Opinion
1-23-0149
05-13-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LISA FARRELL, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. No. 22500204501 Honorable John J. Mahoney, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
COGHLAN JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Defendant's conviction for misdemeanor battery is affirmed where (1) defendant failed to raise defense of dwelling as an affirmative defense in the trial court and, therefore, forfeited her argument that the State failed to rebut her defense; (2) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise defense of dwelling; and (3) defendant was not denied a fair trial on the basis of judicial bias.
¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Lisa Farrell was convicted of misdemeanor battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2022)) and sentenced to four months of conditional discharge. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the State failed to rebut that she used reasonable force in defense of her dwelling; (2) alternatively, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to sufficiently raise defense of dwelling as an affirmative defense; and (3) she was denied her right to a fair trial where the trial court exhibited bias through its repeated interruptions during defense counsel's closing argument. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 Officer Richard Ryan testified that on May 23, 2022, he was on duty with his partner, Office Rangel. Around 1:50 a.m., they received a call for an "audible burglar alarm" and "glass break" for a business located at 5512 West 79th Street in Burbank. When they arrived, the business appeared to be secure, and Ryan did not see any glass breakage. They proceeded up a stairwell that was accessible from the street, which led to the residence above the business. Ryan had "prior knowledge" of a "door that leads from the residence above the business into the business from the inside." As they proceeded upstairs, Ryan heard a woman "in distress," "uttering phrases" and "mumbling" from inside of the residence. They announced their presence and knocked on the door. The woman stated that she "was not going to open up the door" because she was naked and needed to put clothes on. When they knocked again, she said, "I'm coming. I have to put clothes on."
Officer Rangel's first name does not appear in the record on appeal.
¶ 5 The woman, who Ryan identified as defendant, eventually opened the door. Ryan explained that they were responding to a "burglary alarm glass break" and wanted to investigate whether there was any glass breakage from the "door that leads from her apartment down into the inside of the business." Rangel went back to the squad car "to see if there was any information from the property," while Ryan remained in the stairwell. Defendant said, "you got the door coming in." Ryan responded that he "wasn't coming in at the time" but that they "still need to make entry just to see if there was any glass breakage *** from the inside of the door that leads to the business." Ryan's hand was "positioned in the door frame." Defendant denied him entry and shut the door "on [his] hand." He could see through the "crack of the door" that defendant was "sitting with her back up against the door." Ryan told defendant that his hand was "jammed" and that she needed to release the door. Defendant slid "even further away out of [his] sight of view" and "press[ed] harder on the door causing more pressure on [his] hand." Defendant "seem[ed] intoxicated."
¶ 6 Another officer, Officer Wilson, was at the bottom of the stairwell. Ryan told her that his hand was stuck, so she came upstairs and helped him "push[ ] up against the door" to free his hand. Ryan sustained minor bruising and redness to the top of his left hand.
Officer Wilson's first name does not appear in the record on appeal.
¶ 7 On cross-examination, Ryan acknowledged that they did not have an arrest or search warrant and that defendant had "every right" to deny them entry. Ryan maintained that he placed his hand "on the door frame, not into the door frame" and that he was just "resting" his hand there.
¶ 8 On May 31, 2022, Officer Robert Michelson responded to a "civil matter" at defendant's residence. He knew that defendant had an "open case for aggravated battery against a police officer." He took defendant into custody and brought her to an interview room at the police station. Michelson read defendant her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and she signed a Miranda waiver.
¶ 9 When Michelson asked defendant about the May 23 incident, she initially claimed she "wasn't aware that [Ryan's] hand was in the door when she shut the door." Then she "changed the story and told [Michelson] that she was aware but she didn't think it shut that hard and she continued to apply pressure to the door with knowledge his hand was still in the door."
¶ 10 Defense counsel moved for a directed finding, arguing that Ryan did not suffer bodily injury and that defendant did not knowingly cause bodily harm to Ryan because she "indicated she did not know the officer's hand was in the door frame." Counsel also argued that "when the officer put his hand on the door frame - anybody that does that *** is putting themselves at risk of a door being closed on them." Ryan also indicated that he had "no right to even go inside the residence," but kept conversing with defendant "to eventually gain entry." Counsel argued that because "[defendant] was free to close the door on her own private residence," the State failed to "me[et] their burden as to the intentionally part." The State argued that the elements of battery were met where Ryan sustained "some bruising," and while defendant "at first said that she didn't know [Ryan's] hand was there," she "changed her answer and said she did know *** and proceeded to put more pressure." The trial court denied defendant's motion.
