Opinion
E073862
04-28-2020
In re F.I., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. F.I., Defendant and Appellant.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles Ragland and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. J281188) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Winston S. Keh, Judge. Affirmed. Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles Ragland and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Defendant and appellant F.I. (minor) possessed a knife on school grounds. Following the denial of his suppression motion and a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true that minor possessed a locking-blade knife on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1)), a felony. The court thereafter exercised its discretion under section 17, subdivision (b), and reduced the offense to a misdemeanor. After a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court did not declare minor a ward of the court and placed him on summary probation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 725. Minor's sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court erred in denying his suppression motion because the search of his person was not supported by reasonable suspicion. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
II
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The factual background is taken from the motion to suppress hearing.
San Bernardino County Probation Officer Erika Pulido was assigned to a community day school in the city of Montclair. Officer Pulido's assigned duties included providing resources to the students, enforcing school rules and policies, and promoting campus safety.
On April 25, 2019, at approximately 10:30 a.m., while classes were in session, Officer Pulido observed minor walking around outside of a school office in an open area where students have lunch. Officer Pulido was aware minor had a history of truancies. Officer Pulido called minor's name numerous times to ask why he was out of class. However, minor continued to walk away from the officer. Minor walked into an administration office, and Officer Pulido followed him. Officer Pulido asked minor to sit down, and minor complied. Minor stated that he was not going back to class, that he wanted to call his mother, and that he did not want to be at school. Minor claimed that he was walking back from the counselor's office. Officer Pulido explained to minor that counselors know to escort the students back to their class. Minor then stated he saw his personal therapist or counselor. The school's principal allowed minor to call his mother while Officer Pulido waited outside the office. After minor made his phone call, the principal called Officer Pulido back into her office and informed the officer minor was not going home. Minor, however, was adamant about not going back to class.
Officer Pulido attempted to convince minor to return to class for 20 to 30 minutes. Minor would not oblige and stated, "if he went back to class, something bad was going to happen." Officer Pulido noted that minor had "been involved in some other criminal activity" in the past, and explained that minor stated, "he was fearing going to class." Minor was adamant that he would not return to class despite Officer Pulido's assurance that she would respond immediately if anything happened. On prior occasions, Officer Pulido had to take minor to the school administration office for drug use. In one prior incident, within a week before the current incident, Officer Pulido took minor to the administration office after he admitted to being under the influence of Xanax. During that incident, minor admitted to Officer Pulido that he had purchased a Xanax pill from another student. Minor also informed Officer Pulido that he did not like the way the pill made him feel and therefore he believed he should not have to pay for the pill, and that the other student was still seeking payment for the pill. Officer Pulido acknowledged that minor had no history of violence or weapons possession.
While Officer Pulido was conversing with minor, minor was not handcuffed and was inside a school office. Officer Pulido was the only officer present at that time and her service weapon was holstered. During her conversation with minor, Officer Pulido noticed that he was very nervous. Officer Pulido believed minor was scared to return to class. Officer Pulido also observed that minor kept placing his hand over his right front pants pocket. When Officer Pulido asked minor what he had in his pocket, he replied, "'Nothing.'" Officer Pulido knew that minor did not have a phone in his pocket because he kept asking the officer to return his phone. Officer Pulido also was aware that usually the students "conceal their phone to take it to class, sneak it into class." Officer Pulido saw something in minor's pocket and could see the outline of an object that was larger than a pencil but smaller than a baseball in his pocket.
Officer Pulido informed minor she would have to search him before he returned to class for everyone's safety. Minor responded, "'F that. I got searched in the morning.'" It was school protocol to search the students in the morning upon entering the campus. Officer Pulido stated that she was not there in the morning when he came in and that she did not remember searching him. Officer Pulido then asked minor to get up from his seat and place his hands behind his back for his safety and for hers. Minor initially complied but then tried to remove his right hand from her grasp. After hearing a commotion, another probation officer came to assist Officer Pulido. The other probation officer helped Officer Pulido to handcuff minor because he was refusing to comply with Officer Pulido's directive to put his hands behind his back, not because he was under arrest. Officer Pulido then patted minor down and felt a hard object in his right pocket. She reached into minor's pocket and pulled out a knife. The knife was closed but had a three- to four-inch blade.
