Opinion
97-01680
Argued April 18, 2002
May 28, 2002.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dabiri, J.), rendered February 11, 1997, convicting him of rape in the first degree, burglary in the first degree (five counts), assault in the second degree (five counts), criminal contempt in the first degree (four counts), assault in the third degree (three counts), reckless endangerment in the second degree, sexual misconduct, petit larceny (two counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (two counts), attempted assault in the third degree, and sexual abuse in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Andrew C. Fine, New York, N.Y. (Michael C. Taglieri of counsel), for appellant.
Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Diane R. Eisner, and Elaine Block of counsel), for respondent.
ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., WILLIAM D. FRIEDMANN, HOWARD MILLER, SANDRA L. TOWNES, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court properly precluded extrinsic evidence offered on the issue of the general credibility of the complainant which was collateral to the ultimate issue in the case (see People v. Inniss, 83 N.Y.2d 653, 658; People v. Knight, 80 N.Y.2d 845, 847; cf. People v. Washington, 278 A.D.2d 517; People v. Castillo, 215 A.D.2d 575; People v. Medina, 130 A.D.2d 515, 516).
The complainant's passing references to the defendant having "just come out of jail" do not constitute a ground for reversal. The trial court promptly gave a curative instruction to the jury and admonished the witness, and the references were elicited by the defense counsel, not the prosecutor. In any event, the proof of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming (see People v. Collazo, 163 A.D.2d 581; People v. Jeudi, 139 A.D.2d 594).
Notwithstanding the defendant's acquittal of the charge of attempted murder in the second degree, the sentencing court's comment that "it was fortuitous that the complainant didn't fall to her death" was not improper in light of the defendant's conviction for reckless endangerment in relation to the same incident (cf. People v. Santiago, 277 A.D.2d 258, 259; People v. Menasche, 224 A.D.2d 551; People v. Grant, 191 A.D.2d 297; People v. Coward, 100 A.D.2d 628). The imposition of consecutive sentences was within the sentencing court's discretion (see People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839; People v. Carter, 286 A.D.2d 773, 774, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 655).
FLORIO, J.P., FRIEDMANN, H. MILLER and TOWNES, JJ., concur.