¶ 11 The defense rested. The trial court asked if there was "any additional argument necessary," to which defense counsel responded that he would like to "add a little more." The following exchange occurred between defense counsel and the trial court:
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, everyone has a right to privacy in their own home. *** So the fact that the officers were trying to make entry into this apartment even though they were there for a glass breakage alarm for a business that's not the unit she occupies. She occupies a completely separate unit. Why they felt the need to try to go into that unit, number one, I don't know. Number two, at that point Ms. Farrell has every right to close the door on the officers-
THE COURT: Oh no she does not.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If they are not there for any legitimate investigatory purpose-
THE COURT: Really?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, at that point -
THE COURT: They weren't there for a justifiable reason?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The moment they crossed the threshold of the entry, Judge, the moment they cross the threshold of the entry they are now invading the abode of my client. That's what they are doing.
THE COURT: Under what authority does somebody-even if they're subject to unlawful arrest, do they have the right to resist and the answer to that is clearly no.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: They don't, Judge. I agree with that point, they don't. But we're going back to the knowingly prong of what my client is charged with.
THE COURT: She admitted it.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, she admitted to closing the door. At first when my client was in the police station in the interview room she said that she did not know she closed on the hand-
THE COURT: I believe the officer testified and I believe him.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: --but after more and more questions then she said yeah, his hand might have been there.
THE COURT: Okay. There you go. There's your knowledge element."
¶ 12 Defense counsel argued that Ryan "had no arrest warrant. He had no search warrant. He had no circumstances to even cross that threshold. The moment his hand crossed that threshold he was going beyond his investigatory duties at that time" and "[t]hat's just the risk he takes the moment he put his hand in there." The trial judge responded, "Under what authority did she have to resist arrest?" To which counsel responded that defendant was not under arrest. The trial court then indicated:
"THE COURT: You're all mixed up on the law here. An unlawful entry into the apartment the remedy is to exclude evidence gained from the unlawful entry, that's one thing. The other thing is right to resist arrest, no, or to, you know, bodily harm to the officer, no. It's clearly no.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor-
THE COURT: That's the law.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor is setting the precedent that an officer is just allowed to go-
THE COURT: You don't tell me what I'm saying. I'm telling you what I'm saying.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm trying to clarify for the record what your Honor is saying. That's all I'm trying to do.
THE COURT: I told you she's not allowed to resist.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: She was not under arrest. She was not under arrest. ***
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: *** The officers had no right to make entry into that apartment, none whatsoever. That was her home, her private residence. They had no reason to go inside that home.
THE COURT: They didn't cross the threshold, did they?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, the moment the hand went through the door the officer crossed the threshold."
¶ 13 The State responded that the officers were there for a legitimate investigative purpose and that Ryan "did not invade this threshold. He did not make entry into the unit. He simply placed his hand on the door frame ***. He was asking for entry but in no way did they try to break in, push in, anything like that."
¶ 14 The trial court found that Ryan sustained bruising and redness, which is "enough for bodily harm." The court also found that "there's probably no good reason for the officers to go in, but there is no right to resist or use of force to resist an arrest or anything else, so, I mean, to me it's easy. *** I found the officers to be credible in everything they said. *** It's a finding of guilty."
¶ 15 Defendant filed a motion for new trial, arguing, in relevant part, that she "had legal justification to close the door, with the officer's hand past the threshold and on the door frame, to prevent unlawful entry." The trial court denied defendant's motion and sentenced her to four months of conditional discharge.
¶ 16 ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Sufficiency of the Evidence and Forfeiture
¶ 18 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but not because it failed to prove the elements of battery. Rather, she argues that the State failed to disprove or rebut that she used justifiable force in defense of her dwelling. The State responds that defendant has forfeited this argument by failing to raise defense of dwelling as an affirmative defense in the trial court.
