( People v. Flores (1989), 128 Ill.2d 66, 83.) This court has also held that it is unreasonable to expect appellate counsel to raise and argue his or her own incompetency. ( People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 91.) Having set forth these principles, we will now examine them in the context of the defendant's case. The defendant relies on People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 821, as support for his contention that his attorney was laboring under a conflict of interest for representing the defendant on appeal. In Fields, following the defendant's conviction, a presentence report was prepared and filed which contained a written statement by the defendant in which he expressed his dissatisfaction with his appointed trial attorney and requested a new trial.
Defendant contends that he should receive a new hearing on his motion because Kavvadias should have withdrawn as his counsel when he realized that defendant was criticizing his performance. Defendant cites People v. Willis, 134 Ill. App. 3d 123, 131 (1985), People v. Fields, 88 Ill. App. 3d 821, 823 (1980), and People v. Norris, 46 Ill. App. 3d 536, 541 (1977). Those cases held that an attorney should move to withdraw when the client criticizes his or her representation.
The court denied the motion for continuance, stating the case did not appear to be complex and Dougherty indicated he was familiar enough with the case to proceed. On appeal, defendant argues that it was not enough to allow defendant to be heard pro se on his post-trial contention of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and, citing People v. Krankel (1984), 102 Ill.2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045, and People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 821, 410 N.E.2d 1178, requests that we remand to the trial court for appointment of new counsel and for another hearing of his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Krankel, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial and, later, defendant filed a pro se motion for a new trial which repeated the assertions of defense counsel's motion, and added the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel based on defense counsel's alleged refusal to set forth the defense of alibi and alleged failure to investigate the defendant's whereabouts at the time of the offense.
In the case at bar, however, the defendant attempts to circumvent this standard by alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in a conflict of interest context. Relying upon our recent decision of People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 821, 410 N.E.2d 1178, the defendant advances the argument that where a defendant merely propounds specific allegations of defense counsel's incompetence and counsel rebuts the charges, a per se conflict of interest arises. (See, e.g., People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill.2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441.)
[¶ 16] There is, however, some indication that it is not appropriate or expected for one to raise one's own ineffectiveness.See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 649 So.2d 1299, 1300 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); State v. Suarez, 137 Ariz. 368, 670 P.2d 1192, 1204 (App. 1983); People v. Fields, 88 Ill.App.3d 821, 44 Ill.Dec. 86, 410 N.E.2d 1178 (1980); Bottoson v. State, 674 So.2d 621, 625 n. 5 (Fla. 1996) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Etienne v. State, 716 N.E.2d 457, 463 (Ind. 1999); Bear v. State, 417 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa Ct.App. 1987); Hill v. State, 749 So.2d 1143, 1149 (Miss.Ct.App. 1999); State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St.3d 83, 748 N.E.2d 528, 530 (2001); Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 810-11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We too have identified that such a practice is questionable. Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777, 795 (Wyo. 1983). For this very reason, several jurisdictions recognize a difference between requests for post-conviction relief when the same attorney has represented a defendant both at trial and on appeal and when different attorneys have handled each matter.
When counsel is called upon to argue his own ineffectiveness, a conflict of interest arises. ( People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 821, 823-24, 410 N.E.2d 1178, 1180.) However, as already noted, defendant never raised the ineffective assistance argument prior to the direct appeal, although he had the opportunity to and should have done so.
Some earlier decisions appear to indicate that the mere allegation of trial ineffectiveness in a post-trial motion triggered the requirement that new counsel be appointed to investigate the allegation. (See, e.g., People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 821, 410 N.E.2d 1178.) But later cases have disabused us of such a notion.
More importantly, we do not believe the trial court was required to take the action asserted by defendant in dealing with his pro se allegations of incompetent counsel. In People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 821, 410 N.E.2d 1178, the defendant alleged orally at the hearing on his motion for new trial, which did not raise the issue, that his appointed trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court denied the written motion for new trial but did not rule on the pro se request for new trial.
have reach similar results. Cf., e.g., People v. Ball (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 36 (counsel other than public defender should be appointed to represent defendant at hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea based inter alia on the ground defendant lacked mental competence to enter a guilty plea where assistant public defender who represented defendant at entry of plea might feel an inclination to protect his reputation since he had previously represented to the court that the defendant was competent to plead guilty); People v. Freeman (1977), 55 Ill. App.3d 1000 (defendant need not demonstrate factually that he was prejudiced by the appointment of another member of the public defender's office to represent him since a per se conflict of interest arose when the second appointed public defender was placed in the incongruous position of having to question the actions of his own office by virtue of the first assistant public defender's alleged coercion of the defendant to plead guilty); and People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 821 (where the court found defendant's attorney was under a duty to withdraw from the case when defendant's statement requesting a new trial and alleging counsel's failure to call known alibi witnesses came to his attention). The State contends the defendant's claim of ineffective representation fails to meet the requirements set forth in this court's opinion in People v. Clem (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 163.
Failure to replace defense counsel, according to the defendant, resulted in a denial of effective assistance of counsel during the post-trial and sentencing hearings. The defendant relies on our decision in People v. Fields (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 821, 410 N.E.2d 1178. In Fields, we held that a defendant was entitled to new hearings on his post-trial motion and on sentencing because his attorney during those proceedings operated under a conflict of interest.