Following Officer Pulido's testimony and argument from counsel, the juvenile court denied minor's motion to suppress. The court reasoned: "In this case the minor was observed wandering the school grounds during school hours instead of being in a classroom receiving instructions. Officer Pulido did what she was expected to do by approaching the minor and asking the minor why he was not in class. As a law enforcement officer, she observed an object, which the minor tried to cover with his right hand, in the minor's right front pocket. At this point the minor was not being detained or arrested. Officer Pulido was merely making inquiries of the minor to find out what was happening. [¶] The minor then made a spontaneous statement, which, coupled with his nervous demeanor, would raise a reasonable suspicion to a law enforcement officer about the safety of the minor and other students on campus. [¶] Under the circumstances then and there prevailing, Officer Pulido conducted a Terry[] pat-down of the minor's person and found what turned out to be a folding knife, which was and still is a forbidden object on school grounds. [¶] So given this scenario, the Court finds nothing illegal or improper about Officer Pulido's conduct. Indeed, the Terry pat-down is allowed under Terry versus Ohio and justified to ensure the safety of the minor and Officer Pulido. [¶] Therefore, the Court is going to deny the minor's motion."
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (Terry).
Minor timely appealed from the denial of his suppression motion.
III
DISCUSSION
Minor argues the juvenile court erred in denying his suppression motion because there was no reasonable suspicion justifying the search. We disagree.
"On appeal from a ruling denying a motion to suppress evidence, we 'exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found by the court, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment [of the United States Constitution].' [Citation.]" (In re Sean A. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 182, 186 (Sean A.).) All presumptions favor the trial court's exercise of its power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw factual inferences, "'and the trial court's findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.'" (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597, quoting People v. Lawler (1973) 9 Cal.3d 156, 160; see In re Lennies H. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1236.)
The Fourth Amendment "applies to searches conducted by school authorities." (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 337 (T.L.O.).) However, "[t]he determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches requires 'balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.' [Citation.] On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order." (Ibid.)
In the public school context, "the child's interest in privacy" must be weighed against "the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds." (T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 339.) Accordingly, the high court has recognized "that maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures" and that "the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily suspect." (Id. at pp. 339-340.) Specifically, "school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority," nor do they need "probable cause" for a student search. (Id. at pp. 340-341.) "Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider 'whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,' [citation]; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,' [citation]." (Id. at p. 341.)
"Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." (T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 341-342.) This standard focuses "on the question of reasonableness" (id. at p. 343), and it applies where "school officials conduct the search 'in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies.' [Citation.]" (In re K.S. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 72, 75.)
Courts have generally distinguished between two types of public school searches: (1) searches predicated on individualized suspicion of a particular student (T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 342-343; In re Bobby B. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 377, 380-382 (Bobby B.) [students suspected of smoking or drug use were properly searched]); and (2) "special needs" administrative searches, conducted without individualized suspicion (Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County et al. v. Earls (2002) 536 U.S. 822, 828-838; Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646, 652-666 [suspicionless drug testing programs for students engaging in athletics and extracurricular activities upheld]; Sean A., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at pp. 187-188 [upholding search pursuant to policy requiring search of all students who leave campus and return during the school day]; In re Latasha W. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1527 [upholding random weapons screening of students with hand-held metal detector]). Searches in the latter category "are part of a larger body of law holding that 'special needs' administrative searches, conducted without individualized suspicion, do not violate the Fourth Amendment where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable." (In re Latasha W., at p. 1527.)
Here, we are satisfied that Officer Pulido possessed a reasonable individualized suspicion adequate to support the patdown search of minor's person. The United States Supreme Court has described this standard as being met when there is "a moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing." (Safford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. Redding (2009) 557 U.S. 364, 371 (Safford).)
