Martinez v. People, 160 Colo. 534, 422 P.2d 44 (1966). See People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (Colo. 1980); People v. Graham, 678 P.2d 1043 (Colo.App. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1216 (1984). Topping's confession and testimony to the effect that hair found at the victim's house matched samples of Topping's hair provided further support for a finding that a sexual assault had occurred.

People v. Gomez, 184 Colo. 319, 519 P.2d 1191 (1974). See also People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980). Here, in contrast, five witnesses testified as to the details of the sexual assault.

See, e.g., People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1982); People v. Franklin, 645 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982); People v. Ganatta, supra; People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980); People v. Downer, 192 Colo. 264, 557 P.2d 835 (1976); People v. Gomez, 189 Colo. 91, 537 P.2d 297 (1975); People v. Gordon, 44 Colo. App. 266, 615 P.2d 62 (1980). IV.

In Colorado, jury verdicts will not be reversed for inconsistency when the "crimes charged required different elements of proof, and the jury could . . . find from the very same evidence that the element of one crime was present while at the same time finding that the element of another charged crime was absent." People v. Mayfield, 184 Colo. 399, 403 520 P.2d 748 750 (1974), See also People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980). Here, the crimes with which the defendant was charged required different elements of proof.

Const. art. VI, § 21. This court specifically upheld the constitutionality of the statute against a similar attack in People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980). VI.

However, that definition includes "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse," and it also provides that "[a]ny penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime." The child described acts that would satisfy the statutory definition even if there were no evidence of vaginal intercourse. See also People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980) (independent corroboration of victim's testimony is not essential in criminal prosecution for unlawful sexual acts). Thus, as in Chard, the results of a physical examination here would have been at best equivocal in regard to defendant's innocence.

The record belies this assertion. People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980) held that, in a prosecution for first degree sexual assault, direct testimony of the victim to the effect that sexual penetration had occurred during the commission of the sexual assault was sufficient to prove the element of sexual penetration. The victim here unequivocally testified that her father inflicted sexual intercourse upon her. She testified that, despite her continuing resistance, he pulled her toward him, forced her legs apart, held her so firmly as to leave marks on her skin, pinned her against the car, ripped her clothes, and accomplished sexual penetration.

However, it is the function of the fact-finder to assess the credibility of witnesses, and it may accept or reject all or any part of their testimony. People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980). The jury, apparently accepting defendant's testimony as credible, found her not negligent.

The test for assessing inconsistency in jury verdicts is whether the jury had to rely on the very same evidence in producing two apparently inconsistent conclusions. See People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980). The defendant asserts that she confessed to all four charges and that the same evidence as to corpus delicti was presented to the jury for all four charges.

Furthermore, the court's findings make clear its rejection of the testimony presented by Garcia and his mother to the effect that Garcia actually held the property for the benefit of his siblings and his mother. See People v. Fierro, 199 Colo. 215, 606 P.2d 1291 (1980) (fact-finder may accept or reject any or all of a witness' testimony). Accordingly, inasmuch as there existed a warranty deed showing Garcia as owner of the property without limitation, and inasmuch as the trial court gave no credence to the only testimony that would indicate a limitation on his ownership by the existence of a constructive trust, we find no error in the court's conclusion as to his being the property's sole legal and beneficial owner.