Opinion
F060572 Super. Ct. No. 1401272
10-07-2011
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FAIRMONT SPECIALTY, Defendant and Appellant.
Nunez & Bernstein; E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant. John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Alice E. Mimms, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Poochigian, J. and Franson, J.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Thomas D. Zeff, Judge.
Nunez & Bernstein; E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant.
John P. Doering, County Counsel, and Alice E. Mimms, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Fairmont Specialty (Fairmont), the surety on a bail bond posted on behalf of Ariana Galvan, appeals from the judgment entered on the bail bond after Galvan failed to appear for a pretrial hearing. Fairmont argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction to order the bond forfeited when it failed to do so at the first hearing from which Galvan was absent. We conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in finding there was a rational basis to conclude that Galvan had a sufficient excuse to justify her absence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On July 24, 2009, Garcia Family Bail Bonds, Inc., posted a bail bond for Galvan. Fairmont was the surety on the bond. Galvan was ordered to appear on August 24. On that date, Galvan failed to appear, but the trial court found good cause to not declare the bond forfeited. The hearing was continued to September 8. A bench warrant was issued and held until the next hearing. When Galvan failed to appear on September 8, bail was ordered forfeited and a bench warrant issued. Fairmont filed a motion to vacate forfeiture and exonerate the bail bond, which was denied by the trial court. Summary judgment was entered on the bond on May 27, 2010. Fairmont appeals from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
This appeal presents only one issue -- did the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined at the August 24, 2009, hearing that good cause existed for Galvan's failure to appear, thus justifying the decision to not order the bail bond forfeited? Both parties have quoted verbatim the relevant events in their briefs. It is sufficient to state that when the case was called on August 24, Galvan's counsel advised the trial court that he had been told Galvan had been present earlier in the morning, but had left at some point in time. Galvan's counsel did not know why Galvan had left the courthouse but asked the trial court to issue and hold the bench warrant for one week, presumably to locate Galvan (counsel advised the trial court he had an address for her).
The relevant statutes are Penal Code sections 1305 and 1305.1. Section 1305, subdivision (a) states, in relevant part, that the trial court must declare the bail bond forfeited when a defendant fails to appear in court as ordered, unless there is a "sufficient excuse" for his or her absence. The trial court's "failure to declare a forfeiture upon a nonappearance without sufficient excuse, either where no excuse is offered or where the finding of an excuse constitutes an abuse of discretion, deprives the court of jurisdiction to later declare a forfeiture." (People v. United Bonding Ins. Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 907.)
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Section 1305.1, first added to the statutory scheme in 1969 as subdivision (b) to former section 1305 (Stats. 1969, ch. 1194, § 2, pp. 2328-2329), provides that if the defendant fails to appear, but the trial court has "reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist for the failure to appear, the court may continue the case for a period it deems reasonable to enable the defendant to appear without ordering a forfeiture of bail or issuing a bench warrant." Former § 1305 was repealed in 1993 and replaced by a new § 1305 addressing the same subject matter (Stats. 1993, ch. 524, §§ 1, 2, pp. 2702-2704). There must be some rational basis for the trial court's "reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist" for the failure to appear. (People v. Surety Ins. Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 22, 27.) In reviewing the matter, we need not find that the defendant had a valid excuse justifying his or her absence. The question is whether the trial court had a rational basis for believing such an excuse may have existed. (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 945, 953.) The trial court has discretion when reaching its decision and each case must be decided on its own merits. (Id. at p. 952.)
The crux of this appeal, therefore, is whether the trial court had some rational basis for believing that sufficient excuse existed for Galvan's failure to appear. The only basis that appears in the record for the trial court's ruling is that Galvan had appeared earlier in the day. She left, apparently without speaking with her attorney and without telling anyone present in court why she was leaving.
To call this a close case is to state the obvious. We conclude, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defense counsel represented to the trial court that Galvan had been present earlier in the morning. It appears the case was called some two hours after Galvan was required to appear. Based on Galvan's earlier appearance that day, the trial court reasonably could have inferred that she intended to appear, but some event required her to leave before the case was called. Moreover, the record indicates that this was a pretrial hearing, and Galvan obviously already had posted bail. Accordingly, there was no reason for the trial court to believe that a sudden departure could have been prompted by the threat of imminent incarceration. In short, there was no reason for Galvan to fear the outcome of the hearing, thus suggesting that her departure was prompted by an event, such as an emergency, which could qualify as a "sufficient excuse." These facts provide a rational basis for the trial court to conclude, in the exercise of its discretion, that Galvan had a sufficient excuse for her absence.
The reporter's transcript attached to Fairmont's request for judicial notice states that the case was called at 10:48 a.m.
--------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.