Opinion
A164989
10-06-2023
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William EVERS, Defendant and Appellant.
Walter K. Pyle, Berkeley, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Arthur P. Beever, Deputy Attorney General, Claudia H. Phillips, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Walter K. Pyle, Berkeley, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Arthur P. Beever, Deputy Attorney General, Claudia H. Phillips, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GOLDMAN, J.
William Evers pled guilty to assault on a police officer with a firearm after being arrested in connection with a string of residential burglaries. At sentencing, the trial court ordered Evers to pay restitution to two victims and assessed a 15 percent administrative fee on the restitution amounts. The court also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine and imposed but suspended a $10,000 parole restitution fine. The court declined Evers’ request to reduce the two restitution fines by applying a statutory formula and concluded that, under the circumstances, the maximum fines were warranted.
Evers now argues—and the Attorney General agrees—that the 15 percent administrative fee was invalid because the statute pursuant to which it was imposed was repealed before the date of his sentencing. Evers also argues that the restitution fines were unconstitutional under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 242 Cal.Rptr.3d 268 and similar cases requiring sentencing courts to take into account a defendant's ability to pay, and that he properly raised his constitutional challenge to the fines by submitting two informal post-judgment motions to the trial court under Penal Code section 1237.2. The Attorney General responds that Evers forfeited his Dueñas challenge by failing to make any argument or objection on that basis at the sentencing hearing, and that a motion under section 1237.2 does not cure the forfeiture.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We reverse the trial court's orders insofar as they require Evers to pay the 15 percent administrative fee, but otherwise affirm, finding that Evers’ motions under section 1237.2 did not excuse his forfeiture.
BACKGROUND
After being released from prison in 2018, Evers worked briefly in 2020, but otherwise was unemployed. In 2021, he was living in the forest in Mendocino County and obtaining food, alcohol, firearms, and other items from occupied and unoccupied residences.
In May 2021, two officers responded to a report that Evers had broken into a residence. Upon encountering Evers, one officer chased him on foot. Evers shot at or near the officer and escaped. He was later apprehended and charged by criminal complaint with attempted murder of a peace officer, grand theft of a firearm, two counts of vandalism, and 15 counts of burglary, along with special circumstances allegations. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court added a count to the complaint for assault on a peace officer with a firearm, and dismissed the remaining counts. As a factual basis for his plea, Evers admitted that he "assaulted Mendocino County Sheriff's Deputy Thomas Kelly with a firearm knowing Deputy Kelly was a peace officer engaged in the lawful performance of his duties." Evers pled guilty to the single count and two prior strikes, and agreed to a sentence of 25 years to life in prison.
At the outset of the March 24, 2022 sentencing hearing, Evers’ attorney asked "to be heard on the restitution fine." The court first ordered Evers to pay direct restitution of $1,450 and $839.99 to two victims, with 10 percent annual interest, and a 15 percent administrative fee. It permanently stayed $30.00 and $40.00 court assessments, and otherwise accepted the plea.
The court then explained that "typically [it] reduces the restitution fine," but, in Evers’ case, "[i]n light of the amount of actual restitution ordered ..., which is approximately $2,500, I am not going to reduce the restitution fines ... under [ section] 1202.4(b). So the Court will order the $10,000 [restitution fine]." The court also ordered but suspended a $10,000 parole restitution fine under section 1202.45. (See § 1202.45, subd. (a) [parole restitution fine shall be imposed in same amount as restitution fine].) Evers’ attorney argued that the fines should be reduced to $6,000 according to a statutory formula. Under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), the court responded, it was required to impose a restitution fine, absent a finding under subdivision (c) of "compelling and extraordinary reasons." The court stated it could not "make those findings," but noted other factors it could consider to increase the fine above the $300 statutory minimum, including Evers’ ability to pay. It stated that Evers "will be at least able to earn wages while incarcerated," and noted he would be incarcerated for 25 years to life, so inability to pay was not "a reason not to impose [the restitution] fine or to reduce that fine." The court explained that the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of its commission, the economic gain to Evers, the extent of loss to others, and the number of victims supported the maximum fine.
Evers’ attorney then asked the court to use the formula in section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2) to reduce the restitution fine to $7,500. The court rejected that proposal for the reasons it had already stated. It confirmed final details of the sentence and entered judgment.
In November and December 2022, Evers’ appellate counsel sent two informal letter motions to the trial court, asking the court to (1) strike the 15 percent administrative fee applied to the two direct victim restitution orders; and (2) reduce the restitution fines to the statutory minimum of $300 and stay enforcement until there is a showing of ability to pay. Among other things, counsel argued that the many practical limitations on work in prison and the amount of victim restitution ordered meant that Evers may never have the ability to make any payments against the restitution fines. Counsel cited section 1237.2 as requiring the filing of the informal motions in the trial court prior to appeal. The trial court did not act on the motions.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Evers continues to challenge the fees and fines imposed at sentencing. First, he argues that the 15 percent administrative fee is not statutorily authorized. Second, he argues that the court's imposition of the two $10,000 restitution fines violated his constitutional rights to be free of excessive fines and to due process and equal protection, at least without consideration of his ability to pay them. We address the issues in turn.
