Cross-Petition for Certiorari Denied (People) September 21, 1992. Certiorari Granted on the following issue: Whether the mere enactment of § 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), and the announcement of People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1989), constituted sufficient "present need" to permit a collateral attack on petitioner's prior convictions during a period where no other need was present. Certiorari Dismissed as improvidently Granted July 6, 1993.

At a March 7, 1991, hearing, the prosecution asserted that Hampton's motions were barred because they had not been filed within the three-year limitations period set forth in section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986). The trial court, citing the statute and, alternatively, People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1989) (allowing a five-year grace period for collateral attacks made under section 16-5-402(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986)), rejected this argument and found that Hampton's motions had been timely raised. The trial court addressed the merits of Hampton's motions and denied his claims for relief.

The overall purpose, therefore, was to make a judgment of conviction unassailable, subject to constitutional constraints, after the expiration of a reasonable period of time for attacking its validity. See People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689, 692 (Colo. 1989) (the primary object of section 16-5-402 was "to reduce as far as constitutionally permissible the availability of post-conviction review of stale convictions"). The legislature's specific goals in limiting attacks on criminal convictions were twofold. First, the statute's time limitations were established to give finality to judgments of conviction so that statutory provisions directed at repeat offenders, former offenders, and habitual offenders would not be frustrated by tardy efforts to set aside prior convictions. Second, the statute expresses the additional and independent goal of avoiding the "difficulties attending the litigation of stale claims," a concern addressed to all forms of attack on criminal convictions that have matured to procedural finality.

B. In People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1989), we examined the 1984 version of section 16-5-402. The trial court in Fagerholm granted the defendant's postconviction motion, filed in 1986, to vacate a 1962 and a 1966 prior felony conviction because, in the trial court's view, there were circumstances "amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect" for the defendant's belated challenge.

The objective of the general assembly in enacting section 16-5-402 was to reduce the availability of postconviction review to the extent constitutionally permissible. People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689, 692 (Colo. 1989). The goals of section 16-5-402 are two-fold. First, the statute seeks to alleviate "the difficulties attending the litigation of stale claims."

We have addressed a similar set of potentially conflicting legislative intentions before. In People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1989), we considered the statute of limitations for collateral attacks of criminal convictions. The legislature clearly intended to limit litigation over stale claims when it enacted the provision, but later amended the statute with an exception for cases of justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, evidencing an intent to preserve the due process rights of defendants.

Any prosecutorial appeal under section 16-12-102(1) is necessarily limited to questions of law only. People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689, 693 (Colo. 1989); Tharp, 746 P.2d at 1339. This section does not give the People a basis upon which to challenge the trial court's assessment of the evidence.

In Colorado, "[l]egislation is presumed to have prospective effect unless a contrary intent is expressed by the General Assembly." Riley v. People, 828 P.2d 254, 257 (Colo. 1992); accord People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689, 692 (Colo. 1989) ("legislation may be given retroactive effect if the statute indicates a clear legislative intent to achieve such . . . application" and if such application does not impair vested rights); McCowan v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 116 Colo. 78, 81, 179 P.2d 275, 277 (1947) ("The courts have universally construed all legislation as prospective only, unless by plain and positive language it otherwise appears . . . and this is true even when applied to statutes which are remedial only."); see § 2-4-202, 1B C.R.S. (1980) ("A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation."); Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. District Court, 199 Colo. 284, 287, 611 P.2d 963, 964 (1980) ("Section 2-4-202, C.R.S. 1973, which is a restatement of the common law, provides that a statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation.").

Defendant, Scott Kelly Janke, appeals the trial court order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion. He argues that the trial court erred by ruling that he was barred from collaterally attacking his prior conviction under § 16-5-402, C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8A). He contends that he is not barred by this section since he is entitled to the five-year grace period established by our supreme court in People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1989). We agree and, therefore, reverse and remand with directions.

Moreover, even if defendant had brought a collateral attack during his 1995 trial, it would have been time barred. See People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689, 693 (Colo. 1989) (grace period to allow collateral attacks on conviction obtained before enactment of § 16-5-402 expired on July 1, 1989). R. at 173-74.