People v. Evans

13 Citing cases

  1. In re Jose T.

    127 A.D.3d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)   Cited 7 times

    Upon noticing the officers, the appellant and his companion fled. Under these circumstances, the officers were justified in stopping and detaining the appellant and his companion (see Matter of Jakwon R., 110 A.D.3d 723, 973 N.Y.S.2d 228 ; People v. Madrid, 52 A.D.3d 530, 859 N.Y.S.2d 717 ). Further, under the circumstances, the fact that a police officer briefly displayed a weapon when the appellant and his companion fled, and used handcuffs to detain the appellant for the purpose of a prompt showup identification by the complainant, who was approximately 30 feet away from the appellant when he identified him as one of the perpetrators, did not transform the detention into a full-blown arrest (see People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378, 380, 540 N.Y.S.2d 971, 538 N.E.2d 323 ; People v. Barnes, 4 A.D.3d 433, 771 N.Y.S.2d 359 ; People v. Worthy, 308 A.D.2d 555, 764 N.Y.S.2d 833 ; People v. Moore, 296 A.D.2d 426, 745 N.Y.S.2d 542 ; People v. Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458, 459, 655 N.Y.S.2d 76 ). With respect to the appellant's contention that the showup identification procedure was unduly suggestive, the credibility determinations of a hearing court are entitled to great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v. Rivera, 59 A.D.3d 467, 873 N.Y.S.2d 157 ; People v. Graham, 54 A.D.3d 1056, 865 N.Y.S.2d 259 ).

  2. People v. McCoy

    30 A.D.3d 441 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 11 times

    After the officers observed that the two occupants of the car, the defendant and the codefendant, matched the description of suspects fleeing the shooting, they acted reasonably in temporarily detaining the defendant and the codefendant, in close proximity to the crime, for the purposes of a showup identification procedure ( see People v. Allen, 73 NY2d 378, 380; People v. Hicks, 68 NY2d 234, 241-244; People v. Barnes, 4 AD3d 433; People v. Sharpe, 259 AD2d 639; People v. Flanagan, 224 AD2d 633; People v. Ryan, 224 AD2d 644). After the positive identification, the officers had probable cause to make the arrest ( see People v. Day, 8 AD3d 495, 496; People v. Largo, 282 AD2d 548, 549; People v. Evans, 237 AD2d 458, 459; People v. Campbell, 194 AD2d 618). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the officers' testimony was not "incredible as a matter of law" ( People v. James, 19 AD3d 617, 618; see People v. Gardner, 220 AD2d 613, 614; People v. Boone, 183 AD2d 721), and the hearing court's determination that the officers were credible should not be disturbed on appeal ( see People v. Parker, 306 AD2d 543; People v. Evans, 298 AD2d 401).

  3. People v. Martinez

    17 A.D.3d 606 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 9 times

    expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that it is more probable than not that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime ( see People v. Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423; People v. Brown, 173 AD2d 629). Here, the police had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant based upon a radio transmission and the fact that the defendant was observed in close proximity to the scene of the crime shortly after the crime occurred ( see People v. Martinez, 301 AD2d 615; People v. Turner, 295 AD2d 545), in addition to his furtive movements upon seeing the patrol car ( see People v. Febus, 11 AD3d 554, appeal dismissed 4 NY3d 743). Upon being confronted by a police officer, the defendant admitted that the screwdriver observed at his feet was his ( see People v. Cordero, 140 AD2d 367). He was then identified by the police officer who had seen him at the scene of the crime ( see People v. Parris, 83 NY2d 342, 345-346; People v. Day, 8 AD3d 495, 496; People v. Moore, 296 AD2d 426; People v. Evans, 237 AD2d 458, 459). Further, there is nothing in the record to support the defendant's contention that the testimony of the detective at the suppression hearing was incredible or patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections ( see People v. Evans, 298 AD2d 401).

  4. People v. Barnes

    4 A.D.3d 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 16 times

    ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. The information provided by the robbery complainant gave the police reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant in order to conduct a prompt showup identification ( see People v. Sharpe, 259 A.D.2d 639; People v. Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458). The fact that the police may have used handcuffs to detain the defendant for the purpose of the showup identification did not transform the detention into a full-blown arrest ( see People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378; People v. Evans, supra at 459). In addition, the defendant's contention that the showup identification was unduly suggestive is without merit. Under the circumstances, the showup identification which was conducted in close spatial and temporal proximity to the offense was not unduly suggestive ( see People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 543, cf People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533, 537).