¶ 19 "A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means *** causes bodily harm to an individual." 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2022). "[A] lack of legal justification is not an element of the offense of battery and need not be pled by the State." People v. Meor, 233 Ill.2d 465, 470 (2009). Rather, "justifiable use of force is considered to be an affirmative defense." People v. Sambo, 197 Ill.App.3d 574, 582 (1990). "A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to prevent or terminate such other's unlawful entry into or attack upon a dwelling." 720 ILCS 5/7-2(a) (West 2022). Defense of dwelling "requires a reasonable belief both (1) that the victim's entry was unlawful and (2) that the use of force was necessary to prevent or terminate his entry." People v. Wiggen, 2021 IL App (3d) 180486, ¶ 20. There must be "evidence that the defendant had an actual belief that the circumstances established the legal justification" to use force. (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 20 An affirmative defense can be raised by "the pleadings or the evidence" (People v. Williams, 96 Ill.App.3d 8, 16-17 (1981)) and "evidence sufficient to entitle a defendant to consideration of an affirmative defense can come wholly from evidence put on by the State." (People v. Bardsley, 2017 IL App (2d) 150209, ¶ 17). Even" 'slight evidence'" is sufficient to allow consideration of a defense by the trier of fact. Id. (citing People v. Kucavik, 367 Ill.App.3d 176, 179 (2006)). Once a defendant has raised an affirmative defense, the State must rebut it beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
¶ 21 In Bardsley, 2017 IL App (2d) 150209, ¶ 17, the court held that a defendant forfeits an affirmative defense by failing to raise it in the trial court. There, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault for attempting to bite a private security officer at a hospital. Id. ¶ 3. At trial, defense counsel argued that defendant did not try to bite the security officer, but instead, was trying to free himself of the restraints on his wrists. ¶ 12. The defendant argued on appeal that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt where "the State's evidence showed" that his conduct was "legally justified as self-defense against a battery." Id. ¶ 16.
¶ 22 The court found that defendant was "improperly attempting to raise this affirmative defense for the first time on appeal" and held that "the mere presence in the State's evidence of facts sufficient to permit a defendant to raise a defense is not by itself sufficient to trigger the requirement that the State disprove the defense." Id. ¶¶ 16-17. To hold otherwise would require the State to "disprove every affirmative defense of which even 'slight evidence' exists or risk a post hoc reexamination of the evidence for new potential defenses on appeal." (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 22. The court explained that a defendant must "alert the State to what it must rebut" and "raise the defense when the State can present further evidence or argument." Id. ¶ 23. The court did not, however, establish how a defendant can properly raise an affirmative defense at trial, i.e., "what [a defendant] would have needed to do or when he would have needed to do it." Id.
¶ 23 Similarly, here, there was no affirmative defense raised for the State to rebut. Because defendant was charged with a misdemeanor, she was not required to notify the State of any defense she wished to raise prior to trial. See Ill. S.Ct. Rs. 411 (eff. Dec. 9, 2011), 413(d) (eff. July 1, 1982). However, defendant did not raise defense of dwelling in a any way during trial that would "alert the State to what it must rebut." See Bardsley, 2017 IL App (2d) 150209, ¶ 23. Instead, defense counsel argued that the State failed to prove the elements of battery. See People v. Valdez, 2022 IL App (1st) 181463, ¶ 119 (recognizing that challenging the element of a crime is "not the same thing as asserting an affirmative defense"). Counsel also asserted that Ryan put himself at risk by placing his hand in the door frame and that defendant had a right to close the door because she has a right to privacy. However, counsel never invoked defense of dwelling, even when the trial court inquired as to what justified defendant to "resist" or to do "bodily harm" to Ryan. Because defendant never raised defense of dwelling, the burden never shifted to the State to rebut this defense. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited this argument on appeal. See Bardsley, 2017 IL App (2d) 150209, ¶ 17; see also People v. Shepherd, 2020 IL App (1st) 172706, ¶ 18 (defendant forfeited necessity defense where defendant's counsel "never mentioned the affirmative defense of necessity at any time during any argument before the trial court").
We acknowledge that defendant argued in her motion for new trial that she "had legal justification to close the door, with the officer's hand past the threshold and on the door frame, to prevent unlawful entry." However, this alone is insufficient to "alert the State to what it must rebut," since the State could no longer present evidence to rebut the defense at that point in the proceedings. See Bardsley, 2017 IL App (2d) 150209, ¶ 23.
¶ 24 Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant sufficiently raised defense of dwelling below, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, "any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act justifiably" in defense of her dwelling (see People v. Yanez, 2022 IL App (3d) 200007, ¶ 27) where there is no evidence that defendant reasonably believed that "use of force was necessary to prevent or terminate [Ryan's] entry" (Wiggen, 2021 IL App (3d) 180486, ¶ 20).