In this case, the search was justified at its inception because Officer Pulido had reasonable grounds for suspecting it would reveal evidence of a crime or a violation of school rules. Officer Pulido discovered minor wandering the school grounds when he was supposed to be in class and called out to him numerous times to ask why he was out of class. Minor, however, kept walking away from the officer and into an office. Officer Pulido knew minor had a history of truancies, as well as incidents involving drugs. Thereafter, Officer Pulido had a 20- to 30-minute discussion with minor in the school's office, during which minor appeared nervous, repeatedly placed his right hand over his right front pocket, refused to return to class, and stated that "if he went back to class, something bad was going to happen." Officer Pulido also had information that another student was pressuring minor to pay him or her for a Xanax pill he or she had given to minor. Based on minor's nervous demeanor, worrying statement, refusal to comply with school rules to return to class, and effort to prevent Officer Pulido from seeing what was in his pocket by concealing it with his hand, the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe a search of minor's person would reveal evidence of criminal activity or a violation of school rules. Officer Pulido had a "moderate chance" of finding evidence of criminal activity or a violation of school rules on minor's person. (Safford, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 371; see T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 342-347 [reasonable to search purse for cigarettes when student accused of smoking in school lavatory]; Bobby B., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at pp. 380-382 [reasonable to search minor who was in campus restroom without a hall pass when minor appeared nervous and restrooms had been a location of drug activity].)
In addition, Officer Pulido searched minor in a reasonable, not excessively intrusive manner. She explained that it was her custom to have students place their hands behind their back while she conducted searches. It was only when minor resisted her request to do so that another probation officer assisted in placing minor in handcuffs. Officer Pulido then conducted a patdown search of minor's person, during which she felt an object in minor's pocket that minor had been covering with his hand. Officer Pulido then reached into minor's pocket and discovered a folding knife. The method actually employed by Officer Pulido was "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." (T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 341-342; contra Safford, supra, 557 U.S. at pp. 375-377 [student's suspected drug dealing did not justify strip search].)
Minor argues his case is analogous to In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550 (William G.), in which the court concluded an assistant high school principal did not have reasonable suspicion to search a calculator case carried by a student that had "an odd-looking bulge" and was discovered to contain marijuana and paraphernalia. (Id. at p. 555.) We are not persuaded. The minor in William G. was stopped while he was walking on campus with two other students at about 1:10 p.m. (Id. at p. 555.) Although classes were in session, the minor did not have any classes after 12 noon. (Ibid.) The minor attempted to hide the calculator case behind his back and told the assistant principal he needed a warrant to see it. (Ibid.) The court concluded the minor's "'furtive gestures'" in attempting to hide the case were not enough to justify a search when the assistant principal had no information connecting the minor to drugs and the minor's demand for a warrant was merely an assertion of his constitutional rights. (Id. at pp. 566-567.)
Minor seizes on the William G. court's comment that the assistant principal's "suspicion that William was tardy or truant from class provided no reasonable basis for conducting a search of any kind." (William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 566.) That may be true in a case where a student is simply found on campus out of class, without information connecting the student to a violation of a law or school rule for which the search was intended to obtain evidence. Here, however, minor was not simply tardy or truant on campus. He was found wandering the school grounds and persistently refused to return to class when asked to do so. In addition, minor stated "something bad would happen" if he returned to class, Officer Pulido was aware that minor had an unresolved issue with another student involving drugs, and minor repeatedly covered an object in his pocket with his hand during the 20- to 30-minute discussion with the officer. Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Pulido knew minor had violated school rules and had a reasonable suspicion he was carrying an illegal or prohibited item on his person. (Compare In re Lisa G. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 801, 807-808 [teacher improperly searched purse of student who was defiant in class for the asserted purpose of finding her identification; there were no facts supporting a suspicion the student had a weapon or other prohibited item in her purse, and she had not been given the chance to voluntarily produce identification].)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in denying minor's suppression motion.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. FIELDS
J.