Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 12-13. The defendant's argument was recently rejected by this court in People v. Flambeau (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 932, 481 N.E.2d 740. In Flambeau, we held that the defendant had no right to elect sentencing under the new statute ( 134 Ill. App.3d 932, 934-35, 481 N.E.2d 740.) Based on the reasoning in Flambeau, we find that the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant.

There is no indication that defendant would have received a lower sentence after a trial or after entering a blind plea where there would be no sentencing cap when the trial court gave him the maximum available sentence under plea bargain with a sentencing cap in place. Under the circumstance of this case, there is also no indication that defendant being sentenced to at least 70 years of imprisonment, after a trial or after entering blind guilty plea, would have been an abuse of the trial court's discretion to support an excessive sentence argument on appeal. See People v. Colbert, 2013 IL App (1st) 112935, ¶ 22 (the imposition of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion); People v. Flambeau, 134 Ill. App. 3d 932, 936-37 (1985) (an appellate court will only reduce a sentence to prevent arbitrary or oppressive sentencing that is disproportionate to the crime). Consequently, defendant is unable to show that a decision to reject the plea bargain so that he would be able to appeal the resulting sentence would have been rational under the circumstances of this case.

A reviewing court has the authority and duty to reduce a sentence where it is arbitrary, oppressive or unjust. People v. Flambeau, 134 Ill. App. 3d 932, 936-37 (1985). A sentence within the statutory sentencing range may be an abuse of discretion where it varies greatly with the spirit and purpose of the law.

83-1067, § 27, eff. July 1, 1984. • 5 Claims similar to the one raised here have been rejected in People v. J.S. (1984), 103 Ill.2d 395, 469 N.E.2d 1090 (deviate sexual assault), People v. Kiner (1986), 143 Ill. App.3d 366, 493 N.E.2d 345, appeal denied (1986), 112 Ill.2d 586 (attempt to change rape, a Class X felony, to criminal sexual assault, a Class 1 felony, for the purpose of sentencing), and People v. Flambeau (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 932, 481 N.E.2d 740, appeal denied (1985), 111 Ill.2d 558 (indecent liberties with a child). The new act applies only to those who commit offenses on or after July 1, 1984.

That provision is paramount to the general saving statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1, par. 1103), under which a defendant may elect which sentencing scheme a court should apply. See People v. Flambeau (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 932, 481 N.E.2d 740. However, even applying the 1983 statute, the 18-year sentence imposed for the conviction of indecent liberties with a child is in error.