Taylor, 164 Ill. App.3d 938, 518 N.E.2d 409. In People v. Fisher (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 619, 623, 404 N.E.2d 859, 863, the court found the logic of the "public building" line of cases equally applicable to the burglary of an apartment by defendants who were given consent "to enter the apartment for the limited purpose of a social visit, not to burglarize the premises." The court concluded that such entry was not in accord with the will of the occupants and was, therefore, unauthorized.

No individual who is granted access to a dwelling can be said to be an authorized entrant if he intends to commit criminal acts therein, because, if such intentions had been communicated to the owner at the time of entry, it would have resulted in the individual's being barred from the premises ab initio. (See People v. Fisher (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 619, 622-23.) Thus, the determination of whether an entry is unauthorized depends upon whether the defendant possessed the intent to perform a criminal act therein at the time entry was granted.

The reviewing court held that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had acted without authority and upheld the conviction for burglary. In People v. Fisher (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 619, 404 N.E.2d 859, this same ruling was applied to a residential burglary. Fisher and two companions arranged to pick up the victim at his apartment to go to a party together.

) In People v. Hudson (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 1041, 448 N.E.2d 178, this court held that interpretation of the language "without authority" in the home-invasion statute should be consistent with the meaning given the same language in the burglary statute. The Hudson court relied on the interpretation for the language "without authority" in the burglary statute found in People v. Fisher (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 619, 404 N.E.2d 859. In Fisher, defendants contended that they were not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary because they had been given permission to enter the victim's apartment.

The majority of Illinois Appellate Courts, however, have extended this doctrine to the residential burglary statute. See, e.g ., People v. Walker , 191 Ill.App.3d 382, 138 Ill.Dec. 610, 547 N.E.2d 1036, 1038–39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (noting that the defendants were permitted into the victim’s home for a specific purpose, but that the evidence "established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Caruth brothers entered with the intent to commit a robbery and that such entry was unauthorized"); People v. Fisher , 83 Ill.App.3d 619, 39 Ill.Dec. 268, 404 N.E.2d 859, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (applying doctrine to burglary of an apartment); see also, e.g ., People v. Hodge , No. 5-11-0082, 2012 WL 7070081, at *4 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 3, 2012) (unpublished) ("[A]ssuming arguendo that the State did not meet its burden of proof regarding the defendant’s authority to enter the home, this court nevertheless agrees with the State that the defendant would have forfeited such authority under the ‘limited authority’ doctrine" because the defendant "had intent to perform a criminal act at the time entry was granted."). Despite these authorities, the Government maintains that there is little indication that the Supreme Court of Illinois would agree with the appellate courts that the limited-authority doctrine applies to residential burglary.

As we observed in Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 253-54, no homeowner would authorize a person to enter her home if she knew that he intended to commit crimes. See also People v. Fisher, 83 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623 (1980) (applying the limited authority doctrine to burglary of an apartment after finding the logic of Weaver "equally applicable to the matter before us"). That observation is as true of residential burglary as it is of home invasion.

An invitee, who, at the time of entry, has "concealed criminal purposes" effectively gains admission by "misrepresentation and subterfuge"--a fraud by silence--rather than "in accordance with the will of the occupant[]." People v. Fisher, 83 Ill.App.3d 619, 622-23, 39 Ill.Dec. 268, 404 N.E.2d 859, 862-63 (1980). In such a case, the occupant's consent to the entry is "vitiated because the true purpose for the entry exceeded the limited authorization granted."

We further note that intent to commit burglary is usually established by circumstantial evidence since it is rarely susceptible of direct proof. (See People v. Fisher (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 619, 404 N.E.2d 859.) Here, the evidence shows that the defendant unlawfully entered the residence.

The State can prove a defendant's intent by inferences drawn from his conduct and from surrounding circumstances. (See People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill.2d 8, 12-13, 470 N.E.2d 1024, 1026-27; People v. Fisher (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 619, 622, 404 N.E.2d 859, 862.) When the trier of fact in a burglary case decides whether the evidence was sufficient in a burglary case to infer a defendant's intent to commit theft, relevant circumstances it should consider include the time, place, and manner of entry into the premises, the defendant's activity within the premises, and any alternative explanations which may explain his presence.

In Scott, the trial court held that home invasion makes criminal the conduct of unauthorized entry of a dwelling for the purpose of threatening or using force. In refusing to follow People v. Fisher (1980), 83 Ill. App.3d 619, the Scott court noted that Fisher placed heavy reliance on the fact that the defendants entered the victim's apartment with the felonious intent to commit burglary, even though the entry was with the consent of the victim. Thus, the entry was not authorized for the concealed criminal purposes for which the defendants actually came.