Opinion
June 25, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Fertig, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's argument, the testimony adduced at the Huntley hearing clearly established that the defendant was fully apprised of his constitutional rights. The exact language set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v Arizona ( 384 U.S. 436) need not be utilized by the police as long as the substance of what is said adequately informs the defendant of his constitutional rights (see, California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355). We also reject the defendant's contention that the Miranda warnings should have been readministered by the second detective to interview him. "Where a station house interrogation of a suspect is continuous and without significant interruption, Miranda v. Arizona ( 384 U.S. 436) does not require the police to repeat the warnings when the defendant has made statements that are sufficiently inculpatory to support his arrest" (People v. Wright, 134 A.D.2d 548). Here, it is apparent that the interrogation of the defendant was continuous and without significant interruption.
We find that the trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in ruling that the defendant could be questioned about his 1983 conviction for robbery and assault (see, People v Bennette, 56 N.Y.2d 142; People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371), and the mere fact that these crimes involved conduct similar to that for which the defendant was charged at bar did not preclude them from being the subject of cross-examination (People v. Winfield, 145 A.D.2d 449).
The trial court did not err in refusing to charge manslaughter in the second degree as a lesser included offense. The record clearly indicates that there is no reasonable view of the evidence which would have supported a finding that the defendant committed manslaughter in the second degree, but did not commit murder in the second degree (see, CPL 300.50; People v Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61).
The court properly imposed consecutive terms of imprisonment upon the defendant for his convictions of robbery in the second degree and murder in the second degree. The evidence shows that the defendant's subsequent act of intentionally killing the deceased was separate and distinct from his prior act of robbing the deceased. The acts constituting intentional murder occurred subsequent to the acts constituting the robbery, and commission of one was not a material element of the other (see, People v Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839).
We have examined the defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be without merit. Thompson, J.P., Brown, Eiber and Balletta, JJ., concur.