Opinion
2002 NY 079181.
Decided March 31, 2004.
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York, New York, ADA Jeremy Glickman, for the People.
Wallace Riley, Esq., Legal Aid Society, New York, New York, for the Defendant.
The defendant, Angel Feliciano, was convicted on January 9, 2004, after a jury trial, of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (PL 195.05). He was acquitted of resisting arrest (PL 205.30).
The defendant moves, pursuant to CPL 330.30(1), to set aside the guilty verdict, alleging the existence of a ground appearing in the record which, if raised on appeal, would require reversal as a matter of law.
As defendant's motion correctly contends, in the factual context of this case, conviction for obstructing governmental administration must rest upon a showing by the prosecution that defendant interfered with the authorized arrest of another person. Specifically, the People were required to prove that the police had reasonable cause to believe that a third person, Damien Myles, had committed the offense of disorderly conduct. In the Matter of Verna C., 143 AD2d 94, 95 (2nd Dept. 1988); People v. Vogel, 116 Misc.2d 332-333 (App. Term 2nd Dept. 1982). The jury was so instructed and its implied finding, that the police had such reasonable cause, is supported by legally sufficient evidence.
The testimony of the officers demonstrated that they were attempting to clear an area where a police narcotics operation was anticipated. The purpose was to facilitate that operation, by making it easier to identify persons engaged in drug transactions, and to assure the safety of persons in the area.
In furtherance of that purpose, the officers gave directions to a group of persons to move. At least one person, Damien Myles, in the presence of others, refused to leave the area, after repeated requests, and refused or was unable to produce identification when requested.
The issue is not whether the facts presented would support a conviction of Myles for disorderly conduct, but whether a rational juror could have found that probable cause existed. People v. Simpson, 244 AD2d 87, 90-91 (1st Dept. 1998); People v. Early, 85 AD2d 752 (3rd Dept. 1981); McDermott v. Justices of the Supreme Court, State of New York, New York County, 2001 WL 826085, SDNY, July 20, 2001.
A reasonable construction of the testimony supports the view that Myles was congregating in a public place and refused to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse. Nor would it be unreasonable to infer that when he did so, he was recklessly creating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. Certainly, the jurors could have found from these facts that the officers who arrested Myles had reasonable cause to believe that he was committing the offense of disorderly conduct.
The jury was specifically instructed that defendant could not be found guilty of obstructing governmental administration unless the People proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was interfering with an authorized arrest. The jury was further instructed that an arrest is authorized if the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe that an offense had been, or was being committed. Furthermore, the jury was reminded that the offense for which Myles was being arrested was disorderly conduct and the jurors were instructed as to the elements of that offense.
By convicting the defendant of obstruction of governmental administration, it is clear that the jurors concluded that the arrest of Myles was an authorized arrest, i.e. that the arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe that Myles had committed the offense of disorderly conduct. Since there is legally sufficient testimonial support in the record for that conclusion, the court finds no basis for appellate reversal as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 330.30 (1), to set aside his conviction, is denied.
This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the court.