¶ 25 Defendant argues that because Ryan's hand was inside of her doorway, she could use reasonable force to both (1) terminate his already unlawful entry into her apartment and (2) prevent him from entering any further. See Yanez, 2022 IL App (3d) 200007, ¶ 29 (a defendant is "not required to wait for an unlawful entry to be accomplished before using justifiable force against the invader"). However, there was no evidence that defendant reasonably believed her use of force was necessary to either expel Ryan or prevent further entry where Ryan explicitly stated that he "wasn't coming in at the time"; defendant denied him entry and closed the door without giving him the time or opportunity to remove his hand; defendant continued to apply force after Ryan told her that his hand was stuck in the door; and there was no indication that Ryan was going to enter her apartment without her consent. Ultimately, there is no evidence suggesting defendant reasonably believed using force was necessary to either terminate Ryan's entry (i.e., to get him to remove his hand from inside of the door frame) or prevent him from entering further. Compare Wiggen, 2021 IL App (3d) 180486, ¶¶ 21-22 (finding that no evidence "established that [defendant] reasonably believed her conduct was necessary to prevent or terminate [the victim's] entry into her house" where she claimed that she did not make intentional contact with the victim and the victim "demonstrated no conduct that suggested that force would have been necessary") with People v. Young, 100 Ill.App.2d 20, 25-26 (1968) (defendant acted in justifiable defense of dwelling where officers "barged into the defendant's home" and "were determined" to search her home, even after she objected and told the officers that they were in the wrong apartment).
¶ 26 Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction where the State proved the elements of battery beyond a reasonable doubt (which defendant does not dispute) and, assuming arguendo that defendant sufficiently raised defense of dwelling below, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State rebutted her defense.
¶ 27 Misapplication of the Law
¶ 28 Defendant asserts that the trial court "deeply misunderstood-or was unwilling to apply-the law of defense of dwelling" and conflated defense of dwelling with resisting arrest. "[T]he trial court is presumed to know the law and apply it properly." People v. Howery, 178 Ill.2d 1, 32 (1997). This presumption is rebutted where "the record contains strong affirmative evidence to the contrary." Id.
¶ 29 The record does not contain "strong affirmative evidence" that the trial court misapplied the law. See id. Applying the elements of battery, the trial court found that defendant knowingly caused bodily harm to Ryan. We cannot fault the trial court for failing to consider defense of dwelling where, as previously discussed, defendant did not raise the defense. See Bardsley, 2017 IL App (2d) 150209, ¶ 22 (because the trial court is presumed to know the law, we "can expect it to consider any defense properly before it") (emphasis added); see also Shepherd, 2020 IL App (1st) 172706, ¶ 30 ("We cannot expect the trial court to look at the evidence through the lens of the necessity defense unless that defense was presented").
¶ 30 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 31 Alternatively, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to sufficiently raise defense of dwelling. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Matters of trial strategy, including "what evidence to present, whether to call a certain witness and what theory of defense to pursue," are generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Morris, 2013 IL App (1st) 110413, ¶ 74. Prejudice is shown where there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A defendant must satisfy both prongs under Strickland, and "if the ineffectiveassistance claim can be disposed of on the ground that defendant did not suffer prejudice, a court need not decide whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient." People v. Griffin, 178 Ill.2d 65, 74 (1997).
¶ 32 Defendant argues that she suffered prejudice because raising defense of dwelling "could only have resulted in the trial court *** find[ing] that [she] was justified in her use of limited force." However, as previously discussed, there is no evidence that defendant reasonably believed that use of force was necessary to prevent or terminate officer Ryan's entry. See Wiggen, 2021 IL App (3d) 180486, ¶ 20 (defense of dwelling "requires a reasonable belief *** that the use of force was necessary to prevent or terminate [the victim's] entry"). Therefore, defendant has not shown that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Because defendant cannot establish that she was prejudiced, her ineffective assistance claim fails. See Griffin, 687 Ill.2d at 74.
¶ 33 Judicial Bias
¶ 34 Defendant argues that she was denied a fair trial because the trial court "repeatedly interrupted defense counsel's closing argument, expressed hostility towards counsel at closing, and revealed through its improper commentary that its finding of guilt was the result of bias against [defendant] and her trial counsel."
¶ 35 Defendant acknowledges that she has forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. She nevertheless urges us to review this issue under the plain error doctrine. A reviewing court may consider an unpreserved error where a clear or obvious error occurred and (1) "the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error," or (2) the "error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence." People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 565 (2007). The initial step in a plain error analysis is to determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred. People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 49.
