The terms "inhabited dwelling house" or "inhabited portion of any other building" have the same meaning in both the robbery and burglary statutes.( People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987-988 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 612].) Although a hotel room is, strictly speaking, not an "inhabited dwelling house" but "an inhabited portion of another building," there is no functional distinction between the two terms.
[Citation.] A place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to continue doing so in the future." ( People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987-988 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 612]; see also People v. Guthrie, supra, 144 Cal.App.3d at p. 838; People v. Cardona (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 484 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 109]; People v. Allard (1929) 99 Cal.App. 591, 592 [ 279 P. 182].) The term "inhabited dwelling house" for many years has been considered a broad, inclusive definition ( People v. Grover (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1182, 1187 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 444], and cases cited), and has been analyzed in terms of whether the dwelling was being used as a residence.
The California Court of Appeal rejected Mr. Gonzalez's challenge to the jury instruction. The court explained that the instruction was derived from a published California case that addressed a predecessor statute to the current robbery statute, People v. Fleetwood, 171 Cal. App. 3d 982 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), which had upheld an instruction similar to that used in Mr. Gonzalez's case. In Fleetwood, the jury was instructed that an "inhabited dwelling house within the meaning of Penal Code section 213.5 [i.e., the predecessor statute to § 212.5] is a structure which is occupied and customarily used as a dwelling.
Since the statutes use the same phrases, they should receive the same interpretation. ( People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 612] ( Fleetwood).) This 1977 amendment of the statute codified long-standing case law.
(Pen. Code, § 460, subd. (a).) "Since the statutes use the same phrases, they should receive the same interpretation." (Long I, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 834, citing People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987.) "Inhabited" is defined in the burglary statutes as "currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not."
(1a) "A place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters intending to [do] so in the future." ( People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 612].) (2a) Jackson and Davis contend the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions for first degree robbery because Davis's bedroom, in which the robbery occurred, was not currently inhabited at the time of the robbery.
Appellant argues that he should not have been convicted of first degree robbery. His theory is that although the robbery took place in "an inhabited dwelling house" (§ 212.5, subd. (a) [defining circumstances in which robbery is of the first degree]; and see People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987-988 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 612] [hotel room is "inhabited dwelling house" for purposes of robbery statute]), because it was his dwelling house, the first degree robbery statute should not apply. Appellant relies on People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal.3d 709, 714 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365] (defendant may not be convicted of burglarizing his or her own residence).
(1a) Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, Bergin's burglarized house was not an inhabited dwelling house and that defendant's conviction for the Bergin burglary, if not reversed, must be modified to a conviction for second degree burglary. Defendant places particular reliance on People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 612]. We note initially that defendant's own beliefs as to the nature of the house have nothing to do with the question of the degree of his burglary.
Nevertheless, if an arsonist burnt the house down after the lease expired but while the tenant was still living there it would defy logic and the clear intent of the Legislature to hold the house was not "inhabited" for purposes of Penal Code section 450. Defendant relies on a sentence taken out of context from People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 987 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 612]. There the court while interpreting Penal Code section 213.5, a robbery statute, remarked, "A place is an inhabited dwelling if a person with possessory rights uses the place as sleeping quarters. . . ."
It is inhabited by numerous people; the only difference is that hotel "tenants" change more frequently. Historically and traditionally, hotel rooms have been included within the definition of a dwelling house (Perkins, Criminal Law (3d ed. 1982) p. 257; see People v. St. Clair (1869) 38 Cal. 137, 138 [lodger's room in rented house]; People v. Fleetwood (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 982, 986-988 [occupied hotel room is dwelling house for purposes of first degree robbery and burglary]), and even a hotel lobby has been considered part of an "inhabited dwelling house," making robbery of a hotel desk clerk a first degree robbery under section 212.5. (People v. Wilson (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 451, 453.)The Ramada Inn laundry room is a locked facility where the employees go to do the hotel's laundry and cleaning tasks, like the "household chore[s]" in Woods.