  5. People v. Safford

    297 A.D.2d 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 8 times

    In any event, the defendant partially matched the description of one of the perpetrators furnished by the complainants, and the showup identification was justified by its spatial and temporal proximity to the crime and was not unduly suggestive (see People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 544; People v. Herrell, 278 A.D.2d 339, 340). The manner in which the defendant was stopped and detained did not elevate the encounter to a full-blown arrest (see People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378, 380; People v. Persaud, 244 A.D.2d 577; People v. Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458). The complainants' prompt identification of the defendant during the showup provided probable cause for his arrest (see People v. Vaughan, 293 A.D.2d 693, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 682). The trial court providently exercised its discretion in only giving an adverse inference charge with respect to the People's destruction of certain Rosario material (see People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286). The defendant failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice or that the People acted in bad faith (see People v. Martinez, 71 N.Y.2d 937; People v. Jarvis, 249 A.D.2d 417).

  6. People v. Moore

    296 A.D.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 8 times

    The defendant, who matched the general description of a suspect in an attempted robbery with a weapon, which had occurred within an hour earlier, was seen alone only a few blocks away from the crime scene. Once the defendant fled upon the approach of the officers, the officers had reasonable suspicion to pursue him (see People v. Largo, 282 A.D.2d 548) . The momentary use of handcuffs to detain the defendant pending a showup identification by the complainant, fell short of the level of intrusion that constitutes an arrest (see People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378; People v. Carney, 212 A.D.2d 721). Finally, the hearing court properly concluded that probable cause to arrest the defendant arose once the complainant identified him (see People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398; People v. Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458). FEUERSTEIN, J.P., O'BRIEN, TOWNES and COZIER, JJ., concur.

  7. People v. Small

    286 A.D.2d 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 8 times

    The police found the defendant near the scene of the crime soon after the crime occurred. Shortly after the police detained the defendant, the complainant, who had pursued the fleeing defendant, arrived on the scene ( see, People v. Sharpe, 259 A.D.2d 639; People v. Ellison, 222 A.D.2d 693). The subsequent spontaneous identification of the defendant by the complainant provided probable cause for the arrest and search of the defendant ( see, People v. Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458). The defendant is not entitled to a de novo suppression hearing because of the prosecutor's failure to preserve the radio transmission and the belated disclosure of the "Sprint" report of the radio transmission, as there is no "reasonable possibility that the nondisclosure materially contributed to the result of the * * * proceeding" (CPL 240.75; see, People v. Sorbello, 285 A.D.2d 88 [decided herewith]).

  8. People v. Largo

    282 A.D.2d 548 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 19 times
    Finding that "probable cause to arrest the defendant arose once the complainant identified him"

    The defendant matched the description of a suspect in an attempted burglary which had occurred only minutes earlier several blocks away, and he was proceeding in the same direction as the suspect. Once the defendant fled while the police were checking his identification, the right of inquiry escalated to a reasonable suspicion to pursue (see, People v. Matienzo, 81 N.Y.2d 778; People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444). The police detention of the defendant, during which he was transported to the crime scene for identification by the complainant, fell short of the level of intrusion that constitutes an arrest (see, People v. Allen, 73 N.Y.2d 378; People v. Carney, 212 A.D.2d 721). Finally, the hearing court properly concluded that probable cause to arrest the defendant arose once the complainant identified him (see, People v. Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458). Accordingly, suppression was properly denied. The sentence imposed was not excessive (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).

  9. People v. Williams

    272 A.D.2d 484 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)

    Those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress identification testimony, physical evidence, and his statements to the police as the fruits of an unlawful detention were properly denied. The hearing testimony established that the police had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant to conduct a showup identification at the crime scene (see, People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 109; People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234; People v. Gordon, 193 A.D.2d 694). After both victims identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery, the police had probable cause to arrest him and conduct a search incident thereto (see, People v. Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458; People v. Gonzalez, 138 A.D.2d 622). The defendant's contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.

  10. Rasheed v. New Star Fashions

    262 A.D.2d 623 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    Even assuming the facts are as alleged by the plaintiff, the defendant City of New York showed that, as a matter of law, there was reasonable cause to arrest the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff could not make out his claim for false arrest and/or false imprisonment against the City ( see, People v. Evans, 237 A.D.2d 458; Minott v. City of New York, 203 A.D.2d 265; Richardson v. New York Univ., 202 A.D.2d 295; Veras v. Truth Verification Corp., 87 A.D.2d 381, affd 57 N.Y.2d 947; see generally, Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553). This shifted the burden to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable question of fact as to that issue. Since the plaintiff failed to do so, the court erred in denying the City's motion to dismiss the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it ( see generally, Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557).