqq, 278 F.3d at 50 (citing Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1549-50 (11th Cir. 1995) (grandparents lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in closet in their home used exclusively by granddaughter), and People v. Fleming, 345 N.E.2d 10, 14-15 (Ill.App. 3d 1975) (defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in brother's bedroom of apartment shared by brother and defendant, where brother kept bedroom locked and kept key in his possession)). Here, the Court finds that the area of the home searched by Officer Bickford was not exclusively used by McKiernan or Robinson.
• 7, 8 A prosecutor is permitted a great deal of latitude in closing arguments ( People v. Franklin (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 408, 421, 355 N.E.2d 634), and absent a clear abuse of discretion, the determination of the trial court should be followed ( People v. Smothers (1973), 55 Ill.2d 172, 176, 302 N.E.2d 324). Comments on the evidence and all legitimate inferences therefrom are proper even if unfavorable to the defendant. ( People v. Weatherspoon (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 315, 322, 379 Ill. App.3d 847; People v. Fleming (1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 612, 621, 345 N.E.2d 10.) The test of determining whether the prosecutor's comments constitute reversible error is whether the remarks, considered in light of all the evidence, were a material factor in the conviction or whether, had they not been made, the jury might have reached a different result. ( People v. Panczko (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 409, 413, 407 N.E.2d 988; People v. Moss (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 769, 777, 370 N.E.2d 89.) Additionally, there is a presumption that a jury will abide by the court's instructions to disregard testimony not admitted into evidence and, therefore, any harm incurred will be cured.
Both parties have a right to comment on the evidence and to draw any legitimate inferences therefrom. ( People v. Fleming (1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 612, 621, 345 N.E.2d 10.) In the case at bar the victim testified that she had accepted a ride with defendant, a stranger.
The State argues that this comment was proper because it was based on legitimate inferences drawn from facts and circumstances proven. ( People v. Fleming (1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 612, 345 N.E.2d 10.) At trial, defendant admitted that he procured drugs for Holiday from one of the victims.
Whether valid consent has been given is a question of fact for the trial court, and where the evidence is conflicting the reviewing court will uphold the trial court's determination unless it is clearly unreasonable. People v. DeMorrow (1974), 59 Ill.2d 352, 358, 320 N.E.2d 1, 5; People v. Peterson (1959), 17 Ill.2d 513, 514-15, 162 N.E.2d 380, 381; People v. Zynda (1977), 53 Ill. App.3d 794, 801, 368 N.E.2d 1079, 1085; People v. Anderson (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 1040, 1042, 356 N.E.2d 1076, 1078; People v. Fleming (1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 612, 617, 345 N.E.2d 10, 14. • 2, 3 In our opinion, there was authority for the search of defendant's luggage independent of the boarding aircraft statute.
Defendant cites other instances where the prosecutor alluded to facts not in evidence, but we find these alleged misstatements are mere comments and legitimate inferences drawn from the evidence. (See People v. Fleming (1st Dist. 1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 612, 621, 345 N.E.2d 10.) Moreover, nonmaterial unintentional misstatements of facts do not constitute prejudicial error. ( People v. Kitchen (1st Dist. 1977), 53 Ill. App.3d 521, 368 N.E.2d 528.) Alleged misstatements by the prosecutor such as defendant "hit her like you hit a man" were not a material factor in defendant's conviction, do not affect the merits or justice of the decision and do not require a reversal.
Each of the cited instances contained a statement made in direct response to defense counsel's arguments to the contrary. Both parties have a right to comment on the evidence and to draw any legitimate inferences therefrom ( People v. Fleming (1975), 36 Ill. App.3d 612, 621, 345 N.E.2d 10), even if the inferences may be to the detriment of the defendant. (See People v. Gilmore; People v. Franklin (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 408, 355 N.E.2d 634.) Arguments may be made in response to defendant's closing argument.