¶ 36 Defendant also argues that the "waiver rule is relaxed" where, as here, "the trial judge's conduct would have been the basis of the objection." People v. Crawford, 343 Ill.App.3d 1050, 1055-56 (2003). Regardless, we find that no error occurred here. See People v. White, 2011 IL App (1st) 092852, ¶ 81 (declining to decide whether plain error or relaxation of the waiver rule was applicable because "even if we *** relax the waiver rule, we still must first determine if there was an error").
¶ 37 "A trial judge is presumed to be impartial, and the burden of overcoming this presumption rests on the party making the charge of prejudice." People v. Faria, 402 Ill.App.3d 475, 482 (2010). "In order to show bias, defendant must demonstrate that the judge displayed 'active personal animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward the defendant.'" People v. Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 96 (quoting People v. Shelton, 401 Ill.App.3d 564, 583 (2010)). Allegations of judicial bias are viewed in context and evaluated in terms of the specific events that took place. People v. Hardin, 2012 IL App (1st) 100682, ¶ 18.
¶ 38 Moreover, a criminal defendant's right to make a closing argument before the fact finder is rooted in the sixth amendment right to counsel. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 856-65 (1975). The trial court has "broad discretion in regards to limiting [closing] argument" (Faria, 402 Ill.App.3d at 483) but "does not have the discretion to deny a defendant the right to make a proper closing argument" (Crawford, 343 Ill.App.3d at 1056 (citing Herring, 422 U.S. at 85665)). "A defendant who waives a jury and submits his or her rights and liberty to a trial judge is entitled to the same fair, patient and impartial consideration he would be entitled to by a jury of fair, impartial, careful and considerate peers." People v. Smith, 205 Ill.App.3d 153, 157 (1990).
¶ 39 The trial court did not display "active personal animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust toward the defendant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 96. Defendant argues that the trial court's interjections during closing argument "prevented the complete presentation of [her] defense" and "show that [it] was unwilling to consider the affirmative defense that [defendant] *** was putting before it." As previously discussed, defense counsel never put an affirmative defense before the trial court. Counsel was permitted to argue his theory of the case, albeit, with some pushback from the trial court. However, that pushback aimed to clarify whether defendant knew Ryan's hand was in the door and what, if anything, justified defendant's use of force. Based on the record, we cannot say that the trial court was biased against defendant, prejudged her guilt, or prevented counsel from making a complete closing argument. See, e.g., Faria, 402 Ill.App.3d at 483 (defendant was not denied a fair trial where "defense counsel presented a full closing argument to the court" and "although [counsel's] remarks were challenged by the court, he was permitted to argue his theory of the case to the court," and was not given a time limit or pressured by the court); see also Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 14132, ¶ 105 ("[T]he fact that a judge displays displeasure or irritation with an attorney's behavior is not necessarily evidence of judicial bias against the defendant or his counsel.").
¶ 40 Defendant relies on Crawford, 343 Ill.App.3d at 1061, to support her argument that the trial court exhibited bias and prejudged her guilt. In Crawford, the trial judge interrupted counsel's opening argument with a comment "suggesting] that the court had prejudged the merits of defendant's case" before any evidence was presented. Id. at 1060. During the defense's closing argument, the trial judge "repeatedly interrupted defense counsel, argued with counsel, challenging him at every turn and even characterized defense counsel's argument as a misrepresentation of the evidence." Id. at 1056. The court interrupted counsel two sentences into closing argument, stating that certain evidence was not helpful to defendant. Id. at 1060. Four sentences later, the trial court interjected:" 'So it's okay. Then it's okay. If [the victim is] *** some trollop that's going around smoking crack or weed or drinking beer, and she's not old enough, she has no right to say no.' "Id. The trial judge "again interrupted for a third time accusing defense counsel of misrepresenting the evidence," and even accused counsel of lying. Id. at 1056, 58. The court found that the trial judge's "comments made during defense counsel's opening and closing arguments clearly reveal[ed] the court's bias against defendant." Id. at 1061.
¶ 41 Whereas, here, the trial judge did not make any comments prior to the presentation of evidence or the close of trial suggesting that he prejudged defendant's guilt or was biased against her. Additionally, the trial court here did not accuse counsel of misrepresenting evidence or lying, and counsel was not prevented from presenting a complete closing argument. See Faria, 402 Ill.App.3d at 482-83 (the trial court's interruptions "viewed within the context they were made" did not show bias or prejudice against defendant and counsel was "permitted to argue his theory of the case to the court").
¶ 42 CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 44 Affirmed.