1. Restitution Administrative Fee
Evers first argues that the 15 percent administrative fee applied to the victim restitution orders was invalid because the statutory subdivision pursuant to which it was imposed had been repealed at the time of his sentencing. Section 1203.1, subdivision (l) was indeed repealed as of January 1, 2022, more than two months before Evers was sentenced. (Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 22 ; see People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 966, fn. 8, 309 Cal.Rptr.3d 814, 531 P.3d 341.) The Attorney General concedes that we should reverse the 15 percent administrative fee. We agree.
2. Restitution Fines
The Attorney General argues that Evers has forfeited his constitutional challenges to the restitution fines. Evers concedes that his trial counsel did not make constitutional arguments at sentencing, did not argue that Evers lacked the ability to pay the fines, and did not request a hearing concerning his ability to pay. His sentencing hearing occurred more than two years after Dueñas was decided. We therefore presume his trial counsel was aware of the case. On those bare facts, we agree with the Attorney General that Evers forfeited his constitutional challenges to the restitution fines.
Evers argues that the two informal motions his appellate counsel submitted directly to the trial court pursuant to section 1237.2 negate any forfeiture because they gave the trial court an opportunity to correct the alleged error. In relevant part, section 1237.2 provides that "[a]n appeal may not be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction on the ground of an error in the imposition ... of fines ... unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for correction in the trial court ...."
Section 1237.2 creates an alternative pathway to correct certain sentencing errors without resorting to appeal. ( People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 255–256, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 97.) The Legislature created this pathway " ‘to conserve judicial resources and [allow litigants to] efficiently present claims in a single forum.’ " ( Id. at p. 256, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 ; cf. People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 957, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 314 ["We are disturbed that this attempt at a minor correction of a sentence error has required the formal appellate process"].) Because the purpose of the rule is to avoid the unnecessary expenditure of appellate resources, it "only applies in cases where the erroneous imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs are the sole issue on appeal." ( § 1237.2 ; see Clark , at p. 256, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 97.)
Section 1237.2 requires a "motion for correction" only when "the error is not discovered until after sentencing." ( § 1237.2.) That does not appear to describe the situation here. As we have noted, there is no indication that Evers’ trial counsel was unaware of Dueñas and similar cases prior to the sentencing hearing. Yet even when the trial court stated that it was taking Evers’ ability to pay into account by considering the possibility of future wages he could earn while in prison, Evers did not challenge the court's reasoning, request a hearing on his ability to pay, or argue that the amount was unconstitutional. Instead, he argued only that the court should rely on statutory formulas to impose fines of $6,000 or at most $7,500, far more than what he contends on appeal is constitutionally permissible.
Evers suggests in his reply brief that, if defense counsel "was aware of the error in the trial court but opted to waive the error, then trial counsel would clearly have provided ineffective assistance of counsel, which constitutes an avoidance of the State's affirmative defense of forfeiture or waiver." We do not consider an ineffective assistance claim raised for the first time in a reply brief. (People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 615, 317 P.3d 1148.) We likewise do not consider Evers’ claim made for the first time in reply that his plea form, by omitting the notation "TBD" next to the checked box, did not advise him that he would have to pay an amount to the Victim Restitution Fund.
"[A] sentencing court may not impose ... restitution fines without giving the defendant, on request , an opportunity to present evidence and argument why such monetary exactions exceed his ability to pay." ( People v. Cowan (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 32, 48, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 505, review granted June 17, 2020, S261952, italics added.) Once caselaw exists holding that a hearing on ability to pay is constitutionally required when requested, a defendant who does not object or ask for a hearing forfeits the claim of error. ( People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624, 285 Cal.Rptr.3d 548 ; cf.; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 854, 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 456 P.3d 416 [finding no forfeiture where trial court imposed $10,000 restitution fine without mentioning it at the sentencing hearing, depriving defendant of any opportunity to object].)
Some cases have construed section 1237.2 as a vehicle to correct ministerial errors, rather than to resolve substantive challenges to the interpretation or application of sentencing statutes, in which case it would not apply to Evers’ claim in any event. (See People v. Clark, supra , 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 256, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 97 ; People v. Jordan (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1142, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 313.) But regardless, in light of the purposes of the statute discussed above, we find no basis to conclude that it was intended to create a mechanism to avoid forfeiture in this context by having appellate counsel present the trial court with constitutional and factual arguments concerning the defendant's ability to pay months after the sentencing hearing has concluded—a mechanism that arbitrarily would be available only when the imposition of the fines is "the sole issue on appeal." ( § 1237.2.)
To preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must be timely. (See, e.g., Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 862, 206 P.3d 403 ; SCI California Funeral Services, Inc. v. Five Bridges Foundation (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 549, 564, 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 ; Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 584, 66 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 ; In re A.R. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1154 & fn. 5, 175 Cal.Rptr.3d 851.) Section 1237.2 does not change our conclusion that Evers’ constitutional objection was not.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's direct victim restitution orders are reversed insofar as they impose a 15 percent administrative fee on the restitution amounts. Evers’ sentence is otherwise affirmed.
We deny Evers’ request for judicial notice as irrelevant to our resolution of this appeal.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.