40; People v Clark, 88 NY2d 552, 555; People v Fuentes, 53 NY2d 892, 894). Accordingly, under the circumstances present here, the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the defendant's motion, made during trial, for leave to renew that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony ( see People v Rhodes, 60 AD3d 705; People v Robinson, 280 AD2d 687, 687; People v Kidd, 247 AD2d 269, 269; People v Ferguson, 237 AD2d 187, 188; People v Rosa, 231 AD2d 534, 536; People v DeJesus, 222 AD2d 449, 450; see generally People v Whiting, 35 AD3d 637, 638; People v Scarpetta, 11 AD3d 490, 491). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to disprove the defendant's alibi ( see Matter of Jeffrey V., 185 AD2d 240, 241; People v Rose, 166 AD2d 680, 681; People v Tullies, 135 AD2d 852, 853; see also People v McCall, 277 AD2d 467, 468; People v Marinus, 254 AD2d 372, 373), and to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator ( see People v Calabria, 3 NY3d 80, 82; People v Watson, 12 AD3d 709; People v Gonzalez, 3 AD3d 579, 579; People v Fermin, 235 AD2d 328, 328; People v Williams, 187 AD2d 547, 547-548).

The hearing court properly exercised its discretion in declining to reopen the Wade hearing, since, under the circumstances, these facts could not have had any effect on the suppression issue (see, CPL 710.40; People v. Clark, 88 N.Y.2d 552, 555-556; People v. Ferguson, 237 A.D.2d 187). Just before trial the defendant requested that the trial court reopen the Wade hearing.

Contrary to defendant's argument, the People were not required to refer to the uncharged sales in the bill of particulars, since these matters were evidentiary in nature (CPL 200.95; see, People v. Fitzgerald, 45 N.Y.2d 574, 580). Defendant's current claims that the court erred in its responses to three jury notes indicating deadlock are unpreserved and waived since defendant, in fact, proposed the responses to the first two notes ( People v. Aezah, 191 A.D.2d 312, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1010), and entered no objection to any aspect of the court's election to deliver an Allen charge following the third note ( People v. Ferguson, 237 A.D.2d 187, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 857). Also waived is defendant's claim that the court should have, sua sponte, declared a mistrial following each of these notes, since defendant in each instance opposed the declaration of a mistrial ( People v. Jackson, 209 A.D.2d 247, 248, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 974). Contrary to defendant's arguments, the jury's last note prior to the rendition of the verdict did not indicate that it was hopelessly deadlocked and the court's response did not serve to coerce a verdict.

The trial court correctly determined that the testimony in question was based on the witness's misunderstanding of a question, and that the witness's mistake was immediately rectified on further examination (see, CPL 710.40; People v. Ferguson, 237 A.D.2d 187, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 857). We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining contentions.