While the Michigan statute does not use the words "effects" or "results," it has been similarly interpreted. In People v Flaherty, 165 Mich. App. 113; 418 N.W.2d 695 (1987), this Court applied the statute and affirmed the defendant's conviction of larceny by false pretenses, MCL 750.218; MSA 28.415, rejecting the defendant's argument that insufficient evidence was presented regarding venue because he never set foot in the county where he was tried. The defendant's insurance agency was located in Macomb County and he was tried in St. Clair County.
In the present case, the Court of Appeals summarized the facts and holdings in Flaherty and Fisher: People v Flaherty, 165 Mich App 113; 418 NW2d 695 (1987).People v Fisher, 220 Mich App 133; 559 NW2d 318 (1996).
"The crime of larceny by false pretenses requires (1) a false representation as to an existing fact, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the representation, (3) use of the false representation with an intent to deceive, and (4) detrimental reliance by the victim on the false representation." People v. Flaherty, 165 Mich App 113, 119; 418 NW2d 695 (1987). Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that venue was improper in Grand Traverse County because all the acts in perpetration of the offense occurred in Wayne County. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding no evidence that any act done in perpetration of the offense occurred in Grand Traverse County. The trial court reasoned that defendant applied for the loan and received the money in Wayne County and that the only possible connection of the offense to Grand Traverse County was the possibility that defendant received the information to carry out the offense from an application that James Hardy submitted to a lender in Grand Traverse County.
"The crime of larceny by false pretenses requires (1) a false representation as to an existing fact, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the representation, (3) use of the false representation with an intent to deceive, and (4) detrimental reliance by the victim on the false representation." [People v. Webbs, 263 Mich.App 531, 532 n 1; 689 NW2d 163 (2004), quoting People v. Flaherty, 165 Mich.App 113, 119; 418 NW2d 695 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds; see also MCL 750.218.]Based on the evidence, a rational trier of fact could find: (1) that defendant falsely represented to Stocks that (a) he had a contract with Orange County Choppers and that the $35,000 loan would be paid off in full by October, (b) he had transferred title to the Impala, and (c) the Impala was in "mint" condition and was worth $35,000;
Statements offered to show that they were made or to show their effect on the listener are not hearsay. People v. Flaherty, 165 Mich. App. 113, 122; 418 N.W.2d 695 (1987). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
Further, it appears the evidence concerning defendant's conduct toward the victim was relevant to explain her delay in reporting the alleged abuse, and at least some of the evidence concerning conduct toward the victim's mother was relevant to the mother's reason for leaving the marital home, an issue addressed by defendant. See People v Flaherty, 165 Mich. App. 113, 122; 418 N.W.2d 695 (1987); People v Abernathy, 153 Mich. App. 567, 573; 396 N.W.2d 436 (1985). Finally, defendant elicited the testimony to which he now objects. IV
The issue before this Court is whether the court may order reimbursement in the first place.People v Cousins, 196 Mich. App. 715; 493 N.W.2d 512 (1992); People v Jones, 182 Mich. App. 125; 451 N.W.2d 525 (1989); People v Flaherty, 165 Mich. App. 113; 418 N.W.2d 695 (1987). MCR 6.005(C) provides for a defendant's contribution to the cost of providing a lawyer where the defendant "is able to pay part of the cost of a lawyer."
Obtaining money by false pretenses, on the other hand, requires a knowing false representation of fact, done with intent to deceive, which causes detrimental reliance on the representation. In re People v Jory, 443 Mich. 403, 412; 505 N.W.2d 228 (1993); People v Flaherty, 165 Mich. App. 113, 119; 418 N.W.2d 695 (1987); see also MCL 750.218; MSA 28.415. False pretenses and larceny are defined in separate chapters of the Penal Code. See MCL 750.356 et seq.; MSA 28.588 et seq. (chapter LII — Larceny); compare MCL 750.218; MSA 28.415 (chapter XXXVI — False Pretenses and False Representation). We acknowledge that obtaining money by false pretenses is often referred to as "larceny by false pretenses."
When the mental state for the commission of a crime requires a showing of a specific intent, the voluntary intoxication of the accused may operate to relieve the accused of criminal responsibility by negating the intent element. People v Sowders, 164 Mich. App. 36, 43-44; 417 N.W.2d 78 (1987); People v Flaherty, 165 Mich. App. 113, 123-124; 418 N.W.2d 695 (1987). Otherwise, the accused's state of voluntary intoxication is no defense to a general intent offense.
(1) a false representation as to an existing fact, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the representation, (3) use of the false representation with an intent to deceive, and (4) detrimental reliance by the victim on the false representation. [ People v Flaherty, 165 Mich. App. 113, 119; 418 N.W.2d 695 (1987).]